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Abstract
This study analyzes and lays out different aspects of Kant’s account of the concept
of objectivity and objective reference in the broad view, as well as their conditions,
to show the relevance of Kant’s view to contemporary philosophy, and to answer
some of the criticisms expressed toward Kant, which criticisms often seem to be
based on misguided readings of his doctrines. I aim to show that Kant’s philosophy
is not – contrary to what is often claimed – overly subjectivistic with the expense of
losing objectivity. Rather, his theory of objectivity and objective reference is both
coherent and relevant as a philosophical theory today. Furthermore, Kant's account
of objectivity, as well as subjectivity, is essential in understanding the origin and
meaning of the modern concept of objectivity, which concept is crucial to science
in general.
In the beginning chapters I outline the most important philosophers and
traditions which Kant was both using and criticizing. After this I show how Kant’s
transcendental idealism along with its notion of a priori forms of intuition and a
priori concepts of the understanding proved to be requirements for objective 
reference. The key of objective reference lies in the necessary agreement of the 
categories to the objects of experience. However, these formal conditions are not
the only conditions of proper, actual objective reference, as we also need to
materialize the forms and concepts by both senses and language, which offer us
sensations and words for judgments. Thus I argue that a more full list of the
conditions of objective reference in Kant’s case would consist of the purely formal
conditions of experience, that is, the forms of intuition and the categories as the
concepts of an object in general, and most of all the capacity to unite
representations in the act of apperception, and what I have called the material or
empirical conditions of objective reference, that is, our actual senses, as well as a
language by which we can materialize judgments.
This work hopefully contributes first of all to the study of Kant's theoretical
philosophy. In addition, the work is related to such fields as philosophy of science
and conceptual history, because of the historical role of the concept of objectivity.
Furthermore, the study may prove relevant to discussions in philosophy of
language, and finally the discussion concerning the interpretation of Kant's
philosophy among the contemporary speculative realists.
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
    
  
 
  
   
 
      
    
  
  
    
   
         
 
 
 
  
 
Tiivistelmä
Tutkimus analysoi ja esittelee Kantin objektiivisuuden ja objektiivisen referenssin
käsitteiden eri aspekteja ja ehtoja, ja pyrkii osoittamaan Kantin näkemyksen
merkittävyyden nykyfilosofialle. Samalla tutkimus vastaa joihinkin Kantia vastaan
esitettyihin kritiikkeihin, jotka usein perustuvat puutteellisille tai virheellisille
tulkinnoille Kantin opeista. Pyrin näyttämään, ettei Kantin filosofiaa ole syytä pitää 
kaiken objektiivisuuden kadottavan subjektiivisuuden filosofian esikuvana, kuten 
valitettavan usein tunnutaan olettavan. Sen sijaan Kantin teoria objektiivisuudesta
ja objektiivisesta referenssistä on sekä koherentti että merkityksellinen nykyajan
filosofian ja tieteen kannalta. Lisäksi Kantin käsitys objektiivisuudesta ja 
subjektiivisuudesta on olennainen pyrittäessä ymmärtämään nykyaikaista
objektiivisuuden käsitettä, joka on keskeinen tieteelle ylipäänsä.
Ensimmäisissä luvuissa hahmottelen Kantin filosofista kontekstia suhteessa
niihin filosofeihin ja oppeihin joita Kant itse sekä hyödynsi että kritisoi. Tämän
jälkeen osoitan miten Kantin oppi transsendentaalisesta idealismista, mukaan
lukien sen keskeiset käsitteet intuition a priori -muodoista ja ymmärryksen a priori -
käsitteista, onnistuu perustelemaan objektiivisen referenssin mahdollisuuden, jonka
ydin on ymmärryksen peruskäsitteiden (kategorioiden) ja kokemuksen kohteiden
(objektien) välisessä välttämättömässä yhteensopivuudessa. Nämä muodolliset a
priori –ehdot eivät kuitenkaan yksinään riitä todelliseen objektiiviseen referenssiin,
johon tarvitsemme myös empiirisiä elementtejä, kuten aisteja ja kieltä. Näin ollen
väitän, että kattavampi luettelo objektiivisen referenssin edellytyksistä sisältää
muodollisten a priori -elementtien (intuition ja ymmärryksen muodot) lisäksi myös
materiaalisia, empiriisiä ehtoja, kuten aistit ja näiden tuottamat aistimukset, sekä
kielen, jonka avulla arvostelmat on mahdollista materialisoida.
Tutkimuksella on toivottavasti annettavaa useammalle kuin yhdelle filosofian
tutkimuskentälle, mutta lähtökohtaisesti se kuuluu filosofian historian
tutkimukseen ja Kantin teoreettisen filosofian tutkimukseen. Työ sivuaa myös
sellaisia filosofian aloja kuin tieteenfilosofia ja käsitehistoria, ennen kaikkea
objektiivisuuden käsitteen historiallisen merkittävyyden takia. Lisäksi työllä saattaa
olla relevanssia kielifilosofialle sekä lukuisille Kantiin liittyville kiistoille
tämänhetkisten spekulatiivisten realistien piirissä.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Kant and the Problem of Objectivity
Why inquire about Kant and objectivity? Is Kant not the prototype of a
‘philosopher of the Subject’, who turned even metaphysics into a study of the
human faculties? Indeed, while perhaps admitting Kant’s tremendous impact on
philosophy, many thinkers after Kant, especially in the twentieth century, have held
the view that Kant's philosophy was overly subjectivistic and idealistic.1 After all, he
himself thought to have achieved a kind of Copernican turn in philosophy, by
which he meant that our minds do not conform to the objects of the world but
rather objects to the forms of our cognition:
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must 
conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something 
about them a priori through concepts that would extend our
cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let
us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of
metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our
cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility
of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something
about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the
first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good
progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed
that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to 
see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer
revolve and left the stars at rest.2 
What exactly this conforming of objects to our cognition means is a question still
debated, and for a reason, since the matter is complex enough. It may still seem
1 For example, Frederick Beiser’s (2002) book German Idealism – which begins with Kant and
then follows some of the immediate reactions to Kant’s philosophy – is subtitled The
Struggle against Subjectivity, 1781-1801, and Dennis Schulting’s recent (2017) book is titled
Kant’s Radical Subjectivism.
2 B xvi.
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puzzling how differing the interpretations of Kant's critical philosophy have been, 
and on how different arguments his philosophy is supported or rejected.3 The
accusations concerning Kant's subjectivism and idealism began already in the
notorious Göttingen review4, but they have seen an uprise both in the 20th
Century and now in the 21st, for example in the form of such contemporary 
philosophical movements as speculative realism5 and object-oriented ontology6, the
proponents of which have criticized Kant for trying to make philosophy simply a 
study of the subject, thereby being forgetful of the actual world with its variety of
objects and their properties.7 These criticisms and debates are part of the 
interpretive context of the study at hand, but I try to show that they are often
misrepresentations of Kant's actual position, which I attempt to sketch out,
claiming Kantian objectivity to be essentially object-relatedness or object-
referentiality. My task is to clarify this notion, or, ‘strip it to the bone’, to reveal a
sort of Kantian ‘skeleton’ of objectivity and the nature of objects. This, I hope, will
be beneficial for better understanding Kant’s own questions and claims, as well as
the debates and criticisms around him.
In this work I want to analyze and lay out the core along with different sides 
of Kant's conception of objectivity, in such a fashion which is historically correct,
and allows us to keep Kant's distinction of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ as a valid and
useful distinction of concepts. In my reading of Kant, the notion of objectivity does
not carry the problematic implications which nowadays are often attributed to it, 
such as complete impartiality or absolute truth(fulness). Rather, I want to show
that for Kant, 'objective' in the simplest sense means something which is directed to
an object or about an object, whereas 'subjective' is something which is about the
subject. My work illuminates what this reading of objectivity means in different
contexts, and with regard to such notions as (the synthesis of) empiricism and
3 See e.g. Allison 2004; Heidegger 1997; Longuenesse 1998; Meillassoux 2007; Schulting
2011; Strawson 1966.
4 See e.g. Cassirer 1981, 219-221.
5 E.g. Meillassoux 2008
6 E.g. Harman 2010.
7 I discuss these two movements in chapter 7 of this work. Accusations concerning 
subjectivity and other problems in Kant’s philosophy can nevertheless be found in countless
criticisms. In light of this, it seems almost ironic that in fact Kant played a major role in the
appearance of the modern conceptualization of objectivity and subjectivity in the first place.
12
 
 
  
  
    
  
          
  
     
  
   
   
 
    
    
     
   
        
  
    
      
 
  
 
   
   
  
    
       
    
 
      
  
   
  
     
    
 
rationalism, the difference between objectivity and objective validity8, the
difference between objective and subjective sensations and senses, the possibility of
ontology (as a general doctrine of objects and their properties) and the possibility of 
making objective judgments9. My work attempts to lay out what Kant took to be
the ingredients or conditions of objectivity as proper object-referentiality, and
illuminate the implications of Kant’s account from various aspects.
I emphasize the fact that many of the central concepts which Kant uses,
nowadays carry meanings, associations or implications very different from Kant’s
use. Examples of this are the notions of ‘experience’ and of ‘objectivity’. As I will try
to show, experience (Erfahrung), for Kant, did not mean what it nowadays often
means, that is, feelings, sensations, or other ‘subjective representations’, as I think
Kant might have put it.10 Kant’s ‘experience’ is not subjective, but strictly objective,
that is, universally valid cognition of objects. Likewise, the word 'objectivity'
nowadays has some rather vague but still identifiable meanings which somewhat
differ from both Kant's meaning, and especially the scholastic meanings used before
Kant. In fact, the word objectivity (Objektivität), in the substantiated form, was
never used by Kant himself, or others, during Kant’s active years in philosophy.11 
Of course, Kant did speak e.g. of the 'objective validity' of concepts and
distinguished between 'objective' and 'subjective' judgments.12 It is indeed part of
the aim of this study to show how Kant used the concepts of objective and 
subjective, to appreciate his role in the modern conception of objectivity, and the 
fact that the meaning of 'objectivity' became a question in the first place, as before 
8 I elaborate on this in chapter 4.
9 See chapters 4 and 5.
10 I discuss Kant’s notion of experience in Chapter 2.
11 According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the word ‘objectivity’ was used for the first
time in 1803. I am unsure whether this only applies to this exact word in English language,
but it is nevertheless sure that Kant never used the word Objektivität anywhere in his texts
or lectures.
12 As a note, for example J. Michael Young, in his 1979 paper 'Kant's Notion of Objectivity',
seems to identify 'objectivity' with 'objective validity'. This obviously cannot be definitive,
because a reference to objective validity cannot explicate the meaning of objectivity itself. It
is curious, however, that none of the commentators who write of Kant's account of
objectivity, such as Dieter Henrich (1994), J. Michael Young (1979) and A.B Dickerson (2007),
fail to mention that Kant indeed never used the word objectivity (Objektivität) in the 
substantive form.
13
 
 
  
     
 
 
  
 
  
        
  
  
   
   
            
     
  
         
  
   
      
 
   
      
  
     
    
     
 
  
   
 
    
  
  
  
   
Kant the words objective and subjective had a remarkably different meaning than
after Kant. I take it that this is not a coincidence.
1.2 Kant and the Concept of Objectivity
The concept of objectivity is undoubtedly one of the most central concepts in both 
modern philosophy and science in general.13 Nevertheless, the concept seems at
times to be used vaguely, without much reflection on its meaning or definition. The 
Cambridge Dictionary defines objectivity as “the fact of being based on facts and 
not influenced by personal beliefs or feelings”,14 and the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary as “the quality or character of being objective : lack of favoritism toward
one side or another : freedom from bias”.15 I find that these definitions – both of
which emphasize impartiality or unbiasedness – lack something with regard to both
the contemporary use of the concept and especially Kant’s use of the word
‘objective’. So, even though Kant never used the word Objektivität, I would gladly
credit him for problematizing the notion in his critical philosophy; I maintain that 
Kant’s understanding and use of the concept ‘objective’ (as well as that of
‘subjective’) has been a notable factor for the modern concept of objectivity, and for
this reason studying Kant’s account of objectivity contributes to our understanding
of the phenomenon and concept of objectivity in general.
The renowned historians of science Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have
traced the history of the concept of objectivity, and show that there indeed was a
remarkable shift in the use of the word, roughly around the beginning of the 19th 
Century. In this shift the meanings of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ somewhat took
each other’s places. Whereas the old, scholastic terminology, which has its origin in
Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, understood ‘objective’ to refer to things “as
they are presented to consciousness”, and ‘subjective’ to refer to the “things in
themselves”, the new meanings almost completely seemed to reverse this.16 Key
13 On the history and significance of objectivity, and their relation to science in general, see
Daston & Galison 2007.
14 https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/objectivity
15 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/objectivity
16 Daston and Galison 2007, 29.
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factors in the emergence of the new sense of the concepts were Kant’s philosophy
and its reception. Daston and Galison write:
The words objective and subjective fell into disuse during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and were invoked only
occasionally, as technical terms, by metaphysicians and logicians. It
was Immanuel Kant who dusted off the musty scholastic
terminology of “objective” and “subjective” and breathed new life
and new meanings into it. But the Kantian meanings were the 
grandparents, not the twins, of our familiar senses of those words.
Kant’s “objective validity” (objektive Gültigkeit) referred not to
external objects (Gegenstände) but to the “forms of sensibility”
(time, space, causality) that are the preconditions of experience.
And his habit of using “subjective” as a rough synonym for “merely
empirical sensations” shares with later usage only the sneer with 
which the word is intoned. For Kant, the line between the
objective and the subjective generally runs between universal and 
particular, not between world and mind.
Yet it was the reception of Kantian philosophy, often refracted 
through other traditions, that revamped terminology of the
objective and subjective in the early nineteenth century.17 
I am willing to support Daston & Galison’s claim about Kant breathing new life
and meanings into the distinction of objective and subjective, and thereby
contributing on a major level to how we have understood and used the notion
thereafter.18 However, their description of Kant’s distinction leaves room for some
17 Daston & Galison 2007, 30.
18 Daston & Galison (2007, 31) further write: “Starting in the 1820s and 1830s, dictionary
entries (first in German, then in French, and later in English) began to define the words
“objectivity” and “subjectivity” in something like the (to us) familiar sense, often with a nod
in the direction of Kantian philosophy. In 1820, for example, a German dictionary defined
objektiv as a “relation to an external object” and subjektiv as “personal, inner, inhering in
us, in opposition to objective”; as late as 1863, a French dictionary still called this the “new
sense” (diametrically opposed to the old, scholastic sense) of word objectif and credited 
“the philosophy of Kant” with the novelty. […] Sometime circa 1850 the modern sense of
“objectivity” had arrived in the major European languages, still paired with its ancestral
opposite “subjectivity.” Both had turned 180 degrees in meaning.”
15
 
 
     
        
         
       
      
 
   
     
   
  
           
   
 
 
 
 
   
 
         
    
   
     
    
   
   
  
   
 
     
      
   
      
 
   
doubts. According to my thesis, Kant’s primary – and perhaps sole – meaning of 
‘objective’ is about object-relatedness, or object-referentiality. This means that the
meanings nowadays often attributed to objectivity, such as ‘impartiality’,
‘intersubjectivity’, ‘agreement’, or ‘correctness’ are not the very primary meanings of
the concept – at least in the Kantian sense – but rather they result from the primary 
possibility of objectivity, that is, the primary possibility of the object-relatedness of 
representations. Thus, a claim to objectivity is not first and foremost a claim to
correctness, truth, or validity, but a claim to be about objects.19 I support the view
that this property of object-relatedness, or something very much like it, can in 
different contexts also be called ‘intentionality’ or ‘aboutness’.20 I take it that Kant’s 
use of the concept ‘objective’ within his theoretical philosophy has played a major
role for the modern conception of objectivity, and by studying Kant’s account, we
can gain knowledge and better analyze the general contemporary concept of
objectivity.
1.3 General theme, Aims and Questions
The aim of this study is to analyze and lay out Kant’s account of the concept of
objectivity and objective reference in the broad view, as well as their conditions, to
show the relevance of Kant’s view to contemporary philosophy, and to answer some
of the criticisms expressed toward Kant, which criticisms often seem to be based on
misguided readings of his doctrines. I aim to show that Kant’s philosophy is not –
contrary to what is often claimed – overly subjectivistic with the expense of losing
objectivity. Rather, his theory of objectivity and objective reference is both 
coherent and relevant as a philosophical theory today. Furthermore, Kant's account
of objectivity, as well as subjectivity, is essential in understanding the origin and
19 For this reason I argue, mostly in Chapter 4, for a clearer distinction of ‘objectivity’ and
‘objective validity’, which, as I claim, are not, generally taken, interchangeable notions. An 
exception of a kind is the case of the categories, in which case what is called the objectivity
of the categories very nearly equals what can be called the objective validity of the
categories.
20 See e.g. Taylor 2016, 15.
16
 
 
            
  
         
      
    
    
   
 
        
   
    
    
   
   
      
      
   
    
    
  
  
   
   
  
    
 
    
    
 
 
  
 
     
      
  
    
   
   
meaning of the modern concept of objectivity, which concept is crucial to science 
in general.21 
I read Kant’s transcendental idealism, as presented especially in the first
Critique and the Prolegomena, to be essentially an answer to the problem of objective
reference, as presented for the first time in the famous letter to Marcus Herz in
1772.22 This problem concerns the relation of our representations to (their)
objects. I attempt to show that the problem of objective reference in the Herz letter
was for Kant very closely connected to what he called the Humean problem. Both of 
these concern – not only, but essentially – the application and validity of a
priori/pure/intellectual concepts to objects, which, at least for Kant, seems to be a
requisite for empirical objective reference.23 Thus I read the problems as essentially
the same, and take the answer to both problems to be found in the Critique of Pure 
Reason’s doctrine of transcendental, or formal, idealism. Within this doctrine Kant
lays out what he takes to be the conditions of experience, as well as of objectivity.
For both, the notions of universality and necessity are crucial.24 
My first claim concerning objectivity is that for Kant objectivity means simply
a representation’s or a judgment’s property of relating or referring to an object.
Thus, an objective judgment is one that claims or says something about an object, 
e.g. “there is water in the lake”, whereas a subjective judgment claims something
only of the subject, e.g. “the water feels cold”. The difference here is that the first
judgment claims something about the objects in a way which makes it possible to
communicate the content of the judgment as such to others, and to debate whether
or not the claim is objectively true. The subjective judgment, on the other hand,
only makes a claim or a statement about sensations that the subject has. This 
characterization of objectivity as object-relatedness does not in my view only
21 Reiss & Sprenger write: "Many central debates in the philosophy of science have, in one
way or another, to do with objectivity: confirmation and the problem of induction; theory
choice and scientific change; realism; scientific explanation; experimentation; measurement
and quantification; evidence and the foundations of statistics; evidence-based science; 
feminism and values in science. Understanding the role of objectivity in science is therefore
integral to a full appreciation of these debates."
22 Br. 10:130-132. In this letter the problem is presented as a question concerning the
nature of the relation of representations to their objects, and the ground of that relation.
23 See Br. 10:130-131.
24 In addition, some Aristotelian elements, which were not present in Kant’s pre-critical
philosophy, find their use in Kant’s critical/formal/transcendental idealism. The most
relevant of these elements to this study is the distinction of matter and form.
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pertain to judgments but to all representations, which is to say, to the concept of 
objectivity in general.25 
Now, if objectivity indeed does mean the property of a representation of 
relating or referring to an object, then the question becomes: how does this relating
or referring happen, and what are its necessary conditions? In his 1772 letter to
Herz, Kant asks this very question: “What is the ground of the relation of that in us
which we call ‘representation’ to the object?”26 In this study I attempt to lay out the
very basic elements of Kant’s answer to this question. Obviously I do not aim to
give an entirely novel reading of the Critique of Pure Reason, let alone of Kant’s
theoretical philosophy in general. An immense amount of work has already been
done and continues to be done on these subjects. I have not structured my work as
to be a defence or an attack of a given established view in the many on-going
debates in Kant scholarship. Rather, the aim is to lay out a sort of skeleton of Kant’s
notion of objectivity, to which skeleton these questions and debates can then be
related.27 
As I already stated, it is increasingly my understanding that the key issue of
the Critique of Pure Reason is to answer the very question posed in the letter to
Herz in 1772. This question concerned the relation of our representations to their
25 For example, what Kant calls ‘an objective sensation’ is indeed related to the object as
part of cognition of it, whereas ‘a subjective sensation’ is only an effect or modification of
the subject, contributing nothing to cognition of objects, and thus not being about an
object. See KrU, 5:206.
26 Br. 10:130-132.
27 Studies focusing especially on the Kantian notion of objectivity are few in number. Still, I
would like to mention Henrich (1976), Young (1979), Dickerson (2007) and Brinkmann
(2011). In addition, I obviously do not seek to dismiss the many important and relevant on-
going debates which somewhat relate to the topics of this study, such as the debate
between conceptualism and nonconceptualism (See e.g. Schulting 2016.), or the more
general discussion of one-world vs. two-world theories. I attempt to address these debates
in ways that are relevant to the objective of the study, to clarify concepts and give credit
where it is due, but this study is not positioned within these debates. As for interpreting
how Kant framed the relation of objects as appearances and objects as things-in-
themselves, we nowadays can, with more or less justification, make a distinction of two
main camps: the one-world theory, often coinciding with what can be called an
epistemological two-aspect-view, and the two-world theory, often coinciding with what can
be called a metaphysical view. Supporters of an epistemological view are e.g. Henry Allison
and Gerold Prauss, while supporters of a metaphysical view are e.g. Paul Guyer (1987) and
Karl Ameriks, with many interpreters such as Lucy Allais (2007), Beatrice Longuenesse (1998)
and Michael Oberst (2015) falling somewhere in between. For more on the two views, see
e.g. Oberst 2015, Schulting 2011, 1-25, or Quarfood 2004, 16-65.
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objects, and to be more specific, the ground of this relation. Thus, when I say that
the Critique is an answer to this question, I mean in it as severely as possible. That
is, I do not intend to say that the Critique happens to give an answer to this
question as well as many others, even though it obviously does give answers to more
questions. Rather, I mean that the key aim of the work is to present a solution to
this exact problem, the nature of which is not as simply understood as one might 
think.
Kant himself writes in the Prolegomena that the core question of the Critique
is: “How are synthetic propositions a priori possible?”28 I support the view that this is
the next step of the question posed in the Herz letter concerning the ground of the
relation between representations and objects. Kant has found that the ground of 
this relation lies in a certain transcendental (non-empirical, and non-changing)
activity, which makes it possible for intellectual concepts29, even though not
possibly derived empirically from objects, to still pertain to empirical objects. It is
Kant’s view that only if we have this a priori way of formally cognizing something
in the objects (and thereby have the concepts of objects in general), can we have
objective cognition or knowledge at all, because otherwise all perceptions and so-
called experience would be subjective, contingent, and thereby without universality 
and necessity.30 This would result in something like mere estimations and guesses, 
or to be more precise, in speculation which cannot be verified because everything
involved is subjective and contingent. This seems to be the fear brought about by 
Hume. Metaphysics, as an intellectual or a priori science of reality, would then have
to be admitted empty speculation, and mathematics, as well as the principles of
natural sciences, could lose any firm ground they were supposedly built on. The
above said, I presuppose that the Critique and Kant’s transcendental idealism are
essentially, even though not only, an explication of the mechanisms of objective
reference.
As to the motivations and structure of Kant’s question and answer, I take it 
that he found both the empiricist and rationalist philosophers before him to have
wrongly set the question, thus resulting in differing but similarly unsatisfactory
answers. These problematic accounts Kant deals with e.g. in the section of the first
28 Prol. 4:276.
29 Or ”intellectual representations”; See Br. 10:130-131.
30 On the question of why we need a priori elements for objectivity and objective validity,
Kant writes specifically in e.g. B167-168. I try to lay out Kant’s view throughout this study.
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Critique titled ‘On the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection’.31 To put it
bluntly, Kant saw that for objective representation, we need both passivity and
activity on behalf of the subject, or cognizer. One of the perspectives from which I
approach Kantian objectivity is precisely Kant’s doctrine of our passive and active
faculties, as a synthesizing approach to empiricism and rationalism.32 In addition,
one of my themes is to tie the analysis of Kant’s notions of objectivity and
experience rather tightly together. I emphasize that for Kant experience is
essentially objective, which insight is beneficial for analyzing both the concepts of
objectivity and of experience.
The interrelated key questions and aims of the study are:
(1) What is Kantian objectivity? That is, what did Kant mean by his notions
and distinction of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’? According to my thesis, we may
describe Kantian objectivity as object-relatedness, object-referentiality, or object-
aboutness. Thus, to be objective is to be about an object, whereas to be subjective is
to be about the subject. Taken this simply, objectivity does not yet imply being
(universally) correct or (necessarily) true, but rather only that a representation such
as a judgment, is actually about or directed toward an object. For this reason I
emphasize, contrary to some commentators, that the ‘objectivity’ and ‘objective
validity’ of representations are not identical notions.33 Thus the possibility of
objectivity of representations is a basic precondition for the truth (objective
validity) of objective judgments. This description, however, is hardly sufficient to
explain the full nature of objectivity. Still, it should be kept in mind that this,
according to my reading, is the essence of the distinction, which is a significant
matter both to inquiring historically into the genealogy of the concept of 
objectivity, and to the understanding of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. So, if 
objectivity simply stated means object-relatedness, or object-referentiality, the next
question is:
(2) What are the conditions that make objective reference possible? What
does it consist in? Answering this question requires discerning the conditions of
31 A260-289/B316-346.
32 A way to describe the starting situation is that the empiricist phenomenalism found in e.g.
Hume’s philosophy did not properly account for the activity that is a necessary condition of
cognition, whereas the rationalism of Leibniz did not properly account for the nature of the
passivity required for objectivity.
33 I argue for this in Chapter 4.
20
 
 
  
  
   
    
     
  
   
    
   
 
  
        
     
 
     
     
     
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
           
 
 
  
    
      
            
 
       
        
    
  
our capacity of making judgments that can even potentially have truth value. These
conditions can, in my view, be divided into transcendental and empirical
conditions. To meet the aforementioned demand, the judgments must obviously
relate to something other than mere subjective representations or their subjective
combination, as supposedly in the case of Hume. I try to illuminate how it is so that
some representations do, according to Kant, in fact relate to objects, and thus have 
objective validity, while others do not. It should be shown that there are certain
universal and necessary conditions in the structure of that relation of subject and
object, within which structure experience itself and thereafter objective judgments
are possible.
(3) What does the explication of the possibility of objective reference and
Kant’s transcendental ontology imply with regard to our knowledge concerning
empirical objects – what kind of constraints are imposed on possible objects? That
is, what kind of entities can qualify as proper objects, and why are some of their
properties, as well as some of our senses, more objective than others? Finally: what
does Kant claim that we can know a priori about these objects and the nature of
their properties? I approach the above described problems from various
perspectives which serve to illuminate different sides and implications of Kant’s
theory of objectivity.
1.4 The Structure and Content
The structure of the work is built as follows. I begin, in Chapter 2, by analyzing the
notions of objectivity and experience – and their relation – in the context of Kant’s
relation to Hume, and especially what was already by Kant called ‘Hume’s
problem’, the expansion and solving of which Kant stated to be essential to his
Critique of Pure Reason.34 In this process I describe basic assumptions and
conceptualizations in Locke’s and especially Hume’s empiricism, as well as their
accounts of experience, and relate those to Kant, to illuminate what the thinkers and
accounts agree upon, and where they most crucially differ. I show that when
34 “I fear that the elaboration of the Humean problem in its greatest possible amplification
(namely, the Critique of Pure Reason) may well fare just as the problem itself fared when it
was first posed. It will be judged incorrectly, because it is not understood” (Kant, Prol. 
4:261.).
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compared to e.g. Locke, Hume’s account of experience is more complex, and can be 
seen to make way for Kant’s account.35 Nevertheless, even though Hume impacted
Kant heavily, from a Kantian perspective Humean phenomenalism cannot account
for proper objectivity. Kant does get from Hume the insight that many of our most
important notions or concepts, such as necessity, causality and substance, are never
directly encountered or perceived in objects or events and thereby these ideas do
not seem to originate as something simply passed onto us from objects in
experience.36 The Humean answer, however, namely that these notions/ideas
originate in customary connection, or habit, is wholly insufficient for Kant. He
finds that we need and use these concepts universally for objective reference, and
yet in Hume’s phenomenalism their origin would only be a contingent product of 
experience, and their validity would only be subjective validity. Part of the problem
is that while some subjects happen to create these connections, others may not. 
Even if everyone happened to create and use a concept like this, or even if some of
us could derive these notions from objects and events, i.e. from experience, they
would still only have subjective validity. But Kant is not looking for psychological
necessity (i.e. “to think in this or that way”), but rather a necessity which is
objectively valid, that is, something which indeed is in the objects and their
relations. Therefore Kant claims that there must be a universally shared a priori
structure to experience, and precisely this is the origin of those crucial concepts 
which Kant, in his famous letter to Herz, calls ‘intellectual representations’.37 
35 I approach the problem called the Humean problem via the concept of experience, which
was a central but rather loosely defined notion for the empiricists, here mainly John Locke
and David Hume. I try to show a sort of lineage from Locke’s position, via Hume, to that of
Kant’s.
36 As is well known, Hume heavily criticized such metaphysical notions as necessity,
substance and causality, to which criticism Kant responded, yet famously crediting Hume for
waking him up from his “dogmatic slumber” (See Prol. 4:260).
37 See Br. 10:130-131. I agree with commentators such as Stang () and Laiho (), who
emphasize the fact that Kant’s ‘experience’ is always objective, that is, universally valid
cognition of objects. Nevertheless, I disagree with Stang on how we should see the relation 
of Kant and the empiricists. However evident it may seem, I find that we should emphasize
the fact that Kant indeed follows the empiricists in saying that all objective cognition starts
with experience. But it is Kant’s emphasis that experience itself has a priori conditions which
must be placed under scrutiny. I defend the view that Kant’s theory manages to explicate
the objectivity of experience, as well as the objective validity of such crucial concepts as
causality and necessity.
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In chapter 3 I discuss rationalist ontology and objectivity in relation to Kant.
I relate Kant’s view to his own closest philosophical traditions, that is, the Leibniz-
Wolffian rationalism, and the Aristotelian scholasticism found in Königsberg at 
Kant’s time. 38 This relating is essential in explicating what happens to ontology, as
a doctrine concerning the most general predicates of objects39, or the concepts of an
object in general40, when it is ‘narrowed down’ to transcendental philosophy (of 
subject and object). Here I discuss in what sense only can we preserve the name and
task of ontology after Kant’s critical, “Copernican” turn in metaphysics. As part of 
this, I present a distinction of formal and material aspects of objectivity. If in 
Chapter 2 I wanted to present why and how Kant thought that we need to have
certain a priori structures to achieve objective experience, in Chapter 3 I want to
illuminate the way in which Kant thought that a purely rational ontology is not
fully objective in the sense that it does not alone provide cognition of objects.41 
Kantian transcendental ontology, however, can be said to be formally objective, as
presenting the formal conditions of cognizing any objects whatsoever.
In chapter 4 I discuss Kant’s notions of object and objectivity, and his doctrine
of faculties as part of a theory of objective reference, and attempt to relate these to
his criticism and synthesis of empiricism and rationalism, dealt with in the previous
chapters. I attempt to explicate why Kant thinks we need to be in possession of a
priori concepts, namely the categories, and must use them for judgments, to have a
relation to an object, that is, to have objective experience.42 On Kant’s account it is
necessary that we have a priori concepts of objects in general43, which concepts
cannot be derived from experience, but which, on the contrary, make experience 
38 See Sgarbi 2010 & Sgarbi 2016. As a remark, it is only in the critical stage of his philosophy
that Kant adopts so many Aristotelian elements into his philosophy. Perhaps the most
crucial is the distinction of matter and form, which is not to be found in Kant’s pre-critical
philosophy, but which is essential to critical/transcendental idealism. It is precisely the form
(of intuition and of understanding, and thereby of their objects, respectively) that is a priori,
necessary and universal. Matter is, however, also necessary, but only in the sense that there
must be some matter for anything to exist as object.
39 See Koistinen 2012, 125.
40 See e.g. A11-12.
41 In my reading of Kant’s ontology, I am more in line with Koistinen (2012) than e.g. Ameriks
(2003), who claims that Kant’s metaphysics essentially remains rationalist. I find this too
strong a claim, even though it is clear that Kant’s ontology with its a priori elements owes a
great deal to the rationalists.
42 See B167-168.
43 See A11-12; A111.
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possible in the first place.44 I read Kant’s account of experience as part of his answer
to Hume’s problem, as Kant in a way ‘reduces’ the whole notion of experience
exclusively to such representational, unified activity which is objective, and can thus
be used to produce cognition. Kant thereby does not turn away from experience as
the beginning of cognition, but shows both that we have representations which are
not objective and that there are, then, conditions, to what can properly be called
experience. Furthermore, learning these conditions is not an empirical enquiry.
For Kant, the question is not only how objects can create representations in
us, but how we consciously can relate to objects and thereby make valid objective
judgments in such a lawful, categorical fashion which is necessarily the same to
everyone. To answer this Kant attempts to show that all cognition requires both
passivity and activity in co-operation. With regard to the first, there obviously first
must be something/objects, and we must then be capable of being affected by these
objects. Our capacity to do (or be) this is what Kant calls the receptivity of
impressions, and it is the task of our faculty called sensibility. This alone does not,
however, amount to cognition, nor to objectivity. For these, an activity which Kant
calls the spontaneity of concepts, is needed, and this is the task of the
understanding, and more precisely, the active faculty Kant calls transcendental 
apperception.45 My claim in relation to Kant’s doctrine of judgment is that the
possibility of objective reference basically means the possibility of making such 
universal and communicable judgments of sensibly given empirical objects which 
can and must belong together in relation to the objective unity of apperception. In
other words, the original unity of apperception, by the categories relates itself to the
object through the representations Kant calls appearances. This is what I take to be 
the essence of Kantian objectivity. Related to this, I attempt a clarification and a
44 A112: ”All attempts to derive these pure concepts of the understanding from experience
and to ascribe to them a merely empirical origin are […] vain and futile.”
45 See A50-51/B74-75. By (transcendental) apperception Kant is usually understood to mean
something like self-awareness or self-consciousness. I find this description a bit misleading
with regard to contemporary notions, for reasons I explicate in Chapter 4. E.g. Dickerson
(2007, 81) argues that rather than meaning something like self-awareness or self-reference,
for Kant, apperception is “the reflexive act whereby the mind grasps its own representations
as representing, and is thus an essential part of all thought and cognition.”
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clearer distinction of the notions of objectivity and objective validity with regard to
certain commentators.46 
In chapter 5 I address Kant’s notion of objectivity in relation to our senses
and sensations. I discuss Kant’s claim that some of our senses and sensations are
more objective than others, and claim that the issue becomes clearer when one
keeps in mind the bare meaning of objectivity as object-relatedness. I present a
picture of Kant’s account of empirical objectivity in which the ‘primary qualities’ of 
objects make up what can be called the empirical thing in itself 47, which is the object
of those representations which Kant calls empirically objective. These are 
contrasted to such subjective representations as color and smell, which can be called
‘secondary qualities’ of objects as appearances.48 
In the sixth chapter I discuss Kant’s notion of judgment in relation to
language and communication, and ask whether Kant would have thought that
language or communication are prerequisites for making judgments or not. I claim
that in Kant’s view the most basic transcendental conditions of thinking are
independent from language and its use, but to materialize cognitions as judgments
we must be in possession of actual, social language, and be able to communicate
these objective judgments to others to test their truth. Thus I suggest that language
should be considered as a sort of empirical condition to actual objective reference. I 
briefly relate Kant’s view more over to that of Hume’s and other empiricists, 
emphasizing that in essence, language is not wholly empirical and contingent, but
46 I agree with both Schulting (2017) and Hanna (2018) on many matters, but I must present
a disagreement with them on their general reading of Kant’s notions of objectivity and
objective validity. See Chapter 4.
47 See A29-30/B45: “[…] things like colors, taste, etc., are correctly considered not as
qualities of things but as mere alterations of our subject, which can even be different in 
different people. For in this case that which is originally itself only appearance, e.g., a rose,
counts in an empirical sense as a thing in itself, which yet can appear different to every eye
in regard to color.” (Italics added.)
48 In the Critique of Judgment Kant speaks of ‘objective sensations’, which are often seen a
problematic notion within Kant’s context, taken that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant
states that sensations are always subjective, whereas only cognitions are objective. It seems
apparent that a refined theory, which takes into account Kant’s both uses of the term
objectivity, is needed. Here I present such a view, relating it to Kant’s view that some of our
senses themselves are more objective, and some more subjective, than others. I here use
the famous distinction of primary and secondary qualities, also found in Kant, to analyze and
illuminate the matter.
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rather necessarily categorical, by which property we are able to use it to materialize
universal objective judgments.
In the seventh chapter I bring Kant into conversation with such
contemporary critics of his as Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman, who
represent the field of speculative realism, or object-oriented ontology49, and who claim
precisely that Kant started the subjectivization of philosophy which has led to a
dominance of views according to which we cannot even theoretically know the real
objects of the world. I show that these accusations are often misguided and to some
extent plainly false. From a Kantian point of view, speculative realism falls into the
exact problems which Kant’s critical philosophy was trying to solve, and thus
speculative realism cannot secure such things as the objectivity of causality,
mathematics, or objective reference in general.
This work hopefully contributes first of all to the study of Kant's theoretical
philosophy.50 In addition, the work is related to such fields as philosophy of science
and conceptual history, because of the historical role of the concept of objectivity.
Furthermore, the study may prove relevant to discussions in philosophy of
language, and finally the discussion concerning the interpretation of Kant's
philosophy among the contemporary speculative realists.
49 I presume that already the name of this movement should be read as a criticism of Kant’s
philosophy, as stating that if Kant supplied an ontology at all, it is only concerned of the
thinking or experiencing subjects, and not at all of objects. I try to show that a criticism
stated like this will not move Kant’s position anywhere, but only shows that either Kant’s
thought has not been understood properly, or that this thought is not taken seriously.
50 As such, the work at hand can perhaps be taken to belong firstly to a subfield of
philosophy called history of philosophy, and perhaps secondly to be at some level relevant
to metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind.
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2 The Humean Problem and Experience
2.1 The Humean Problem
What is the Humean problem, and how is it related to Kant? Let us begin with
what Kant himself wrote about the relation of Hume’s philosophy to that of his
own:
I freely admit that the remembrance of David Hume was the very
thing that many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber
and gave a completely different direction to my researches in the
field of speculative philosophy. I was very far from listening to him
with respect to his conclusions, which arose solely because he did 
not completely set out his problem, but only touched on a part of
it, which, without the whole being taken into account, can provide
no enlightenment.51 
But I fear that the elaboration of the Humean problem in its
greatest possible amplification (namely, the Critique of Pure
Reason) may well fare just as the problem itself fared when it was 
first posed. It will be judged incorrectly, because it is not
understood; it will not be understood, because people will be
inclined just to skim through the book, but not to think through it;
and they will not want to expend this effort on it, because the work 
is dry, because it is obscure, because it opposes all familiar concepts
and is long-winded as well.52 
The above passages from the Prolegomena do not leave it unclear that Hume’s
philosophy has a very special place with regard to Kant’s philosophy. According to
Kant, it was Hume’s setting of the problem of metaphysics, especially with regard
to causality, that made the impact, but failed to produce the results. As is shown in
51 Prol., 4:260.
52 Prol., 4:261.
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the latter passage, Kant even identified the Critique of Pure Reason with the task of
elaborating and answering the problem hinted at by Hume.
Ernst Cassirer writes of Kant’s early relation to Hume that “He [Kant] says in
his letter to Herder dating from 1768 that he now feels closer to Hume in his entire
intellectual orientation; Hume occupies the highest place among the teachers and
masters of the true philosophical ‘state of mind.’“53 Accordingly, it is often enough
that one sees mentions of Kant’s indebtedness to Hume, as Kant himself credited
Hume of waking him from his dogmatic slumber. Nevertheless, it seems almost as
often that one finds this relation of Hume and Kant not quite properly
acknowledged, and at times even to some extent dismissed as a real driving force in
Kant’s critical philosophy.54 I have no intention of claiming that Kant’s philosophy
is essentially Humean, rather at some level on the contrary, but I do claim that one,
if not the, great problem(s) of the first Critique was to tackle the problem
discovered by Hume, although for the great "skeptic", by which name Kant referred
to Hume, mainly in relation to causality.55 And it is indeed the problem of 
causality, discovered by Hume, which Kant wants to answer, but also generalize it
in such a way that the answer has far wider implications.56 
The problem itself is revealed by Hume’s extreme empiricism, according to
which we have no innate ideas, and no a priori concepts, but all our ideas, thinking
and knowledge is based on what Hume calls impressions and their reflection, and
thus have an empirical origin in experience.57 Below I offer a more careful
consideration, but bluntly put the Humean problem is that there seems to be no
legitimate way to acquire the concept of causality, as we cannot sense causality itself, 
no more than we can sense the necessity inherent in a connection between
something as a cause and something else as an effect. Nevertheless, we think of
53 Cassirer 1981, 90.
54 Of course there are exceptions, such as Waxman (2005), De Pierris & Friedman (2013),
and Longuenesse (1998). Still, often Hume is dealt with as mainly an opponent, whose
problematic views Kant wants to fix, especially in the Second Analogy (see e.g. Allison 2004,
261).
55 Wayne Waxman (2005) does present a well-argued interpretation in which the similarities
between Hume and Kant seem greater than the differences.
56 For a thorough investigation of Kant and Hume on causality, see Watkins 2005.
57 Hume’s empiricism led him to claim, not only that such ideas (or their referents) as
‘causality’, ‘substance’ or ‘the self’ can never be perceived, but even that there simply are
no such things at all. According to Hume mathematics is a kind of a priori knowledge as
necessary relations of ideas, but the ideas themselves still have an empirical origin.
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things and events as causally related, and the relation of cause and effect as
something necessary. Beatrice Longuenesse writes that
Kant calls the problem posed by the concept of cause "Hume's
problem," but he claims credit for its generalization: there are many
other concepts besides that of cause which cannot have been
acquired by mere empirical generalization, which we nevertheless
use in our cognition of empirical objects, and which moreover
constitute the framework of a metaphysics that purports to
proceed by means of pure reasoning, independently of any 
experience.58 
With all this said it must be noted that obviously Kant cannot be taken to be a
follower of either the Humean empiricist account, or its rationalist counterpart, the
Leibniz-Wolffian school, but in the end they both served to produce the
background setting, starting from which Kant could begin to build his critical 
version of metaphysics. Kant saw that there is something deeply unsatisfying and
wrong in both Hume’s account of experience and thus his theory of knowledge, as
well as with the rationalist account of objects and our knowledge of them. Both
these accounts are, according to Kant, unable to give a satisfying explanation of how
and why we can represent the world objectively, that is, make objective judgments
that first of all refer to real objects outside us, and secondly are universally valid,
thus, even potentially have truth value. I find it a fruitful approach and a necessary
step in dealing with the matter at hand to both look at the mentioned accounts
from Kant’s perspective and to approach Kant’s theory from the mentioned
accounts. I attempt to carry out this task in both this and the following chapter.
The basic problem of the empiricists, here mainly Hume, with regard to
experience and objective knowledge59, seems from Kant’s perspective to be that if
all that experience is, was some sort of subjective being-affected-by-objects and thus
reactively forming ideas and relating them to each other, then it seems that we
58 Longuenesse 1998, 17.
59 From Kant’s perspective, insufficient accounts of objectivity and causality are obviously
not the only shortcomings of Hume’s philosophy, to which list we may easily add pretty
much everything which Kant takes to be a priori, such as the concept of substance and what 
Kant calls transcendental apperception.
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would have no criterion of the validity or objectivity of these ideas.60 As Kant noted
already in his famous letter to Marcus Herz from 1772 (which letter I will address 
later in the chapter), the existence of representations caused by objects is itself not a
problematic assumption. It is easy to think of the relation of representations to
their objects as such that the objects simply cause the representations in us. But in 
this case there is at first the problem of subjectivity, namely that what guarantee do
we have that we do not represent the objects differently from each other, or even
represent different objects? The bigger problem, however, is exposed when we
realize that there are such concepts, which Kant in the letter to Herz calls
intellectual representations, and later the categories, which cannot be of empirical
origin, at least in the sense of something that is or has been directly perceived. So, if 
these representations, such as causality, substance and accident, originate not in the 
objects or events themselves, but in us, why should they pertain to objects?
The problem does not end, however, with the validity of the ideas of causality
and substance (etc.), but has to do with the overall possibility of objective reference.
Kant saw that we need to have these intellectual representations, (the validity of
which we also desire to show,) to be able to represent any objects at all. Thus the
problem turns into the problem of the possibility of a priori cognition, upon which
the possibility of objective reference and all of metaphysics rests. Here I will first 
approach this problem from the viewpoint of the possibility of experience.
60 See e.g. A2/B5: “Now what is especially remarkable is that even among our experiences
cognitions are mixed in that must have their origin a priori and that perhaps serve to
establish connection among our representations of the senses. For if one removes from our 
experiences everything that belongs to the senses, there still remain certain original
concepts the judgments generated from which must have arisen entirely a priori,
independently of experience, because they make one able to say more about the objects
that appear to the senses than mere experience would teach, or at least make one believe
that one can say this, and make assertions contain true universality and strict necessity, the
likes of merely empirical cognition can never afford.”
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2.2 What is Experience?
2.2.1 Objectivity and Experience
First, I would like to point out that the notion of experience has been central to
many philosophers from Locke and Hume to e.g. Husserl and Heidegger. We
should not, however, take it for granted that all of these philosophers mean the
same thing with the notion. With regard to the empiricists, Hume’s account of 
experience seems more complex than Locke’s, but it was Kant who made the notion
central in another sense by inquiring into what conditions might this thing called
experience depend upon. I stress, once more, that we must be careful when
comparing e.g. Hume’s and Kant’s accounts of experience, because there may be
differences not only in how they describe or explain experience, but also in what is
thought to be experience. At this point I would only like to note that for Kant e.g.
our feelings in themselves are not experience, because for him, the notion of
experience (Erfahrung) includes the concept of objectivity. This is shown e.g. in the
Prolegomena’s distinction between judgments of perception (which are subjective)
and judgments of experience (which are objective). Thus the notion of experience
does not for Kant mean, say, all sensations brought about in a living creature (by 
the world). Rather it means something like a (self-)conscious, objective and
intentional relation to the world.
According to Kant, experience as something objective, that is, as relating to
actual objects, is not possible without certain pre-given conditions which guarantee
a sort of universal necessity to it, and make possible the unity of the experience.
That is, there must be one, identical experience (rather than many), which validly
relates to the object or objects, and not only (other) subjective representations.61 As
e.g. Longuenesse and Dickerson emphasize, the unity of self-consciousness62 (and 
thereby of concepts, judgments and experience) is a central issue for Kant, who 
claims that no cognition of objects could arise purely passively, but rather there 
must be an element of unifying spontaneity involved in cognition, in order for
there to be this unity and thus objectivity.63 In my view, it is above all the
61 See e.g. A110.
62 ‘Einheit des Selbsbewußtseins’.
63 See Dickerson 2007, 80-98. Dickerson (80) writes that ”Kant is in fact concerned with a
problem that is the representationalist equivalent of the problem debated in the nineteenth
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synthesizing activity of the mind in the act of apperception and judgment which is
missing from Hume’s account, and which Kant labours hard to explicate. He writes 
in the first Critique:
Unity of synthesis in accordance with empirical concepts would be
entirely contingent, and, were it not grounded on a transcendental
ground of unity, it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to
fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from it.
But in that case all relation of cognition to objects would also
disappear, since the appearances would lack connection in
accordance with universal and necessary laws, and would thus be
intuition without thought, but never cognition, and would 
therefore be as good as nothing for us.64 
The “transcendental ground of unity” which Kant mentions, is, according to my
reading, the faculty of ‘transcendental apperception’, which I discuss more closely
in chapter 4. I read Kant to claim that this unity is necessary for relating
representations to objects at all, and this is precisely what Kant means by
objectivity. From Kant's perspective no cognition or experience could take place,
were it not for something that unifies the experience and gives the cognition
universality and necessity, which are according to Kant the two secure characteristics
of a priori cognition.65 These cannot be created empirically by contingent
experience, but still are inherent in experience. Furthermore, we have, and use, 
other such concepts which we could never have simply received in or from
experience, and which then must have another source: “All attempts to derive these
pure concepts of the understanding from experience and to ascribe to them a
merely empirical origin are therefore entirely vain and futile.”66 This was also
acknowledged by Hume, with regard to causality (or the “necessary connexion of
and twentieth centuries as the problem of the ‘unity of judgment’ or the ‘unity of the
proposition’. Kant argues that if we are to make sense of the unity possessed by complex
representations then we cannot think of representing objects as a purely passive, or
receptive, affair, but as one that must also involve some element of spontaneity.”
64 A111.
65 B3-6.
66 A112.
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cause and effect”), which he thinks is an idea we have built based on constant,
subjective conjunction, that is, custom.67 
For Hume, we have no innate ideas and no a priori knowledge or concepts,
but everything we have concerning the world is based on empirical impressions, 
sentiments and reflections. As Hume famously illustrated it, we can see a billiard
ball moving and touching another ball which then starts to move, but we cannot
sense the causality or the necessity which we seem to suppose when thinking or
describing the event. This insight does not cause Hume to abandon his empiricist
doctrine, but rather forces him to find a solution to this problem of the origin of 
these concepts. This he does by explaining that there indeed is a sentiment which
gives birth to the idea of a “necessary connexion”. This sentiment arises customarily
in experience when certain events are repeated multiple times, after which we at
some point feel this new sentiment, telling us that these events are connected.68 
But if concepts such as substance and causality only exist as subjective
customs, and therefore contingently, it is hard to see how we can build any
knowledge or proper objectivity into our judgments, since concepts such as
substance and causality seem to be conditions for making objective judgments at all.
Rather than building our judgments upon subjective and contingent ‘experience’,
there should be some kind of necessity and universal applicability to our concepts
and judgments if we really claim them to be objective. Furthermore, the concept of 
necessity itself has been revealed problematic, as it is clearly not a sensible property
of objects of the world. Still, we use or apply it, and perhaps must do so, to make
any sense of causality, among other things. Thus Kant holds that the problem of 
causality and necessity is primarily one concerning their origin, not of their 
applicability.69 He gladly gives merit to Hume for understanding the nature of the
problem, as one concerning the question of whether necessity is based solely on
reason, independently of all experience, but it is Hume’s answer which Kant found
unsatisfying.70 So whence do we indeed get these concepts and how can they be
valid of objects if they do not originate in the objects (of experience)?
67 See Hume 2007, 43-45 (EHU 5.5-6/43-45).
68 See Hume 2007, 71 (EHU 7.30/78).
69 Prol. 4:258-9.
70 See Prol. 4:258-9. As Kant claims, the precise nature of Hume’s problem seems to have
been misunderstood by many, thus causing only debates which are rather useless for
solving the original problem. I find that the same can be claimed about certain
contemporary thinkers, such as Meillassoux (2008) and Badiou (2008), who, in my view, see
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2.2.2 The Letter to Herz
It is well-known and frequently commented upon that in a letter to Marcus Herz 
dating in 1772 Kant presented an important metaphysical problem which he saw
yet to be unanswered, and which may be taken to be the first formulation of Kant’s
take on the problem of objective reference. I see the problem presented in the letter
as essentially connected to the problem he saw in Hume, and in fact leading to his
doctrine of transcendental, or formal, idealism.71 This question is obviously
dependent on and related to such questions as what is objectivity in general, what
are objects in general and what makes certain concepts and judgments objectively
valid. In the Herz-letter Kant approaches the problem as that of how our
representations (can) relate to their objects. In the letter Kant seems to take it for
granted that we are in possession of, and use, concepts which cannot be derived
from experience. These “representations” Kant calls “the pure concepts of
understanding”, or the categories, upon the origin and objective validity of which
the fate of ontology and the whole of metaphysics depend. Pure or intellectual
representations are such that they have not been produced in us by objects, but we
obviously also are in possession of representations which have been brought about
in us by the objects. The problem then concerns the application and validity of the
pure concepts, as well as their relation to the empirical ones, for the application of
which the pure ones seem to be required. He writes:
I noticed that I still lacked something essential, something that in
my long metaphysical studies I, as well as others, had failed to 
consider and which in fact constitutes the key to the whole secret
of metaphysics, hitherto still hidden from itself. I asked myself this 
question: What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we
call "representation" to the object? If a representation comprises
only the manner in which the subject is affected by the object, then 
it is easy to see how it is in conformity with this object, namely, as 
an effect accords with its cause, and it is easy to see how this
modification of our mind can represent something, that is, have an
and present the Humean problem incorrectly, and thus also fail to fully appreciate the
Kantian answer to it. I return to this topic in Chapter 7.
71 I am not alone in observing this connection; see e.g. Longuenesse 1998, 17-33.
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object. Thus the passive or sensuous representations have an
understandable relationship to objects, and the principles that are
derived from the nature of our soul have an understandable validity 
for all things insofar as those things are supposed to be objects of
the senses. Similarly, if that in us which we call "representation"
were active with regard to the object, that is, if the object itself were 
created by the representation (as when divine cognitions are 
conceived as the archetypes of things), the conformity of these
representations to their objects could also be understood. […]72 
Kant here presents two alternatives for the relation of object and representation. In
the first case the objects produce the representations and in the other the
representations produce the objects. But the problem now seems to be that the pure
concepts cannot have been produced by the objects, but it would also seem very
peculiar to think that the representations produce the objects. We should
remember that the letter predates the first Critique by almost a decade, and thus at
this point Kant had probably not yet reached his critical conclusion. It is my claim
that, in the conclusion, the second alternative, in which the representations are
indeed causes of the objects, is taken to be the right one, although with serious
restrictions, namely that the pure concepts can be said to be formal conditions or
even formal causes for appearances, even though not for the things in themselves.
Going back to the Herz-letter, Kant continues to explicate the problem:
In my dissertation I was content to explain the nature of 
intellectual representations in a merely negative way, namely, to 
state that they were not modifications of the soul brought about by
the object. However, I silently passed over the further question of
how a representation that refers to an object without being in any
way affected by it can be possible. I had said: The sensuous
representations present things as they appear, the intellectual
representations present them as they are. But by what means are
these things given to us, if not by the way in which they affect us?
And if such intellectual representations depend on our inner
72 Br. 10:130.
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activity, whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to 
have with objects - objects that are nevertheless not possibly
produced thereby? And the axioms of pure reason concerning these
objects - how do they agree with these objects, since the agreement
has not been reached with the aid of experience? […]73 
As I have stated, I take it that at the time of writing these passages, Kant had not yet
constructed all of his theory, including the essential part of it known as the
transcendental deduction (of the categories), in which he would come to claim why
and how there indeed is, and must be, an agreement between representations and
the objects (which haven’t produced the representations). He thus continues the
letter by glossing at previous answers as to the question of the source of the pure
concepts:
Plato assumed a previous intuition of divinity as the primary source
of the pure concepts of the understanding and of first principles.74 
[…] As I was searching in such ways for the sources of intellectual 
knowledge, without which one cannot determine the nature and
limits of metaphysics, I divided this science into its naturally
distinct parts, and I sought to reduce transcendental philosophy
(that is to say, all the concepts belonging to completely pure
reason) to a certain number of categories, but not like Aristotle,
who, in his ten predicaments, placed them side by side as he found
them in a purely chance juxtaposition. On the contrary, I arranged
them according to the way they classify themselves by their own
nature, following a few fundamental laws of the understanding.75 
I have already stated that the passage is generally recognized for its importance, and
I see Kant’s critical theoretical philosophy essentially as an answer to the main 
question of the passage, which, once more, is “What is the ground of the relation of
73 Br. 10:130-131.
74 Here Kant refers to Plato’s thesis of anamnesis, which I take to be the reason for e.g.
Heidegger calling Plato the true originator of the a priori (See Engelland 2017, 175.).
75 Br. 10:130-132.
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that in us which we call "representation" to the object?”76 Besides laying out the
approaches that will not give satisfactory results, he already here refers to his 
discovery of the role of the categories, and “a few fundamental laws of the 
understanding”77. What we should note here is that Kant is not simply inquiring
about the relation of objects to representations, but of the ground of that relation. I
take it to imply that he had started to form the answer later found in the Critique, 
according to which we need the categories, not just to use them by themselves, but
in all objective reference.
It is also worth observing that Kant takes the existence of what he calls
‘intellectual representations’ completely for granted. Thus some might oppose,
saying that there is no problem, because there are no intellectual representations.
This is a battle which Kant does not take part in the letter in question, but which is
nevertheless so severely addressed elsewhere in Kant, that I permit myself to
postpone the answer, which will become evident later, after having viewed Kant’s
theory on a larger scale. However, Kant does refer to Plato and many others as also
finding the existence of the intellectual representations completely evident. So, for
Kant, it is not their existence which is the question, but it is their origin, and 
thereby their validity and objectivity. Now, if philosophers since Plato have
thought that there are these non-empirical intellectual representations, not
originating in the objects, and have tried to explain them by referring to miracles or
forgotten divine knowledge etc., then what is so revolutionary in Hume and his
account? It is not the realization that there are ideas, concepts or representations
which seemingly have no empirical origin, but it is the claim that these indeed have
a completely empirical and subjective origin, which means that they themselves are 
contingent and subjective, and thereby not necessary, universal and objective.
2.2.3 Hume and Kant on the Unity of Experience
From Kant’s perspective the Humean phenomenalist approach, let alone the
Lockean version of empiricism, is inadequate to lay out the way our representations
refer to their objects, what exactly these objects and their existence are constituted
76 Ibid. In addition, I interpret certain sections of the first Critique to make direct reference
to the question of the Herz-letter, mainly A 258/B 314, A 92-93/B 124-126 and A 128-130.
77 Ibid.
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on, and how it is that our concepts and judgments can be objectively valid, that is,
can have objective reference. The reason why Hume is important in this matter is
that he himself, as Kant observed, noticed this problem, albeit with regard to only a 
few concepts, or ideas as Hume called them. Most importantly Hume struggled
with the idea of causality, or a necessary connection of cause and effect. Hume saw
that we cannot perceive these ideas as such, which for Hume is to say that they
cannot be simple ideas. How is it, then, that we come about such ideas? Hume
writes:
When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the 
operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to
discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which
binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible
consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually,
in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is 
attended with motion in the second.  This is the whole that appears
to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward
impression from this succession of objects: Consequently, there is
not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing
which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion.78 
What Hume stresses in the passage is that at no single instant do we sense or
perceive causality, but rather impressions followed by other impressions. I take it
that in this matter Kant would somewhat agree. But how, then, does the idea of a
‘necessary connexion’ come to be? Hume’s answer is that indeed it does not come
about at any particular instance, but after customary repetitions we learn to
anticipate things to behave in a certain way. Thereby a new (subjective) sentiment
also arises, but only in the course of a long “uniform experience”. Hume’s lengthy
conclusion thus follows:
This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this
customary transition of the imagination from one object to its
usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we 
78 Hume 2007, 59 (EHU 7.6/63).
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form the idea of power or necessary connexion. Nothing farther is
in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides; you will never
find any other origin of that idea. […] Every idea is copied from
some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we cannot
find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea. In all 
single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is
nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can
suggest any idea of power or necessary connexion. But when many
uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by 
the same event; we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and
connexion. We then feel a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a
customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one
object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment is the original of 
that idea which we seek for. […] The first instance which we saw of
motion communicated by the shock of two billiard balls (to return
to this obvious illustration) is exactly similar to any instance that
may, at present, occur to us; except only, that we could not, at first, 
infer one event from the other; which we are enabled to do at
present, after so long a course of uniform experience.79 
As this illustration shows, Hume thought of the concept or idea of causality to be
the result of us feeling “a new sentiment or impression”, or a “customary connexion
in the thought or imagination”. This suggests that the origin of the conception is
indeed empirical, but also subjective. Who knows how many times an event must
be repeated for each person to come up with the sentiment and idea, if it happens at
all? Laid out like this, it seems unavoidable that the arising of the idea of necessary
connection, if not the content of the idea itself, is wholly contingent. What in
addition is relevant to our matter at hand is the end of the passage where Hume
refers to a long “course of uniform experience”80 as a condition for creating this idea 
of necessary connection. This shows that experience for Hume is not simply
particular sensations, but rather has temporal character and uniformity. Now, 
before engaging in the battle between Hume and Kant, I ask the reader to
79 Hume 2007, 69-72 (EHU 7.28-30/75-79).
80 Italics added.
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accompany me on what might seem a detour. By this I mean tracing the empiricist
conception of experience from Locke via Hume to Kant, to see and appreciate the 
role of this conception for all of these philosophers.
2.3 The Empiricist Account of Experience
In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke writes:
§2. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void
of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished?
Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless 
fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety?
Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I
answer, in one word, from experience: in that, all our knowledge is
founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation
employed either about external sensible objects; or about the internal
operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is 
that, which supplies our understandings with all the materials of 
thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence
all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.81 
Here we have an articulation of the classical empirical account of mind, experience
and knowledge, in which Locke presents mind as tabula rasa, and ideas as resulting
from two sources, that is, either directly from sensation or reflection upon these.
Now, the account of experience that Locke has in mind is not here fully explicated,
but in the following we can see that Locke did not mean by it everything that we
are conscious of, but rather the events that bring about the simple ideas:
Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own
mind. Can another man perceive, that I am conscious of anything,
when I perceive it not myself? No man's knowledge here, can go
beyond his experience.82 
81 Locke, Essay, II.i.2.
82 Locke, Essay, II.i.19.
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The simple ideas we have are such, as experience teaches them.83 
Now, what is absolutely essential is that experience is the one event that is at the
heart of the production of all ideas and knowledge. Still, as is observed by Roger
Woolhouse, “[w]hat experience immediately provides is not knowledge as such, but
its 'materials', the 'ideas' of which the Essay talks so much. This means that the
content of all our thoughts must be ultimately traceable back to experience.”84 Thus
experience does not, for Locke, mean what it sometimes nowadays can mean, e.g. all
that we feel and perceive etc., but rather simply the events that begin the formation 
of ideas and knowledge.
The reason for taking up Locke here is to show, firstly, that his account of
experience as teacher and the beginning of knowledge is highly relevant and
influential to Kant. For instant validation of my claim, without a deeper
interpretation at this point, I refer to what Kant writes in the Introduction of the
Critique of Pure Reason: 
Experience is without doubt the first product that our
understanding brings forth as it works on the raw material of
sensible sensations. It is for this very reason the first teaching, and
in its progress it is so inexhaustible in new instruction that the
chain of life in all future generations will never have any lack of
new information that can be gathered on this terrain.85 
As is apparent, in Kant’s account experience only comes after sensations, as it is
“brought forth” by the understanding. Secondly, I want to show that from Locke’s
account we can, in a way, retrospectively trace a route to that of Kant’s, but through
Hume, whose notion of experience already somewhat differs from that of Locke’s,
even if he also considered experience to be the beginning of knowledge. If, for
Locke, experience consists in the first events that give rise to simple ideas, for Hume
the account seems to have been a bit more elaborated, since he did not consider
single perceptions as such to be experience, but only when these are combined with
83 Locke, Essay, II.iv.6.
84 Woolhouse 1997, xii.
85 A1.
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others through certain acts. Stephen Buckles notes, regarding Hume’s conception 
of experience, that Hume did not regard all of our representations, perceptions or
ideas to be experience, but only those that are already somehow connected to other
representations: 
The a priori is what is prior to experience; Hume’s use of the term
reflects the Aristotelian conception of experience as the fruit of
sensations and memories over time. Individual sense-perceptions
are thus not experience, which explains why he treats the attempt
to draw conclusions from such individual perceptions as a priori
reasoning. (The modern meaning of a priori to mean prior even to 
sensation derives from Kant.)86 
Leaving Buckles’ comment on Kant’s use of a priori here uncommented, I wish to
refer to what I noted a couple of pages earlier, that is, Hume’s reference to the
uniformity of experience. For something like a perception to qualify as, or become,
experience, it needs to be put in context with other perceptions. Now, it is exactly
this uniformity and the necessary acts that are relevant with regard to Kant, as I
hope to show in the following.
At this point I again must note that in no way do I want to present Kant as
essentially Humean. Still, it is obvious that the thinkers share many views, and
there can just as obviously be no question of the direction of the presumed
influence. In the following passage from the Enquiry we find a striking resemblance 
to what Kant later would write of the dangers of unrestricted reason, that is,
rationalist metaphysics, as well as a clear statement of the view and answer which
Kant saw to be so problematic. That is, that there should be no a priori at all, and
causality itself, even though it lies at the heart of our “reasonings concerning matter
of fact”87, can only be said to be a subjectively produced idea, of which we have
many:
Nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the 
thought of man, which not only escapes all human power and
86 Buckles 2007, 30, Footnote 6.
87 Hume 2007, 29 (EHU 4.4/26).
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authority, but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and 
reality. To form monsters, and join incongruous shapes and
appearances, costs the imagination no more trouble than to
conceive the most natural and familiar objects. […] What never was
seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is anything beyond the
power of thought, except what implies an absolute contradiction.88 
Now, this far everything seems to be in line with Kant’s views. In the following
passage, however, we start to see the difference between Hume and Kant:
5 But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty,
we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really connected 
within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the
mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding,
transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us
by the senses and experience. When we think of a golden
mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, gold, and mountain, 
with which we were formerly acquainted.89 
What Hume here calls “the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or
diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience” is precisely the
focus of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, as he wants to show that the actions
Hume here describes can and should be analyzed, in order to arrive at a ground and
criteria of how these (synthesizing) actions of the mind can be truly universally
objective. Thus the obvious difference between Hume and Kant is the view
concerning a priori reasoning, or a priori rules of synthesizing, which Kant claims to
be, not a result of experience, but rather a necessary condition for experience.
Hume’s stand becomes clear in the following passage:
4 All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on
the relation of cause and effect. By means of that relation alone we
can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were
to ask a man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent; 
88 Hume 2007, 15 (EHU 2.4/18).
89 Hume 2007, 15-16 (EHU 2.5/19).
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for instance, that his friend is in the country, or in France; he
would give you a reason; and this reason would be some other fact;
as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former
resolutions and promises. A man finding a watch or any other
machine in a desert island, would conclude that there had once
been men in that island. All our reasonings concerning fact are of 
the same nature. And here it is constantly supposed that there is a
connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from
it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would
be entirely precarious. […]
5 If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of
that evidence, which assures us of matters of fact, we must enquire
how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect.
6 I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of
no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any
instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from
experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly
conjoined with each other.90 
I have already presented how Hume attempted to solve the problem; his only resort
was to refer to a new sentiment or feeling, and our subjective thought of a
customary connection hence brought forth. From this we can finally move back to
Kant, whom we find thinking along the same lines as Hume, with regard to
experience not meaning all of our representations, but rather only those
representations that are connected to each other in a certain, unified manner. I
argue that it is precisely this certain, unified manner which Kant analyzes
differently and more profoundly than Hume, thus resulting in a claim concerning
the unity of apperception and the forms of intuition as well as the categories as a 
priori conditions of all possible experience, and ultimately, even the objects of that
experience. However, as the purpose of this chapter is only to frame the question, I 
will not here attempt to explicate Kant’s solution of the problem, but only rather
briefly take a preliminary look at Kant’s account of experience and how he saw it in
relation to Hume, leaving the details and argumentation for the following chapters.
90 Hume 2007, 29-30 (EHU 4.4-6/26-27).
44
 
 
     
   
    
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
 
    
  
   
   
  
    
     
 
  
 
    
              
     
 
        
   
   
   
   
 
   
     
          
 
   
The aim at this point is to present the direction which Kant thought we must take,
to be able to arrive at a firm and lasting answer concerning “the ground of the
relation of that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object”.
2.4 Kant’s Account of Experience in Contrast to Hume
To emphasize what can be taken as Kant’s partial allegiance to the empiricist
tradition, let’s see what Kant writes in the beginning of the second edition of the
Critique of Pure Reason: 
There is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins with 
experience; for how else should the cognitive faculty be awakened
into exercise if not through objects that stimulate our senses and in
part themselves produce representations, in part bring the activity
of our understanding into motion to compare these, to connect or
separate them, and thus to work up the raw material of sensible
impressions into a cognition of objects that is called experience? As
far as time is concerned, then, no cognition in us precedes experience, 
and with experience every cognition begins.91 
Again, this seems to be rather much in line with the Humean empiricist account.
However, this is not at all where the story ends. I find it convincing to think that
the above passage (the opening of the B-edition of the first Critique) was written to
acknowledge the empiricist claim of the essentiality of experience as the starting
point of knowledge. Still, the reference of no cognitions temporally preceding
experience should already give us the clue to what is to come, that is, that Kant
wants to inquire into another kind of preceding of experience. This preceding will
be of utmost importance, as it will be shown that experience itself has a priori
conditions which we should explicate. Thus the passage continues:
But although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it
does not on that account all arise from experience: For it could
well be that even our experiential cognition is a composite of that 
91 B1, italics added.
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which we receive through impressions and that which our own 
cognitive faculty (merely prompted by sensible impressions)
provides out of itself, which addition we cannot distinguish from
that fundamental material until long practice has made us attentive
to it and skilled in separating it out.
It is therefore at least a question requiring closer investigation,
and one not to be dismissed at first glance, whether there is any
such cognition independent of all experience and even of all
impressions of the senses. One calls such cognitions a priori, and
distinguishes them from empirical ones, which have their sources a
posteriori, namely in experience.92 
Here we see how the question is now posed simultaneously as the question of the 
existence of a priori cognition and the question of the conditions of (objective)
experience itself. From Kant’s writings in both the first Critique and Prolegomena it 
seems that he conceived the conception of experience as an explication and a part of
the answer to the problem he saw in Hume’s account. That is, Kant’s thought was
that we cannot either perceive or derive concepts such as causality, or even space, 
from experience, but yet we need these concepts93 to have experience of objects and
events in the world. If our most general and basic concepts (the categories) were not
valid of objects but were only subjective rules, it would make all experience
contingent and subjective. But this is not the case if it can be shown that the
categories have objective validity and reality, and that they are necessary elements of
any possible experience in general. This is part of what Kant writes in the following
passage, along with his famous formulation of the conditions of experience being
the conditions of the objects of experience: 
The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the
same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience.
Now I assert that the categories that have just been adduced are
nothing other than the conditions of thinking in a possible
experience, just as space and time contain the conditions of the 
92 B1-2.
93 Or the rules represented in them. See e.g. B145.
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intuition for the very same thing. They are therefore also
fundamental concepts for thinking objects in general for the
appearances, and they therefore have a priori objective validity […] 
94 
I will not here deal with all of the implications of this important passage, since my
aim for now is only to lay out the basics of Kant's account of experience, and the
claim that it is essentially objective, and essentially has an a priori form, by which it
is conditioned. Still, we can note that when Kant speaks of space and time as 
conditions of intuition, and the categories as conditions of thinking, he means
them properly as forms and rules by which objective experience is united.95 It is not
entirely obvious in the passage why the categories as conditions of thinking are
conditions for any possible experience, but a clue is given in the end, when Kant
says that the categories thus are “fundamental concepts for thinking objects in
general for the appearances”. This seems to imply that appearances as
representations need a thought object, for the existence of which the categories are
a necessary condition.
So, even if Kant thought that experience is where cognition begins, for him
experience was not something subjective, say, subjective combining of perceptions,
even if it were done according to well-learned custom or habit.96 In the Prolegomena
Kant indeed writes reminiscently of Hume that “experience itself is nothing other 
than a continual conjoining (synthesis) of perceptions”.97 However, the crux of the
matter is that Kant wants to show that certain universal and necessary conditions
must be fulfilled for this experience to arise. That is, the aforementioned synthesis
or continual conjoining of perceptions must follow rules, or even universal and
necessary laws. The difference between Hume and Kant with regard to experience
94 A111.
95 B144-148.
96 Hannah Ginsborg (2006) notes, to my knowledge very appropriately, that Kant’s own
presentation of his conception of experience is at times hard to follow and explicate. Given
that the matter is extremely relevant to his critical philosophy, Kant’s conception of
experience is rather clearly understudied, as Ginsborg also notes. Without proper
arguments I don’t want here to engage in dialogue, but I only note that, to me, Ginsborg’s
own view still seems inadequate and problematic as it does not seem to acknowledge the
role of the categories as rules in experience.
97 Prol. 4:275.
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and causality then can be described as follows: according to Hume we learn to
associate perceptions in a certain way, thus building up experience and the concept
of causality, or the idea of a necessary connection, from the custom of relating two
things to each other, which Hume calls constant conjunction. However, we can
never observe the necessity either in the relation of the objects, or in the objects
themselves, and indeed there it does not, according to Hume, reside.98 This means
that even though causality is a universal way of relating ideas to each other, it is
essentially a subjective idea or concept, which we are accustomed to use, but which 
in the end cannot be said to originate in or pertain to empirical objects.
Kant, on the other hand, sees this account as deeply problematic, and wants
to show that causality indeed can validly be applied and actually pertains to
empirical objects, even though Kant agrees with Hume that we can never directly
perceive or abstract the necessity, which is inherent in causality, from experience.
The basic idea then becomes that causality (among other categories) must be
objectively valid of empirical objects, or objects of experience, exactly because we 
need this a priori concept to have experience in the first place. Representations need
to be joined with each other and related into the original unity of apperception
according to necessary laws, or we would never have any pertaining, on-going and
even potentially objective experience, but only some flux of subjectively combined
representations.
The radicality of Kant’s position in relation to that of Hume’s was to say that 
there are universal and necessary conditions of experience, which do not arise from
the experience itself. Of course, this much is well-known. What needs to be
acknowledged, however, is the fact that when Kant now started to search for and
analyze these conditions of experience, he was not analyzing the conditions of the
totality of our representations, feelings, judgments etc., but primarily that relation
which can be said to be objective, and thereby useful for us in producing
knowledge. For Kant, experience is a conscious, objective and intentional relation
to the world. And what Kant will show to be a condition of objective representing
of objects, that is, experience, has to do with universal necessity in the representing
of the objects. This is a crucial distinction, the misunderstanding of which could
lead to a misconception of Kant’s critical project. In the Prolegomena Kant writes:
98 See Fieser 2018, 3c.
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The possibility of experience in general is thus at the same time the
universal law of nature, and the principles of the former are
themselves the laws of the latter. For we are not acquainted with
nature except as the sum total of appearances, i.e., of the
representations in us, and so we cannot get the laws of their
connection from anywhere else except the principles of their
connection in us, i.e., from the conditions of necessary unification
in one consciousness, which unification constitutes the possibility
of experience.99 
In the following chapters I attempt to show in more detail how Kant solved the
Humean problem with his Copernican turn of philosophy, partly relying on his
new conception of experience and its a priori conditions, most importantly the
necessary unification of representations in one consciousness, as a guiding line.
I state once more that, for Kant, by no means are all of our representations or
contents of the mind what he calls experience. Were this the case, then Kant’s claim
would have to seem very strange or even pointless. Rather, the case is that Kant’s
overarching way of proceeding is to show that we need to have universal and 
necessary forms and rules, that is, the a priori intuitions and concepts, and a priori
synthesizing activity, for self-conscious and objective experience to be possible. The
essential, new strategy is to point out and validate the transcendental conditions,
not primarily of all representing, but of objective empirical cognition, that is,
experience, the possibility of which rests on our unifying synthesis of appearances:
The possibility of experience is therefore that which gives all of our
cognitions a priori objective reality. Now experience rests on the
synthetic unity of appearances, i.e., on a synthesis according to
concepts of the object of appearances in general, without which it
would not even be cognition but rather a rhapsody of perceptions,
which would not fit together in any context in accordance with
rules of a thoroughly connected (possible) consciousness, thus not 
into the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception.100 
99 Prol., 4:319.
100 A156/B 195.
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And:
There is only one experience, in which all perceptions are
represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection, just as
there is only one space and time, in which all forms of appearance
and all relation of being or non-being take place. If one speaks of
different experiences, they are only so many perceptions insofar as
they belong to one and the same universal experience. The
thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions is precisely what
constitutes the form of experience, and it is nothing other than the
synthetic unity of the appearances in accordance with concepts.101 
These passages make it clear that subjective feelings and perceptions are for Kant
not experience but rather there is only one universal experience which is brought
about by “the synthetic unity of appearances in accordance with concepts”. How
this unified experience, its synthetic unity of appearances and its objective reference
is in more detail constructed, will be examined in the following chapters. In the
fourth chapter I also return explicitly to the Humean problem and the Herz-letter,
as well as to the A-deduction’s rather direct answer to the question Kant posed in
the letter to Herz. I will not quote the passage here in full, but only as a glimpse:
If the objects with which our cognition has to do were things in
themselves, then we would not be able to have any a priori concepts
of them at all. For whence should we obtain them? If we take them
from the object (without even investigating here how the latter
could become known to us), then our concepts would be merely
empirical and not a priori concepts. If we take them from ourselves,
then that which is merely in us cannot determine the constitution
of an object distinct from our representations, i.e., be a ground why
there should be a thing that corresponds to something we have in
our thoughts, and why all this representation should not instead be
empty. But if, on the contrary we have to do everywhere only with
101 A110.
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appearances, then it is not only possible but also necessary that
certain a priori concepts precede empirical cognition of objects. For
as appearances they constitute an object that is merely in us, since a
mere modification of our sensibility is not to be encountered
outside us at all.102 
So, how can we have a priori concepts or cognition of objects? And why does our
experience of these various kinds of objects seem so unified and affine? The case is 
not as simple as Hume suggested, namely that there really is no a priori cognition of
any kind, but we learn all we learn from experience, which just happens to have the
uniformity which it obviously has. Rather, claims Kant, there is a form to all
experience, which form then is a condition of the experience and the objects within
the experience, and by which form we can thus have a priori cognition of the
objects of experience. Kant would here agree with Hume on two things, namely
that (1) by pure reason alone, we cannot cognize any objects, and that (2) all
empirical cognition starts with experience. Nevertheless, Kant disagrees with Hume
about the possibility and necessity of a priori cognition. This is so because the a
priori cognition, which concerns the form of experience and thus objects in general,
does not concern the things in themselves but rather only the appearances, for
which the forms of experience indeed are a formal cause.103 
2.5 Additional Remarks on the Kantian Notion of Experience
Experience, for Kant, does not mean what it nowadays often means, that is, feelings,
sensations, or other ‘subjective representations’, as I think Kant might have put it.
In other words, experience is not subjective, and something which is subjective is 
not experience, but experience is something objective, that is, something about
102 A128-129.
103 The notion of a formal cause is a well-known Aristotelian notion. To the best of my
knowledge, Kant, however, did not use this notion precisely in the context or meaning in
which I am using it. Rather, I am introducing it as springing from Kant’s account of the
nature of experience, and the objects thereof, in the sense that a formal cause is a form (of
either intuition or understanding) which is a precondition for the existence of that to which
it is a formal cause. I find this fitting for many reasons, one of which is the letter to Herz,
where Kant writes about the relation of representations to their objects, inquiring into in
which cases which – object or representation – might be considered a cause for the other.
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objects. In addition it is something conceptual and of a cognitive nature, meaning
the form of that universal cognition of objects which we all relate to in a similar
fashion. 
On this question I agree with e.g. Hemmo Laiho, who describes Kantian
experience (Erfahrung) generally as objective, empirical cognition, and emphasizes
that for Kant there is only one, unified experience. This means that experience is
different from both perceptions, of which there of course may be many, and from
such things as “lived” or “felt” “experiences” (Erlebnis), which are multiple, and
come and go.104 
I am even willing to support, to some degree, Nicholas Stang’s defence of
Hermann Cohen’s reading of Kantian ‘experience’.105 According to Cohen, Kant
developed a new concept of experience, which was hard to identify in the first
edition of the first Critique, but rather clearly laid out in the second edition. Stang
states about Cohen’s interpretation of Kant, that even though “Cohen’s reading of
Kant was massively influential, it was, and remains, just as controversial. From the
late nineteenth century to today, it has attracted everything from meticulous
scholarly critique to brusque dismissal.” What was Cohen’s interpretation, then?
As Stang writes, according to Cohen “experience is Newtonian mathematical
natural science.” However curious this may appear to us, accustomed to our
contemporary notion of experience, in which we are having experiences of this and
that kind, and which may be very personal feelings etc., I find that Cohen’s
interpretation of Kant’s experience, supported by Stang, does somewhat fit my
reading of Kantian experience and objectivity. One should still be very careful with
the nature of the claim, and I can only claim to reservedly support this
interpretation if the identification of experience and natural science is not made
too strongly. Stang continues:
While this equation of experience with mathematical natural
science has few contemporary defenders, I believe it is substantially
correct, with one important qualification. Kant uses the term
104 See Laiho 2012, 184.
105 On another matter, Stang states that he considers Kant’s phrase “things in themselves in
the empirical sense,” to refer to “the fully contingent properties actually possessed by
objects in space and time” (Stang 2018, 15.). I present my strongly differing interpretation in
Chapter 5.
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Erfahrung in a number of different senses in the Kritik der reinen
Vernunft […] a central, and neglected, sense of that key technical
term aligns with Cohen’s reading; what Kant sometimes refers to as
‘universal experience’ (sometimes, simply ‘experience’) is, in broad
outlines, correctly interpreted by Cohen as mathematical natural
science.106 
I think that Stang is correct in claiming that Kant has different senses for
Erfahrung. Stang, however, concentrates on one of these, which may hide the
possibility that the different senses in question are not that far from each other. 
This, again, might mean that we could be able to group all the senses that Kant
attributes to Erfahrung together, in which case the essence of the term might not be
completely reducible to ‘mathematical natural science’. I also find that even though 
I somewhat agree with Stang on the relevance of Cohen’s interpretation of Kantian
experience, I do not agree on a few other relevant matters with him. For starters,
Stang claims the following:
Kant denied what Locke and Hume maintained, that, in Kant’s
words, all of our cognition “entspringt … aus Erfahrung” (B1). In
order to express this disagreement Kant needs a ‘neutral’ concept of
experience, one that does not contain specifically Kantian
assumptions about the nature of experience.107 
I think that the case is not as simple as this, and from a certain perspective it is
almost contrary to what Stang claims. I find it obvious that Kant indeed expressed
some likeness to the empiricist position, stating indeed that all cognition starts with
experience, only with the important addition that it does not still all arise from
experience.108 So, yes, Stang is right to say that Kant’s claim that all of cognition
does not arise from experience is a sort of criticism of empiricism. However, this
criticism should be read in context, namely acknowledging the fact that Kant has
just prior to this statement claimed that all cognition begins with experience:
106 Stang 2018, 13.
107 Stang 2018, 16.
108 See B1.
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“There is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins with experience”109. This
claim is what Kant begins the introduction of the B-edition of the Critique, and it
is, I take it, where he gives credit to the empiricists rather than attacking them. It is
only that after this statement, he expresses the reservation that even if all cognition
begins with experience, as the empiricists claim, it does not all arise solely from
experience.
109 B1.
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3 Kant’s Copernican Revolution as the New Metaphysics
3.1 Introduction to Kantian Ontology
In the previous chapter I looked at what can be called the Humean problem, as a 
crucial motivation for Kant’s critical philosophy. For Kant, the problem must be
solved with reference to our a priori concepts – something that Hume could or
would not accept. As Kant proceeded in his answer to the problem, it became
crucial to claim that objects must conform to our cognition, and not vice versa, if
we are to explain how concepts which are of intellectual origin and which are
necessary for making objective judgments, can be perfectly valid of objects.110 This
account, which builds on the a priori conditions of experience, is often called Kant’s
Copernican revolution. I now want to ask: what does this revolution mean with
regard to the possibility of ontology, and how does this relate to objectivity? Was
Kant doing ontology? If yes, was it a priori ontology?111 In what way, then, was it
different from the rationalists or the scholastics? And if Kant’s categories were to be
something like concepts for the most general predicates of objects in general112, how
does the Kantian view of categories and objects differ from its ancestor, namely the
view of Aristotle?
I try to approach the matter by asking what is the relation of ontology and
objectivity. Can ontology be objective and in what way? For Kant, ontology is part
of metaphysics, which is a non-empirical science by definition, and thereby deals
with non-sensible, a priori cognition. But what kind of ontology can we have in a 
purely a priori fashion, that is, purely rationally? Can we have a priori cognition of
objects, that is, objective a priori cognition? I take it that Kant’s answer is
affirmative. And it is not only that we can, but we must have this a priori cognition
110 B xvi.
111 I here only discuss Kant’s ontology as a subsidiary question to objectivity, and do not
want to give the impression of claiming any total truths concerning Kant’s ontology. For a
more thorough investigation of Kant’s ontology, see e.g. Koistinen (2012), where Koistinen
shows that Kant does make a distinction, stating that pure metaphysics consists of and can
be divided into his [transcendental] ontology and the critique of pure reason; however, Kant
is not consistent in this, and sometimes these two are not clearly distinct (See Koistinen
2012, 125.)
112 See A11-12; B128; A246-247/B303; V-Met/Mron, 29:752; Koistinen 2012, 125.
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in order to have a posteriori cognition, that is, sensible, empirical cognition of real
objects. Kant’s new revolutionary thought, however, in a way combines Aristotle
with rationalism, and states that we can cognize a priori only the form of objects, or
the form of experience, but the matter must be sensibly given to us. Thereby full
objective cognition arises only a posteriori from experience. This means that the
only objective a priori cognition that we can have concerns only the general form of
objects, but is not in itself enough to produce a relation to real objects. Thus the
only objective a priori cognition we have is objective only formally, but for full, 
empirical objectivity we also need material objects affecting our sensibility. Let us
look at two short passages from Kant:
I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much
with objects but rather with our a priori concepts of objects in 
general. A system of such concepts would be called transcendental
philosophy.113 
Transcendental philosophy is also called ontology, and it is the
product of the critique of pure reason.114 
In these passages we see Kant’s project and his account of ontology rather clearly
defined in relation to his notion of a priori concepts. This account of a priori
concepts and a priori cognition of objects is nevertheless by no means a simple
restatement of the tradition where the thought of a priori or innate concepts played
a key role, that is, the differing thinkers who can be dubbed to propose various
forms of rationalism. Rather, Kant was fairly critical in his reception of the
rationalists, and came to share with Hume some of his starting points. Much in line
with what Hume wrote some decades earlier115, Kant writes in the Preface to the
first edition of the first Critique:
Human reason has the peculiar fate in one species of its cognitions
that it is burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since
they are given to it as problems by the nature of reason itself, but
113 A11-12.
114 V-Met/K3E, 29:949.
115 Hume 2007, 26-27 (the passage I presented in 2.2.3.).
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which it also cannot answer, since they transcend every capacity of
human reason. […]  But it thereby falls into obscurity and
contradictions, from which it can indeed surmise that it must
somewhere be proceeding on the ground of hidden errors; but it
cannot discover them, for the principles on which it is proceeding,
since they surpass the bounds of all experience, no longer recognize
any touch stone of experience. The battlefield of these endless
controversies is called metaphysics.116 
However negative this passage may seem towards metaphysics, I want to defend the
view that by no means did Kant want to be rid of metaphysics overall, rather on the
contrary, but he did want to criticize the dogmatically rationalist view of
metaphysics, and give it a critical, scientific form. What he wanted specifically was
to give sensibility, or sensible intuition, its proper role as a condition of all objective
cognition. This is obviously in opposition to any account of metaphysics which
proposes to cognize objects or lay out truths about the world purely rationally.
Thus, it seems to me impossible to arrive at a satisfactory conception of Kant’s
theory of objects and objectivity without taking on the rationalist account of
metaphysics. But what can Kant’s critical version of metaphysics and especially
ontology amount to with regard to the nature of objects, if Kant says it is primarily
concerned with “our a priori concepts of objects in general”? Is Kant’s
transcendental philosophy really at all concerned with ontology, and if yes, in what
sense?
Below I examine some aspects of Kant’s conception of ontology in relation to 
the Aristotelian-scholastic and the Leibniz-Wolffian rationalist doctrines of 
ontology, to understand what of these doctrines Kant approved and what he
rejected. I attempt to illuminate the way in which Kant thought that a purely
rational (a priori) ontology is not objective in the sense that it does not alone
provide cognition of particular objects.
Ever since the first Critique Kant has been accused of rejecting the possibility
of ontology altogether, of which an early example is Moses Mendelssohn calling
Kant the “all-destroyer”.117 Much of the negative early reception of Kant had to do
116 A vii-viii.
117 See e.g. Cassirer 1981, 369.
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with Berkeleian or phenomenalist interpretations of Kant, which of course were
soon accompanied or rivaled by more productive interpretations. Still, it seems a
matter of debate to date, what Kant’s stance toward ontology was, and what
actually happens to ontology within the context of Kant’s critical philosophy. In 
the Critique of Pure Reason Kant stated that he wanted to deny the (at the time)
classical notion of ontology, and replace it with an analysis of the understanding:
the proud name of an ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic
a priori cognitions of things in general in a systematic doctrine (e.g.
the principle of causality), must give way to the modest one of a
mere analytic of the pure understanding.118 
Nevertheless, it would be rather naïve to expect that Kant simply wanted to destroy
the field of philosophy called ontology. At times it may seem as if he wanted to get
rid of ontology and actually metaphysics overall, but a more credible depiction
might be that he only wanted to reshape them.
Olli Koistinen has shown that even though Kant’s attitude toward
metaphysics is somewhat ambivalent, and critical of some aspects of rationalist
metaphysics, the Critique of Pure Reason can, and perhaps should, be read precisely
as a project of metaphysics.119 Koistinen humorously states that at a point Kant
reported having fallen in love with metaphysics, but it is unclear whether this love
lasted throughout Kant’s philosophy. In any case, it seems clear that the relation
was somewhat unhappy, and if the love lasted, it is not sure whether the object
remained the same.120 I support the view that for Kant, the rationalist metaphysics 
of his time, ontology naturally included, was dogmatic, resulting in, as Koistinen
writes, “consistent fairy tales”.121 The problem in such metaphysics is that it fails to
pass what Koistinen calls “the intuition test”,122 that is, it fails to take into account
the proper role of sensible intuition as a condition of all cognition. And 
metaphysics, by definition, was supposed to be exactly cognition a priori.
118 A246-247/B303.
119 See Koistinen 2012 for elaboration on how Kant’s metaphysics relates to Baumgarten
etc.
120 See Koistinen 2012, 119-123.
121 Koistinen 2012, 123.
122 See Koistinen 2012, 125.
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Kant thought that in rationalist metaphysics, the role and nature of
sensibility with relation to our possibility to cognize things, was not properly
understood. The problem was that the rationalists seemed to build up systems
based only on concepts and their relations (their contradictions and non-
contradictions), regardless of the actuality or sensible conditions (of objectivity)
which could validate these concepts and judgments. What Kant made essential in
his critical metaphysics was the distinction of sensibility and understanding, as well
as the related distinction of phenomena (or appearances) and noumena. In relation
to this, he accused both the rationalists and empiricists of committing the same
mistake, namely, the failure to separate between sensibility and understanding, and
their differing tasks. This failure results in what Kant calls ‘the amphiboly of the
concepts of reflection’, in which the complex tasks involved in cognition are all
ultimately ascribed to either the intellect, as in the case of rationalists, or the senses,
as in the case of empiricists.123 Kant thought that to rationally build a philosophical
doctrine and claim it to be true about the real world, just based on a priori concepts,
is an attempt in vain, and certainly no true metaphysics concerning the world.
As I now aim to show how Kant's stance toward ontology was not as confused
as it may seem, it might be beneficial to start answering the original question by
reformulating it: in what sense is Kant’s transcendental philosophy ontology, and
in what sense is it not? The answer to this question of course depends, on the one
hand, on what ontology is, and on the other, on what the nature of Kant’s
transcendental philosophy is.
3.2 A Very Brief History of Ontology
The word ontologia, which roughly translates to the sience/study of
being/existence, was probably first used by German philosopher Jacob Lorhard in
1606.124 It was the rationalist philosopher Christian Wolff, however, who
approximately a century later popularized the term, followed by Alexander 
Baumgarten. It should be noted that the period in question, roughly a century and
a half from Lorhard’s introduction of the term to Kant’s supposed rejection of it,
123 I discuss the amphiboly section (A260-A289/B316-346) of the Critique of Pure Reason
more closely in 4.2.
124 See e.g. Øhrstrøm et al 2008.
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was a period during which metaphysics was heavily crafted into a science. This also
meant coming up with new words for its “sub-sciences”, if one may say so, and an
overall attempt to divide metaphysics into sections dealing with different aspects of
reality and being. Terms such as ‘ontosophia’ and ‘angelosophia’ were also used, but
not many of them remained in use.125 Jose Mora writes of the origin of the word, as
well as Kant’s stance to it:
Christian Wolff popularized (in philosophical circles) the word
'ontology' (ontologia, Ontologie). […] Ontology uses a
"demonstrative […] method" […] and purports to investigate the
most general predicates of all entes as such [...] Following Wolff,
Alexander Baumgarten (Metaphysica, 1740) defined ontology (also
called ontosophia, metaphysica, metaphysical universalis,
architectonic, philosophia prima) as "the science of the most
general and abstract predicates of anything" […], in so far as they
belong to the first cognitive principles of the human mind […].
Kant launched an epoch-making attack against rational ontology in 
the sense of Wolff and Baumgarten; for ontology was to him both a
pseudo-science and a temptation. He was convinced that he had
succeeded in eliminating it by the "transcendental Analytic." The
whole Critique of Pure Reason is, in a way, the work of a man who
was obsessed, and deeply distressed, by ontology.126 
Whether or not Mora’s claim of Kant’s obsession toward ontology is justified, it
seems clear that Wolff’s and Baumgarten’s doctrine of metaphysics as consisting of
proper metaphysics (ontology) and special metaphysics (cosmology, psychology and
theology), was the prevailing doctrine of metaphysics for Kant, and so it is first and
foremost this conception of metaphysics and ontology that Kant was familiar to,
and toward which his criticism also was directed. As we shall see in a bit, Kant also
divided metaphysics into two sections, but the division was different, namely (1)
125 See e.g. Mora 1963.
126 Mora 1963.
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transcendental metaphysics (ontology in the transcendental sense), and (2) proper
metaphysics (as applied to objects).127 
3.3 Aristotle as Background to Kant
Before launching into Kant’s account of ontology, another element which was
crucial at least for Kant’s terminology and architectonic should be given some
consideration. Marco Sgarbi has emphasized the fact that Aristotle’s philosophy, or
its derivative ‘Aristotelianism’, is far too seldom acknowledged to be a major
influence on Kant; little has been written on the relation of Kant to Aristotle and
Aristotelianism, and often Kant is rather depicted as an anti-Aristotelian
philosopher.128 However, Sgarbi claims that in fact “Aristotelianism had a decisive
impact on Kant’s philosophy”.129 Of course it is widely acknowledged that
127 See V-Met/K3E, 29:956. For elaboration on how Kant’s metaphysics relates to that of
Wolff’s and Baumgarten’s, see Koistinen 2012. In this context it is also worth mentioning
that when Kant wrote his Prolegomena, after publishing the first edition of the Critique of
Pure Reason, he wasn’t the first to use this term (Prolegomena), but both Wolff and
Baumgarten had written what they called a “Prolegomena” to their own doctrines of
psychology and metaphysics, respectively. Baumgarten’s Metaphysics, which was the book
used by Kant for his lectures, also includes a section titled “Prolegomena to Metaphysics”. I
do agree that Kant’s critical account of transcendental ontology, along with his self-claimed
Copernican revolution, is largely critical toward rationalist ontology, starting already with
the rather early text Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. Still, it should be noted that the influence of
the rationalist tradition was so heavy, that much of what Kant writes seems to be written
precisely in relation to it, and in fact so, that Kant seems to build his version of ontology at
least structurally with the aim of replacing it part by part.
128 Sgarbi 2016, 217. Sgarbi (2016, 5) writes: “Historical comparisons between Kant and
Aristotle in the fields of metaphysics, logic, and methodology are few and far between. My 
proposal, following Giorgio Tonelli’s suggestion, is to read Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason not 
as a treatise on metaphysics or on the theory of knowledge, but as a book on logic and,
more specifically, on the “method” of metaphysics, which must be understood within the
Aristotelian tradition: “referring the Critique of Pure Reason to its logical matrix has the
most far-reaching consequences on the very intelligibility, and on the historical and 
philosophical interpretation of this work [. . .] the whole general structure of the Critique,
seen in this light, does not appear any more as a personal, and largely obscure and arbitrary,
creation of its author, but as the meaningful outcome of some basic traditions in the history
of logic.” In this sense the whole first Critique would have been a propaedeutic tool for 
metaphysics, while the “critique” would have been a canon for the possibility of knowing an
object in general.”
129 Sgarbi 2016, 218.
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Aristotle’s philosophy was a major influence on what is called scholastic
philosophy, but I find credible Sgarbi’s claim that his study of “Konigsberg’s
intellectual context shows that it was a melting pot for various philosophical
traditions, and that, at least up until the first three decades of the eighteenth
century, the dominant philosophy was Aristotelianism.”130 Based on this 
observation, it is not so surprising to find, upon an even mediocre level of scrutiny,
astoundingly many Aristotelian terms and elements in Kant’s philosophy.131 
When one starts to look at the formulations in the first Critique in this
respect, it is striking how full of Aristotelian terminology the work is. Terminology
in itself, of course, does not mean that much, as one can say that Kant is using the
terms in a very different manner. But is he really using the terms in such a different
manner? Furthermore, the structure of the Critique, along with the many
unexpressed presuppositions, point toward an Aristotelian framework of logic,
syllogisms, analytics, categories and deductions. Historically, Marco Sgarbi has
traced Kant’s deeper acquaintance with Aristotelianism to a specific time in the
beginning of what some call Kant’s ‘silent decade’, namely the years 1771-1772.132 
Let us first make a few observations about what Kant wrote or spoke
concerning Aristotle and logic. First of all, for Kant, logic has to do only with
concepts (or form, in Kant’s Aristotelian terms), and their relations, and not with
actual objects or sensations caused by them etc. (matter, in Kant’s Aristotelian
terms). Kant holds Aristotle high with regard to logic, but not as much with regard
130 Sgarbi 2016, 217-218.
131 I make no strong claim, but suggest that, as the relation of Aristotle and Kant is often
only seen interesting or relevant from the point of view of ethics, some Aristotelian
tendencies in Kant’s philosophy are commonly overlooked. It seems somewhat plausible to 
me that in his critical philosophy, especially in the first Critique, Kant was trying to construct
a sort of organon akin to that of Aristotle’s, which could serve as a basis for all philosophical
enquiries from there on. See A11-12/B24-26.
132 Sgarbi 2016, 51. Sgarbi (2016, 5) also writes: “the seeds and roots of Kant’s philosophy
originated between 1766 and 1772, but […] they do not find a full expression in either the
Dreams of a Spirit-Seer or the Inaugural Dissertation. From the logical standpoint, the
enterprise of criticism began only with the discovery of the Aristotelian doctrine of 
categories as an essential part in the conception of synthetic a priori knowledge, in other
words after 1772. Kant, however, came to this doctrine only after two decades of failed
attempts and only, as I have already mentioned, after turning away from Wolffian
rationalism and British empiricism. There was an evolution in Kant’s thought from the false
starts and incomplete projects of the precritical period to the discovery of the key of his
transcendental logic.”
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to metaphysics. This is, to simplify a bit, because of Aristotle’s (alleged) confusion
of the proper fields and methods of logic vs metaphysics (which confusion
resembles what Kant calls ‘the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection’133):
Aristotle erred by including in logic a division of general concepts
by means of which one can think objects; this belongs to
metaphysics. Logic has to do with concepts whatever they might
be, and deals only with their relation.134 
Aristotle can be regarded as the father of logic. But his logic is too
scholastic, full of subtleties, and fundamentally has not been of
much value to the human understanding. It is a dialectic and an
organon for the art of disputation. Still, the principal ideas from it
have been preserved, and this is because logic is not occupied with
any object and hence it can be quickly exhausted.135 
From these passages one might get the impression that Kant opposed Aristotle,
which in general is only partly the case. The passages nevertheless do illustrate what
Kant considered Aristotle’s failure, namely the inability to separate logic from
metaphysics, in the sense that only the latter should and even can be concerned
about objects and the conditions of thinking about objects, whereas logic should
only concern concepts and their relations. On the other hand, Kant obviously
recognized the immense value of Aristotle’s logic as such:
From Aristotle’s time on, logic has not gained much in content, by
the way, nor can it by its nature do so. But it can surely gain in
regard to exactness, determinateness, and distinctness. … Aristotle
had not omitted any moment of the understanding; we are only
more exact, methodical, and orderly in this.136 
133 A260-A289/B316-346. As a note: Kant saw Locke as a kind of follower of Aristotle, and
Leibniz as a kind of follower of Plato.
134 R4450, 17:556.
135 V-Lo/Wiener, 24:796.
136 V-Lo/Jäsche, 9:20.
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We have no one who has exceeded Aristotle or enlarged his <pure>
logic (which is in itself fundamentally impossible) just as no
mathematician has exceeded Euclid.137 
These passages show that Kant thought highly of Aristotle’s logic per se, and saw
himself as continuing, or rather improving, the work of Aristotle. But what is the
purpose and scope of logic according to Kant? It seems crucial for Kant that logic
be separated from other fields, such as psychology and most importantly
metaphysics, and that logic should only be concerned with concepts and their
relations (form), and not with content (matter). The following passages, which
criticize given accounts of logic, shed some light on the matter:
After [Aristotle and Peter Ramus] come Malebranche and Locke.
This last wrote a treatise de intellectu humano. But both writings
deal not only with the form of the understanding but with
content. They are preparatory exercises for metaphysics. … The
logic of Crusius is crammed full of things that are drawn from
other sciences, and it contains metaphysical and theological
principles. Lambert wrote an organon of pure reason.138 
So, for Kant, logic is something that should only be concerned with the form of
understanding or thinking (and thereby concepts and their relations,
contradictions etc.), and should not concern individual objects, the matter or
sensible content of representations. But what, then, is the relation and relevance of
logic to metaphysics? Huaping Lu-Adler writes:
For Kant, a strictly scientific logic deals with nothing other than
the form of thinking, in abstraction from all relation (Beziehung)
to the object, that is, from all content (Inhalt) of thought
(A55/B79). This notion of logic underlay Kant’s earlier complaint
that Aristotle’s logic wrongly included a division of the concepts by
which to think objects. It is now also his basis for charging Locke
137 V-Lo/DW, 24:700.
138 V-Lo/Wiener, 24:796.
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with mixing in logic a metaphysical topic, namely the origin of
concepts, and Lambert with making logic an instrument or
‘organon’ of substantive knowledge.139 
Kant’s thought was that logic, as concerning only form (or concepts and their
relations), cannot in itself claim anything about objects, without material
elements.140 One of the most important aspects of Kant’s critical philosophy indeed
is his conception of objects (as appearances) as consisting of matter and form. It is a
matter of debate, however, as to how Kant’s use of the notions differs from
Aristotle. I find it plausible that Aristotle is perhaps not directly a major influence
on the birth of Kant’s critical philosophy, but Aristotelianism, as Marco Sgarbi has
shown, definitely is.141 Many Aristotelian elements can be found in Kant, but based 
on Sgarbi’s research, perhaps the most essential ones are the facultative logic, the
categories and forms of judgment, the distinction of matter and form, and the
distinction of logic into analytic and dialectic.142 Many of these of course come
together when discussing Aristotle’s view on the nature and method of
metaphysics, the ‘first philosophy’, or the study of ‘being as being’. And this brings
us to another question: does Kant’s use of the Aristotelian framework and concepts
serve either metaphysical or epistemological purposes, or are they, for Kant,
inseparable? Sgarbi claims the following with regard to the aim of Kant’s critical
project, in relation to the categories:
Kant’s doctrine of categories arises from the failure of the
precritical attempts at finding first, simplest, and primitive
concepts that, once combined, can explain reality in its complexity: 
it is the failure of the syllogistic and combinatoric project. […] The
result of Kant’s investigation is essentially threefold: (1) the
impossibility of finding first, simplest, and primitive concepts that, 
139 Lu-Adler 2016, 5.
140 As has been stated, the notions of matter and form, which seem very suitable for
describing Kant’s view, are of Aristotelian origin, and were not really present in Kant’s pre-
critical writings. Kant’s first proper use of ‘matter and form’ is found in the Inaugural
Dissertation, AA 2:392. See Sgarbi 2016, 84.
141 See Sgarbi 2016.
142 See Sgarbi 2016, 220.
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once recombined, can describe the whole of reality; (2) concepts
are merely heuristic devices to explain reality, but they are in no
way constituent building blocks of it; and (3) logical investigation
cannot start from concepts, but from judgments from which the
concepts are determined. Starting from these results, at the
beginning of the 1770s, Kant adopts the Aristotelian doctrine of
categories, understood not as the highest kinds or first concepts,
but as modi considerandi and cognoscendi. Categories as modi
considerandi are what gives determinate significance to the object
of knowledge. This notion of “category” is traceable back to early-
modern Aristotelianism in authors such as Zabarella and Pace, but 
was followed in particular by Rabe in his commentary to Aristotle’s
categories. Also the idea of schema, the figure of the process of the
attribution and arrangement of categories for describing reality, has 
an Aristotelian origin […]143 
I find no reason to doubt Sgarbi’s claims of the historical predecessors from whom
Kant might have gotten inspiration to draw on Aristotelian doctrines. Neither do I
have much against Sgarbi’s claim of the categories as modi cognoscendi. Sgarbi gives
plenty of evidence to show that Kant himself identified modi cognoscendi with 
form.144 Based on this evidence it seems fair and accurate to say that, for Kant, space
and time are the modi cognoscendi of sensibility, and the categories are the modi 
cognoscendi of the understanding.145 These forms are conditions for the
organization of the matter, and thereby a priori with regard to cognizing the
content. As conditions of cognition of objects (as appearances), the categories can a
priori be cognized as attributable to all possible objects of experience, that is, to all
appearances. In this sense, however, it would also make sense to say that the
categories are – not only modi cognoscendi, but – something like ‘first concepts’ or
‘highest kinds’, with the restriction that they are not highest kinds with regard to
things in themselves, but with regard to appearances. Amie Thomasson writes:
143 Sgarbi 2016, 220.
144 See e.g. Sgarbi 2016, 85.
145 Sgarbi 2016, 86-87.
66
 
 
 
         
   
 
  
   
      
      
  
 
   
  
  
    
      
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
 
   
  
 
 
  
  
 
   
    
Although these are categories of the understanding, they
nonetheless retain a certain sort of ontological import, as it is a
priori that they apply universally to all objects of possible cognition
(A79/B105). In this way, by delineating the concepts that are a
priori necessary for the cognition of objects, we can acquire 
knowledge of categories governing any possible object of cognition,
and so acquire a sort of descriptive set of ontological categories,
though these must be understood explicitly as categories of objects of
possible cognition, not of the thing in itself.146 
I find this description of Kantian categories quite fitting. Thomasson’s mitigating
addition of “sort of” could perhaps even be omitted, since the categories do retain
ontological import in Kant’s sense of ontology, because, as Thomasson puts it, “it is
a priori that they apply universally to all objects of possible cognition”. This is what
Kant means by the a priori objective validity of the categories.
3.4 Kant’s Notions of Metaphysics and Ontology
In one of his lectures on metaphysics Kant introduced ontology as part of 
metaphysics in the following way:
We now begin the science of the properties of all things in general,
which is called ontology. […] One easily comprehends that it will
contain nothing but all basic concepts and basic propositions of
our a priori cognition in general: for if it is to consider the 
properties of all things, then it has as an object nothing but a thing
in general, i.e., every object of thought, thus no determinate object.
Thus nothing remains for me other than the cognizing, which I
consider.147 
For Kant, ontology is not a science of some individual objects, but of objects (of
thought) in general, and thereby actually concerns cognition itself, along with its
146 Thomasson 2019, 1.2.
147 Kant, V-Met/Mron, 29:784.
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basic concepts and propositions. Kant’s view in general is that it is the essence of
metaphysics not to be empirical with regard to either (1) the sources of concepts, or
(2) the objects of enquiry. In the above passage Kant states that metaphysics does
not consider any given, determinate object, and is thus not derived from experience.
Rather, it is exactly that science which is completely a priori. In the Prolegomena he
writes:
First, concerning the sources of metaphysical cognition, it already
lies in the concept of metaphysics that they cannot be empirical.
The principles of such cognition (which include not only its
fundamental propositions or basic principles, but also its
fundamental concepts) must therefore never be taken from
experience; for the cognition is supposed to be not physical but
metaphysical, i.e., lying beyond experience. Therefore it will be
based upon neither outer experience, which constitutes the source
of physics proper, nor inner, which provides the foundation of 
empirical psychology. It is therefore cognition a priori, or from
pure understanding and pure reason.148 
In the passage we can see that metaphysics is defined in relation to experience as
that which is prior, or beyond, experience. Now, if Kant wanted to be rid of all
metaphysics, he would most likely not have tried to build a theory, in addition to a 
critique, of our a priori cognition. But as we know, he did build such a theory, and it
should be noted that the ‘critique’ does not refer to a rejection but rather to a
proper way of examining this type of cognition. In his lectures on metaphysics,
Kant stated the following concerning metaphysics and ontology:
Metaphysics or the system of the pure cognitions of reason divides
into two main sections:
I. Transcendental metaphysics, or that part of metaphysics which
exhibits elementary concepts in order to cognize a priori objects
which can be given: this system of metaphysical cognitions is called
ontology and rests on dissection of reason according to all the 
148 Prol. 4:265-6.
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elementary concepts contained in it, e.g., magnitude, quality,
substance, cause, effect, etc.
II. Metaphysics proper <metaphysica propria>, as metaphysics is 
called when it is applied to objects themselves [...]149 
Here we see that Kant keeps ‘ontology’, even after the first Critique, 
terminologically as an essential part of his definition of metaphysics. Ontology is
now the transcendental doctrine of elementary concepts of a priori cognition. Of 
course the context of the passage is that of teaching metaphysics in general, but it
reflects Kant’s own critical/transcendental views, as is seen from the important
reference to objects “which can be given”. To make it clear, ontology is now about a
priori cognition of – not things in themselves or noumena, but – things that can be
sensibly given, namely empirical objects.
Based on the above, Kant does not reject either metaphysics in general, nor
even ontology, but rather redefines both while maintaining some aspects and
structures of the metaphysics of his predecessors. Even though Kant at times seems
to have problems with relating his doctrine of transcendental idealism to previous
metaphysics, with regard to both content and terminology, I still find no serious
contradictions even when comparing his somewhat older lecture notes to his more
‘official’ views, presented in the Critiques. Olli Koistinen has shown that what 
seems to be ‘the heart’ of the first Critique, that is, the ‘Transcendental Analytic’,
“has a structure that closely resembles the structure of the metaphysics presented in
the lecture notes. Within this structure we may read the ‘Metaphysical Deduction’
as ontology (as presenting the source of the pure concepts of the understanding),
the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ as presenting the extent and borders of pure 
reason, and the ‘Analytic of Principles’ as applied metaphysics. This said, I suggest
that Kant in no way abandons metaphysics, but rather his transcendental account
of metaphysics is all about making metaphysics objective, in the sense of being
concerned precisely with the universal and necessary conditions of representing and
cognizing objects.150 
149 V-Met/K3E, 29:956.
150 According to Karl Ameriks (2003, 5), Kant's metaphysics remains essentially rationalist,
regardless of Kant criticizing both his scholastic and rationalist predecessors. On this matter,
I cannot bring myself to agree that Kant’s metaphysics is essentially rationalist, even though
I have already tried to show some of the terminological and structural inheritances to Kant
from the rationalists.
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3.5 Further remarks on Kant’s Metaphysics and Ontology
One of the relevant aspects of Kant's debt to his predecessors, and one relevant to
the matter at hand, has to do with his notion of a thing in itself.151 This notion is,
yet again, a bitterly debated issue in the scholarship, much of which debate relates
somehow to the rather well-known debate between one-world and two-world 
views.152 As I interpret the notion, the notion of 'thing in itself' refers simply to a
thing in itself, that is, with no additions or relational properties. These additions
would be the forms (characterized by Sgarbi as modi cognoscendi)153 of sensibility
and understanding, that is, space, time, and the categories. Thus, a thing in itself is a
thing without these forms or modes; an abstraction of a kind; (in a specific sense) a 
formless something.
But Kant was not the first philosopher to speak of things in themselves, 
although in the Kantian sense he most probably was. I mean this both literally and
content-wise, as I think it is worth noting that the notion connects both to John
Locke and to Aristotle. Kant had read Locke’s Essay154, and even makes detailed
references to it. In the Essay Locke uses the phrase ‘things themselves’ to refer to, 
not the perceived qualities (whether primary or secondary) of things or objects, but
rather the proper object or thing, consisting of mathematically depictable
properties, to which the perceived qualities have a relation of resemblance.
Yasuhiko Tomida has claimed that “Kant’s ‘things in themselves’, ‘affection’, and
sensible ‘representations’ correspond to Locke’s ‘things themselves’, ‘affection’, and
sensible ‘ideas’, respectively”.155 
Another question to ask is whether Kant’s notion of ‘things in themselves’, or
‘thing in itself’, is in any interesting way related to the Aristotelian doctrine of
metaphysics as the study of being qua being, or being in itself. It is well-known that
Aristotle characterized ‘Metaphysics’, or the first philosophy, as a study of ‘being
qua being’. That is, it is a study of being as being, or to put in another way, it
concerns no special or limited group of beings or ways of being, but rather the most
151 I have above not explicated this notion (thing in itself, Das Ding an Sich), or my
understanding of it, but will attempt to do so in 4.1.
152 See e.g. Oberst 2015 or Schulting 2011, 1-25.
153 Sgarbi 2016, 86-90.
154 Locke, John 1997 [1690]. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
155 Tomida 2009, 51-52. I consider Kant’s relation to Locke with regard to things (in)
themselves, as well as the distinction of primary and secondary qualities, in chapter 5.
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general predicates of all beings, and thereby being itself. This idea of being as being 
has actually been a matter of debate in Aristotelianism and in later studies of
Aristotle and Aristotelianism, and has taken many forms and undergone changes
from Aristotle to the Scholastics, e.g. to Francisco Suarez' concept of ens ut sic, that
is, being as such.156 It is obviously not my view that Kant simply took his concept
from e.g. Suarez or other Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophers, but rather that
Kant's metaphysical doctrine is rather a comment or a move in the line of moves
which can partly be traced back to Suarez, as well as other Aristotelians. If
metaphysics, for Suarez, in general was the study of being, ens, in all of its aspects, 
then the study concerning the very essence of that being (ens ut sic) was the prime
metaphysics, which later came to be known as ontology, and which would  suffer a
heavy blow from the fist of Kant's Critique. Again, this blow can be claimed to
essentially include the Copernican revolution as the claim that we can only have a 
priori cognition of the formal aspects of objects, and are only allowed to use our a 
priori concepts in relation to what can possibly be given to us sensibly. That means
that our a priori cognition is limited to the objects of experience, and not valid of 
objects in themselves, as Kant took the rationalists to think. The categories, then,
are only objective and thereby objectively valid in relation to the conditions of
sensible intuition. Kant writes:
the understanding can never accomplish a priori anything more
than to anticipate the form of a possible experience in general, and
since that which is not appearance cannot be an object of
experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility within
which alone objects are given to us. Its principles are merely
principles of the exposition of appearances, and the proud name of
an ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognitions
of things in general in a systematic doctrine (e.g. the principle of
causality), must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of 
the pure understanding.157 
This passage seems to nicely tie up what I have dealt with this far in the study, 
namely the possibility of ontology and a priori cognition, including the principle of
156 See Pabst, 318-319, and Doyle, 22.
157 A246-247/B303.
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causality which was highly relevant with regard to Hume, in relation to the “form
of a possible experience” and the “limits of sensibility within which alone objects
are given to us”. What Kant essentially is saying here, is that our a priori cognition is
relevant, and the a priori concepts, such as causality, are valid, only in relation to
appearances as objects of a possible experience. Without this limitation ontology is 
useless, and were it meant to refer to this unlimited use, the whole notion of
ontology should be replaced by “the analytic of the pure understanding”. This is not
only a terminological question, because it is so essentially related to understanding
the nature and scope of Kant’s transcendental idealism altogether.
As I have already pointed out, Kant is not actually criticizing ontology
altogether, or saying that all ontology is impossible. Rather he is criticizing such a
way of doing ontology that makes claims of real existing things purely rationally. In 
other words, he is criticizing rational ontology. The point with regard to the notion
of ontology is simply that as the word ontology at Kant’s time was used to imply
something along the lines of Wolff’s or Baumgarten’s conception of ontology, the
whole concept seemed for Kant a failure and an impossibility. Thus for the critical
system he does not even want to use the word, but talks of an “analytic of the pure
understanding” replacing “ontology” in the new critical system of metaphysics.
When put in context of Kant’s transcendental idealism, the point, however, is also
to deny a priori knowledge concerning things in themselves, as they can never be
given in intuition. All that we can do with critical, or transcendental, ontology, is “a 
kind of self-cognition”, or an examination of “the principles of a priori cognizing in
general”, that is, what I call a transcendental ontology of subject and object. Kant 
explicates this in the following passages from his lectures on metaphysics:
Thus transcendental philosophy could also be called
transcendental logic. It occupies itself with the sources, the extent,
and the boundaries of pure reason, without busying itself with
objects. For that reason it is wrong to call it ontology
<ontologiam>. There we consider things already according to their
general properties. Transcendental logic abstracts from all that; it is 
a kind of self-cognition.158 
158 V-Met/Mron, 29:756.
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[...] while ontology has no determinate object, it can contain
nothing but the principles of a priori cognizing in general: thus the
science of all basic concepts and basic propositions upon which all
of our pure cognitions of reason rest is ontology. But this science
will not be properly called ontology. For to have a thing in general
as an object is as much as to have no object and to treat only of a
cognition, as in logic. The name, however, sounds as if it had a
determinate object. But this science has no object that would be
distinguishable from the essence of reason, but rather it considers
understanding and reason itself, namely their basic concepts and
basic propositions in their pure use (or of pure reason and pure 
understanding); the most fitting name would be transcendental
philosophy.159 
So, even if Kant here saw it practical to refrain from using the term ontology, he
also, as we saw in the passages from the Metaphysik Vigilantius160, continued to use
the word to describe his transcendental philosophy, even after writing the
Critiques. There can be seen to be a use for the name of ontology when the things
that the knowledge is to be about are not things in themselves but appearances. In a 
sense Kant's transcendental philosophy fulfills the criteria of ontology, namely in 
the sense that it considers and acquires knowledge concerning every possible object
(of experience) and their general predicates. This is the sense in which it is relevant
to the investigation at hand, namely with regard to the Humean problem of
causality, and thereby with regard to the problem of objective reference altogether.
What it doesn't do, on the other hand, is offer a priori knowledge of things in
themselves. In this sense, Kant's transcendental (critical) philosophy isn't or doesn't
include (rational) ontology.
Kant's thought was that with regard to noumenal reality we can have no
ontology, that is, a doctrine concerning the essences or properties of things or
objects in themselves. A position claiming this would claim, in Kantian
terminology, a kind of a noumenal ontology, which would be exactly what Kant
criticized in Wolff and Leibniz, especially in the Amphiboly section in the first
159 V-Met/Mron, 29:784-786.
160 V-Met/K3E, 29:949 ["Transcendental philosophy is also called ontology, and it is the
product of the critique of pure reason."]  and 29:956.
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Critique. On the other hand, if we restrict ontology to be a doctrine of the essences
or properties of appearances, then it is possible to have such a doctrine, but as Kant
pointed out, it might be better to call such a doctrine the analytic of the
understanding, so to make clear that this doctrine does not make claims of things in
themselves, but only appearances, and even there, it actually makes claims
concerning no particular thing or object but rather the concepts of an object in
general.
For the reasons explicated above it was essential for Kant to redefine the
notion of a priori, as this notion is required to solve the Humean problem, as
something related only to the form of objects of experience. To be even possible
objects of experience, these objects must be such that they can be given to the
understanding sensibly. This implies the distinction of things in themselves and
appearances, as the a priori cognition that Kant is seeking will only be applicable to
the latter. What I wish to have made clear this far, is that according to Kant, we
must have a priori cognition, because certain concepts, as well as objective
experience itself, would not be valid or possible without it, but this cognition only 
concerns objects which can be sensibly given. Now we must turn to the question of
why this a priori cognition is applicable to even the objects of experience, that is,
why and how are the forms of sensibility and the understanding universally
objective.
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4 Objective Reference 
4.1 The Notions of Objects and Objectivity
Let us begin this discussion with a thought, or the assumption that there are things,
or objects, around us. These things presumably also affect us in many ways. Some of
these affections create what we call representations in us. Now, should we then call
these representations objective, if they were brought about by the objects? But if we 
did, why wouldn’t every affection caused by any object be ‘objective’? No, this
cannot be what we mean by objectivity, and it is not what Kant means, either.
Something else is meant by objectivity, and this something is the focus of this
chapter. Kant writes:
Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of cognitions. 
These consist in the determinate relation of given representations
to an object. An object, however, is that in the concept of which
the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now, however, all
unification of representations requires unity of consciousness in
the synthesis of them. Consequently the unity of consciousness is
that which alone constitutes the relation of representations to an
object, thus their objective validity, and consequently is that which
makes them into cognitions and on which even the possibility of
the understanding rests.161 
What Kant here calls a “determinate relation of given representations to an object”
is the key here. I have already stated my basic view, according to which objectivity
per se, in Kant’s sense, means the object-relatedness or object-directedness of 
representations. I have just also stated that objectivity does not mean something
like the mere affections created by objects. These affections are of course necessary
for objectivity, but something else seems to be needed to make the representations
objective, meaning that the representations are really and validly about the objects.
The task of this chapter is to try to explicate what this something else is, and why.
161 B137.
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For Kant, both the Humean phenomenalist account of cognition, as well as
rationalist metaphysics, were deeply unsatisfying theories. From Kant’s perspective, 
these previous accounts were incapable of explaining the objectivity, or objective
validity, of such crucial metaphysical concepts as substance, causality and necessity.
To be precise, what is at stake here, is not mainly the usefulness, but the origin –
and along with it the validity – of these concepts, which we seem to need as a basis
for all objective, empirical judgments.162 For how are we to cognize and describe the
world if we cannot validly say that there are ‘objects’ or ‘substances’, and that they 
affect other objects, which affect them, and yet other objects, and so forth,
reciprocally, according to universal and necessary rules? Making any statements
about these things, and even thinking these things, requires concepts, by which we
synthesize and universalize given content, and thereby achieve objectivity.
Objective cognition cannot be simply contingent being-affected-by-objects in this
or that way. Even if this affection were assumed to work according to rules or laws
(of nature), this affection would not in itself produce any general or universally 
valid cognition, or unified experience. And even though e.g. Hume wrote of the
‘uniformity’ of experience, the empiricist accounts were still somewhat atomistic
and subjectivistic with regard to cognition, and most of all, seemed to lack a ground
for the universality and necessary unity of experience, which Kant sought.
As I want to lay it out, this missing ground Kant finds in our universal
capacity of making judgments which apply the a priori categories to objects of
sensibility. In my view, it is precisely the concepts and forms of judgment, which
carry the generality and universality needed for what we call cognition. But the
concepts in themselves would not be cognition, if they were in no way related to
objects of sensibility. Kant writes:
162 In the Prolegomena, Kant writes of Hume and the Humean Problem: “The question was
not, whether the concept of cause is right, useful, and, with respect to all cognition of 
nature, indispensable, for this Hume had never put in doubt; it was rather whether it is
thought through reason a priori, and in this way has an inner truth independent of all
experience, and therefore also a much more widely extended use which is not limited
merely to objects of experience: regarding this Hume awaited enlightenment. The
discussion was only about the origin of this concept, not about its indispensability in use; if
the former were only discovered, the conditions of its use and the sphere in which it can be
valid would already be given.” (Kant, Prol. 4:258-259.)
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We cannot think any object except through categories; we cannot
cognize any object that is thought except through intuitions that
correspond to those concepts. Now all our intuitions are sensible,
and this cognition, so far as its object is given, is empirical.
Empirical cognition, however, is experience. Consequently no a 
priori cognition is possible for us except solely of objects of 
possible experience.163 
Kant’s view could perhaps be simplified in the following way: concepts, however
essential they may be, are worth nothing if we cannot show their objective validity.
Concepts need to be validly and universally about objects, that is, if they are to be
objective. Sensations brought about by objects are also in themselves not objective
cognition, because if not related to anything universal and necessary (concepts and
their related rules), the sensations are contingent and subjective. The question of 
objectivity is thus not only how objects affect us, even though this is part of the
issue, but how these affections relate to our representational acts and faculties, so 
that we can claim to represent the objects in a universally and necessarily valid way. 
Kant continues the above passage:
But this cognition, which is limited merely to objects of experience,
is not on that account all borrowed from experience; rather with
regard to the pure intuitions as well as the pure concepts of the
understanding, there are elements of cognition that are to be
encountered in us a priori. Now there are only two ways in which a 
necessary agreement of experience with its concepts can be
thought: either the experience makes these concepts possible or
these concepts make the experience possible. The first is not the
case with the categories (nor with pure sensible intuition); for they
are a priori concepts, hence independent of experience (the
assertion of an empirical origin would be a sort of generatio
aequivoca). Consequently only the second way remains (as it were a
system of the epigenesis of pure reason): namely that the
163 B165-166.
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categories contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience in
general from the side of the understanding.164 
This passage is important in its clarity. First of all, empirical cognition is limited to
objects of experience. Experience, accordingly, is experience of empirical objects;
thus it is empirically objective. But in what sense is experience valid or necessary? In
the sense that there is a completely necessary agreement of “experience with its
concepts”. The nature of this necessary agreement, which is based on the claim that
only these concepts make the experience possible, is one of the focuses of this
chapter.
To proceed, let us take a closer look at some of Kant’s essential notions, and
their roles with regard to the possibility of objectivity. J. Michael Young writes of
Kant’s notions of object and objectivity:
The notion of an object, along with such related notions as those of
objectivity and objective validity, plays a prominent and important
role in Kant’s theory of knowledge, especially in his famous 
“transcendental deduction.” After identifying a set of pure
concepts or categories, Kant seeks in the deduction to show that
they possess objective validity, i.e., that they can legitimately be
applied to the objects of experience. His endeavors necessarily
involve him in an analysis of the notion of an object, for he grants
what Hume had argued concerning the concept of causality,
namely, that the applicability of the categories cannot be
established straightforwardly, by an appeal to empirical evidence. It
must be established indirectly instead, through an analysis of the
very notion of an object.165 
As said earlier, it is the validity of the categories in relation to objects which is 
crucial for Kantian objectivity in general. Objectivity per se only means object-
relatedness, but the question is: what does this relation consist of? How does this
relatedness come about, and under which conditions? These are not questions
164 B166-167.
165 Young 1970, 71.
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which can be treated in isolation from Kant’s other claims and theories.
Nevertheless, as Young states, Kant deals with this question especially in a section
of the first Critique called the ‘transcendental deduction’, as a question of the
objective validity of the categories, and the conditions of the unity of objective
representation. But, again, the validity of the categories is hardly explainable
without reference to other Kantian notions and his doctrine of faculties.
Now, I will not try to conduct a thorough examination or even an explication
of Kant’s doctrine of faculties. Nevertheless, some account of them is required here.
I present my reading of Kant’s philosophy throughout this study, but my simplified
reading of some of Kant’s basic notions is as follows. According to the Critique of
Pure Reason we are in possession of three original faculties, namely sense, 
imagination and apperception.166 I take it that it can be supposed that the co-
workings of these basic and original faculties ‘produce’ the other faculties, e.g.
sensibility and the understanding. In the course of the work I will come to make
reference to the tasks of these faculties, but it should perhaps already be mentioned
that in Kant’s view we do need all of the three original faculties for objective 
cognition. The role of transcendental apperception, however, is crucial for objective
reference, as it seems to serve the purpose of creating a (self-)consciously unified
and objective relation of the representations to the object.167 Only in this relation
are both, the subject and the object, represented to the subject self-consciously. And 
this act of representing objects, which involves unification of different
representations, seems to require that these representations belong to a single
consciousness.168 As I stated above, it is the role of the concepts (of an object in
general) and the forms of judgments, to bring generality, universality and necessity
to our representations. Let us look at the three following quotes from the Critique 
of Pure Reason, which now serve to illuminate a route to Kant's account of objective
reference and objectivity in general:
The pure concept of this transcendental object (which in all of our
cognitions is really always one and the same = X) is that which in all
166 See A94, A97-98 and A114-115 (Sinn, Einbildungskraft, Apperzeption). It is noteworthy,
however, that the three original sources or capacities are not as such mentioned in the B-
deduction, nor is their relation to apprehension, reproduction and recognition.
167 I discuss Kant’s notion of apperception below, especially in 4.3.
168 See Wiliams 2017, 69.
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of our empirical concepts in general can provide relation to an 
object, i.e., objective reality.169 
If we investigate what new characteristic is given to our
representations by the relation to an object, and what is the
dignity that they thereby receive, we find that it does nothing
beyond making the combination of representations necessary in a 
certain way, and subjecting them to a rule [...] 170 
[...] a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given 
cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.171 
I do not wish to oversimplify these complex passages, but as a preliminary outline, I 
wish to interpret Kant as claiming that there are concepts which are more general
than any empirical concept, but which still are to be valid of any empirical object.
Further, not only are these concepts to be valid of all objects we may encounter, but
these concepts are that which provides the objectivity, or objective reality to our
empirical representations, and relate them to objects. These universal concepts of
objects in general are the categories, which represent the universal rules of
synthesizing representations, and they are necessary for any objective
representation.172 For subjective representation, such as sensations (in themselves), 
these concepts are not needed.173 Now, by these concepts – or the concept of a
169 A109.
170 A197/B242-3.
171 B141.
172 According to my view, the categories can thereby be taken to be concepts for the most
general predicates of all possible objects. See e.g. A11-12, B128, A246-247/B303, V-
Met/Mron, 29:752 and Koistinen 2012, 125.
173 There is, however, heated discussion concerning questions of what is the relation of the
categories (and the unity of apperception) to our sensibility, and whether we need concepts
for intuitions etc. Lately this discussion has often taken place in the context of the debate of
conceptualism vs. nonconceptualism, which really is too complex to sum up here. At the
moment, I only wish to claim that according to Kant, we can at least be affected by objects
which produce something in us, completely regardless of concepts. Just to give an example
of a moderate nonconceptual view, let us see what Lucy Allais (2016, 4) writes: “It seems to
me impossible to dispute that Kant is a conceptualist about cognition; he does not think we 
have or could have cognition without the application of concepts (A51–2/B75–6; 
A320/B377). Similarly, I think that the overwhelming evidence is that Kant does not think we
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transcendental object, in which concept the categories are united, so to say – we are 
able to think about an object, or, be (self-)conscious of the object(s). This
consciousness is, according to Kant, only possible if there are certain, unchanging
elements involved, such as the a priori concepts, the rules of synthesizing
representations, and the capacity of apperception, by which the representations are
united into one. Thus we find an aspect of objectivity here: it is the act of conscious
relating of our representations to objects, which relating follows universal and
necessary rules. As a note, I do confess to have given the above statement a bit
hurriedly, but below I attempt to clarify and justify it.
Before we proceed further, however, there seems to be a need to address some
essential notions, which I have used above, but not sufficiently explicated.174 One
group of terms in question refers to different kinds or aspects of objects, and they
are the following: thing in itself, appearance, phenomenon and noumenon.175 By
saying that these are different kinds or aspects of objects, I do not mean that they
are completely different and separate real entities, but rather objects of differing
faculties or representations. The difference is based on what these representations
(objects) are objects of or for. Clearly I cannot here give full arguments for my
interpretation of these notions, but I must settle for an explication of how I
interpret them. In addition to the immediately following section below, the
arguments I give for this interpretation are found in the ways in which this
interpretation makes use and sense of them throughout this study.
Let us start with a passage from the B-edition’s Preface, where Kant presents
the distinction of things as appearances and things in themselves, and claims that
space and time are neither things in themselves nor predicates of things in
themselves, but rather they are forms of sensible intuition, and as such, conditions
for experience and objectivity:
could have what he calls “experience” without concepts, but this is simply because what he
means by “experience” is empirical cognition (and not, for example, phenomenological
consciousness). Whether or not Kant is a conceptualist about perception is less clear. As I
shall show, conceptualists have clear texts to appeal to here. On the other hand, a few
nonconceptualists have, it seems to me, given compelling reasons for caution here, based
on seeing specifically what Kant means by “perception”, and that he may be using the word
technically.”
174 This is not to say that I am able to sufficiently explicate them now.
175 Das Ding an Sich, Erscheinung, Phenomenon, Noumenon.
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In the analytical part of the critique it is proved that space and time
are only forms of sensible intuition, and therefore only conditions
of the existence of the things as appearances, further that we have no
concepts of the understanding and hence no elements for the
cognition of things except insofar as an intuition can be given 
corresponding to these concepts, consequently that we can have
cognition of no object as a thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an
object of sensible intuition, i.e. as an appearance; from which follows
the limitation of all even possible speculative cognition of reason to
mere objects of experience.176 
In this passage Kant speaks of things or objects as appearances and as things in
themselves. This could be taken to support the dual-aspect view, or the one-world
view177, according to which Kant does not want to postulate or claim that there are
two separate worlds, or that there are things in themselves, which are a cause for, but 
still completely different from, appearances. Rather, the appearances and things in
themselves are aspects of the same thing, either considered as objects of sensibility
(appearance) or as objects of none of our faculties or capacities. Taken like this, the
passage can be read so that with “object as a thing in itself” he seems to mean an
object which is simply in no relation to sensibility. That is, things in themselves are
not considered objects of sensible intuition and thus do not have the form of space
and time, while the things as appearances do. I take it that Kant’s term thing in itself
(Ding an sich) should be understood simply as to mean a thing just by itself, with no
additions, forms or conditions attached to it.178 For Kant, the concept of a thing-in-
176 B xxv, italics added.
177 For more on the one-world and two-world views, see e.g. Oberst 2015, Schulting 2011, 1-
25, or Quarfood 2004, 16-65.
178 In this question, I presume to be along the same lines as Henry Allison, who writes (2004,
56): “to consider things as they appear is to consider them in their relation to the sensible
conditions under which they are given to the mind in intuition, that is, as in uns in the
transcendental (but not the empirical) sense; just as to consider them as they are in
themselves is to think them apart from all reference to these conditions, that is, as ausser
uns in the transcendental sense. Clearly, however, in order to consider things in the former
manner, it is necessary to distinguish the character that these things reveal as appearing
(their spatiotemporal properties, and so forth) from the character that the same things are
thought to possess when they are considered as they are in themselves, independently of
the conditions under which they appear.”
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itself is a logical and metaphysical assumption, because, if Kant is right, a thing
cannot just in itself be simply passively either intuited or understood, that is,
without actively “adding” something, namely form, to it: “absolutely nothing that is
intuited in space is a thing in itself.”179 This means that if something is intuited,
something is “added” to it. This is not to say that we e.g. add or make up the spatial
figure of an object, say, a tea cup, but rather this figure is in the object as intuited via
our sensibility according to the form of our intuition, that is, space.
Now, objects nevertheless produce representations (Vorstellung) in us, and of
some of these representations, as well as the objects, we may become conscious.180 
Kant writes in the beginning of the transcendental aesthetic:
[t]he effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar
as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition which is related
to the object through sensation is called empirical. The
undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called
appearance.181 
Here we have what might be called Kant’s classic definition of appearance
(Erscheinung), that is, the “undetermined object of an empirical intuition”. What
Kant here (and elsewhere) means by ‘undetermined’ has been a cause of
puzzlement, but I take him to mean that the object (of intuition) is not as such
conceptually determined by the understanding. Once more, I emphasize that
according to Kant, appearance is an object of intuition. Thereby it necessarily has the
form according to which the intuition, so to say, ‘intuits’ the object, that is, the
form of spatiotemporality.182 But, in addition to form, appearances naturally also
have matter:183 
179 A30/B45.
180 See A197/B242: “We have representations in us, of which we can also become conscious
[…]”
181 A20/B34.
182 Both Allison and Longuenesse take Kant to mean, by the form of intuition, the form of the intuiting and the
form of the intuited. Allison, however, takes these to be in some sense two forms, while Longuenesse (1998,
218n) stresses that “one and the same form is form of the intuited and form of intuiting.”
183 It is obvious that here the Aristotelian distinction of matter and form plays a crucial role,
as discussed in 3.3.
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I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its
matter, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be
intuited as ordered in certain relations I call the form of 
appearance. Since that within which the sensations can alone be
ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn
sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us a
posteriori, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori, 
and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation.184 
As I stated earlier, by “the form of appearance” Kant does not mean the shape or
figure of an individual appearance, but the general form of all intuition and thus all
appearances, spatiotemporality. As the form of our sensibility and intuition is space
(and time), the matter of our sensible representations is always already ordered in
space, that is, it is necessarily and universally spatial. Everything we intuit is already
spatiotemporal.185 
Now, the relation of things in themselves and appearances is one of the most
debated issues related to Kant, and has been from the very beginning. One of the
manifestations of the discussion is the debate between one-world views and two-
world views. Within this study, I do not want to take a strong stand on the matter,
but only remark that, as much depends on what is meant with ‘world’ and ‘object’, I
find it more fruitful to focus on understanding the distinction in the original
context of Kant, who writes in the Prolegomena: 
In fact, if we view the objects of the senses as mere appearances, as is
fitting, then we thereby admit at the very same time that a thing in
itself underlies them, although we are not acquainted with this
184 A20/B34.
185 Henry Allison (2004, 68) writes: “if we think of Kant's transcendental account of the
conditions of discursive cognition as a "grand narrative," then the indispensable role of
material condition of this cognition must be assigned to something considered as it is in
itself, apart from this epistemic relation and, therefore, as a merely transcendental object.” I 
think Allison is correct here, even though I do not quite see why he adds the word ‘merely’
to the transcendental object. Nevertheless, this material condition which he refers to, could,
under certain conditions, also be called the ‘transcendental matter’ of representations, as 
Kant seems to do on page A143/B182: “Since time is only the form of intuition, thus of
objects as appearances, that which corresponds to the sensation in these is the
transcendental matter of all objects, as things in themselves (thinghood, reality).”
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thing as it may be constituted in itself, but only with its appearance,
i.e., with the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown
something. Therefore the understanding, just by the fact that it
accepts appearances, also admits to the existence of things in
themselves, and to that extent we can say that the representation of
such beings as underlie the appearances, hence of mere intelligible
beings, is not merely permitted but also unavoidable.186 
This passage could be taken to support a one-world view, but aspects of it might
also point to a two-world view. In any case, Kant’s thought is most likely not that
just using the word or concept of appearance would somehow prove the existence
of things in themselves. Rather, it comes with the way of conceptualizing the
matter, namely the concept of appearance, that something appears, but this
something that appears as appearance is only relatable to us as an intelligible being,
since it is the object without its relation to our sensibility.
When appearances (the objects of sensible intuition) are taken as objects of
thought, that is, they are “thought in accordance with the unity of the categories”, 
they may be called phenomena.187 This is, then, the proper place of objectivity, as
Kant's view was that intuitions in themselves do not stand in a universally necessary
relation to each other and to the objects. Nevertheless, Kant has made it clear that
we can have intuitions without the concepts of the understanding, but these
intuitions in themselves are not universal or objective without being brought into
the original unity of apperception. In the original act of apperception the categories
are applied to objects of intuition, but without these objects of intuition the
categories are of no use, and can yield no cognition.
Next, if by the notion of phenomena Kant means sensible objects of the 
understanding, as I read him to do, we may contrast this to his notion of noumena, 
which is for Kant, so to say, only a negative notion, marking a non-sensible, but still 
possibly intuitable object of understanding.188 The concept of noumena thus is in a
way parallel to the concept of a thing-in-itself, even though these concepts are, as it 
186 Prol. 4:315.
187 A249. Allison (2004, 58-59) writes: “[i]n short, a phenomenon is a conceptually
determined appearance.”
188 See A249-258.
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were, constructed from different starting points.189 In addition, we still need to
account for at least one more kind of concept of object, and this is what Kant calls
the concept of a transcendental object, which basically means the concept or thought
of (a) something in general.190 This concept brings together the categories, which
Kant says to be the concepts of an object in general, and is closely related to, and at
times equated by Kant to, both the notions of a thing in itself and a noumenon.
In my reading of these key terms I do not intend to be committed to specific
standard readings of Kant. However, simply based on the above, it cannot be said
that Kant either did or did not hold a one-world or a two-world view, because all he
was claiming here was that it is wrong to divide objects or the world into two, in the
following way: to the world of sensibility, and the world of understanding.191 This 
division only functions as a distinction of kinds of concepts, and the pure concepts
of understanding, also called intellectual concepts192, have no object as such, that is,
without a relation to sensibility and thus without a relation to any object
whatsoever.193 Thus the objects of Kant’s criticism are the rationalist accounts,
including Kant’s own former view, which held that there is indeed an intellectual
world available to be cognized by pure understanding. His critical account is that
this is wrong; the pure concepts of understanding have no objective validity or
reality by themselves, but only in relation to sensibility, that is, as applied to
appearances. This is to say that we need both sensibility and the understanding to
cognize this one world that we are experiencing and living in. Whether we then
want to think of things in themselves, or noumena, as making up another world, is
a matter of debate, but in my view these are more or less negative, restricting
189 Given what has been stated above, and with regard to the discussions and readings of
Kant as holding either a ‘metaphysical’ or ‘epistemological’ account, I find that it makes no
sense in Kant’s case to speak of separate accounts of epistemology and metaphysics. If 
epistemology is supposed to refer to a theory of knowledge or cognition (a knowledge of
knowledge, if you will), and metaphysics is to be knowledge of the world, how could we
have one without the other? If we want to claim to know anything about objects and their
relations, we are making a claim to knowledge, and this knowledge, as Kant has shown,
always has conditions. Similarly, there is no knowledge in itself, but knowledge about
something. This obviously does not mean that reality or things in themselves depend in any
way on any conditions of cognition. But the same cannot be said of objects of experience (or
cognition): they must take the form of experience (or cognition).
190 A249-253.
191 A255/B 311.
192 Or, as in the letter to Herz: ”intellectual representations”; See Br. 10:130-131.
193 A255/B 311.
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concepts, because without both sensibility and understanding we can have no
objective cognition whatsoever.
There has also been a lot of confusion and debate concerning what Kant
means by his notion of a priori cognition: “[w]e are in possession of certain a priori
cognitions, and even the common understanding is never without them.”194 It 
would probably go without saying that the interpretations of this notion at times
seem a bit shallow, especially if done by people not engaged with the proper context
of Kant’s philosophy. This seems to be the case e.g. with Saul Kripke, whose
interpretation of Kant’s notion of a priori, and the critique of Kant based upon that 
interpretation, unfortunately miss Kant’s intentions.195 After attempts, I find it
hard to conceive what Kripke means by a priori, but it seems as if he means by it
some secret, pregiven knowledge of things, which knowledge we just have without
doing, thinking or experiencing anything.196 This is not so with Kant, as for him
“[t]here is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins with experience”.197 A 
priori, as in “prior to experience”, means for Kant something which is not
abstracted from (contingent) experience, but rather a necessary (formal) condition
for experience in the first place, and thus not alterable by contents (matter) of
experience. It should be noted that Kant himself stressed, time after time, that we
can never cognize or experience actual objects a priori, because these acts require
empirical elements such as sensing and judging. What we can know are only the
formal elements, which Kant wants to show are necessary for experience, and thus
194 B3.
195 See Kripke 1980.
196 In Naming and Necessity we find Kripke arguing (1980, 159) that Kant has made a
mistake (well, many, to be precise) and that mathematical knowledge is – instead of being
either a priori and necessary or a posteriori and contingent – both necessary and a 
posteriori, because we can learn it by experience, by e.g. asking a mathematician. Now, I
find it hard to see how we could really know something to be necessary by only asking a
mathematician, but even if we think that testimony is sufficient to know a thing, it seems we
could find another mathematician making a differing claim. These means of trying to arrive
at necessity by asking seem completely contingent. Kant’s point was that necessity is not
found empirically, by asking, or in the objects themselves, as also Hume noted. Rather, the
necessity of mathematics for Kant is based on the a priori form of intuition, by which we can
come to know it in such a way that no contingent empirical experience could change it or
prove otherwise. Thus, it is not so much that we do not need any experience for it, but 
rather that it is a condition for experience itself, and thus no experience could change it. We
can find a priori truths, and this is what Kant means by synthetic a priori cognition.
197 B1. I discussed this passage in Chapter 2.
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even for the objects of experience (as experienced). Thus his a priori elements are
not what the rationalist ontology was trying to formulate, but rather only concern
the concepts and form of experience:
the understanding can never accomplish a priori anything more
than to anticipate the form of a possible experience in general, and
since that which is not appearance cannot be an object of
experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility within
which alone objects are given to us. Its principles are merely
principles of the exposition of appearances, and the proud name of
an ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognitions
of things in general in a systematic doctrine (e.g. the principle of
causality), must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of
the pure understanding.198 
This brings us to what I noted in the end of chapter 3, that is, Kant’s view that we
cannot have or do a priori metaphysics or ontology concerning things in
themselves. What we can do, on the other hand, is analyze our sensibility and
understanding to arrive at the conditions of experiencing objects in the first place.
These objects are not experienced as they are in themselves, but as they are given to
us by sensibility and brought under concepts of the understanding. Thus, Kant is
saying that we cannot know the objects themselves a priori, but we can know the
formal conditions of the objects, or, the form of the objects as appearances, a priori.
To have cognition of the actual objects, we obviously also need intuition. In this 
way Kant is not agreeing with Hume on the impossibility of metaphysics, but
instead saying that the possibility of metaphysics is based on what he calls synthetic
a priori cognition. To appreciate this, one must go back to Kant’s crucial
distinction of appearances and things in themselves, on the one hand, and
sensibility and understanding on the other. As Kant saw it, both of these
distinctions were missing in empiricism as well as in rationalism, resulting in what
Kant called the “Amphiboly of the concepts of reflection”.199 
198 A246-247/B303.
199 A260-292/B316-349.
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4.2 The Amphiboly
In the following I illustrate some aspects of what Kant saw to be the problem he
called the “Amphiboly of the concepts of reflection”. I try to explicate how he
nevertheless fused elements of both rationalism and empiricism – both of which he
found guilty of committing to the amphiboly – to build his conception of objective
experience. I wish to emphasize that for Kant there is no real objectivity without
sensibility, but instead the forms of sensibility are necessary (but not sufficient)
conditions for all real objectivity. However, there is also no proper objectivity
without the concepts and judgments that unite the sensible representations into
experience. Thus Kant rather famously writes in the Critique of Pure Reason: 
It comes along with our nature that intuition can never be other
than sensible, i.e., that it contains only the way in which we are
affected by objects. The faculty for thinking of objects of sensible
intuition, on the contrary, is the understanding. Neither of these is
to be preferred to the other. Without sensibility no object would
be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought.
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts
are blind.200 
My view is that this well-known passage should be read in relation to Kant’s
critique of both empiricism and rationalism as saying that neither alone is a
sufficient account of our relation to objects. Rather, what is needed is a distinction
of the roles and forms of sensibility and understanding, and an account of their co-
operation. This is what is at issue in the amphiboly section where Kant writes that
“Leibniz intellectualized the appearances, just as Locke totally sensitivized the
concepts of understanding”.201 The section is, among other thing, a densely packed
illustration of the problems of rationalism and empiricism, although mainly a
critique of Leibnizian rationalism.202 Kant sees the core of all these problems in the
failure to distinguish the functions of sensibility and understanding, on the one
200 A51/B71.
201 A271/B327.
202 An elaborated presentation of Kant’s relation to, and critique of, Leibniz, is found in Anja
Jauernaig (2018).
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hand, and phenomena, or appearances, and noumena, or things in themselves, on
the other.203 
In the amphiboly section Kant introduces transcendental reflection as a
procedure by which we are to determine whether certain representations belong
together in sensibility or in understanding. This procedure works as what I call a
transcendental positioning system (TPS) of representations to find out their
transcendental place either in sensibility, as determined by intuition, or in
understanding, as logically determined concepts. Given the weight of the issue, the
section and the points made are remarkable explications of Kant’s critique of
Leibniz and his own transcendental position.
Now, what I take Kant essentially to be saying is that by logical comparison
alone (in the case of Leibniz), or by sensibility alone (in the case of Locke), we are
doomed to make crucial errors in trying to understand objective reality, as either
making unjustified claims which never can be tested, or failing to build any kind of
certainty and necessity in our attempted objective understanding of the world. We
need to be able to separate whether something is to be tested or determined
conceptually or by intuition. As Kant claims, the error of Leibniz was that he
thought everything could be tested conceptually, thus degrading sensibility to
something that partly benefits, but also greatly confuses our cognition of objects:
deceived by the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection, the famous
Leibniz constructed an intellectual system of the world, or rather
believed himself able to cognize the inner constitution of things by
comparing all objects only with the understanding and the abstract 
formal concepts of its thinking. Our table of the concepts of
reflection gives us the unexpected advantage of laying before our
eyes that which is distinctive in his theory in all its parts and the
leading ground of this peculiar way of thinking, which rests on
nothing but a misunderstanding. He compared all things with each
other solely through concepts, and found, naturally, no other
differences than those through which the understanding
203 I am aware that in Kant’s use the word “appearance” does not always refer exactly to
what the word “phenomena” refers to, but many times they can be and are treated as
equal. The same applies to the relation of “noumena” and “things in themselves”. I have
already discussed the differences and relations of these terms in 4.1.
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distinguishes its pure concepts from each other. The conditions of
sensible intuition, which bring with them their own distinctions,
he did not regard as original; for sensibility was only a confused
kind of representation for him, and not a special source of
representations; for him appearance was the representation of the
thing in itself […]204 
Kant, on the other hand, wants to show that there are a great many things which
never can be cognized, compared or decided upon based only on concepts. This is
to give sensibility its proper place as a necessary condition of experience, and even
the empirical objects themselves, that is, appearances. The way to determine the
transcendental place of a representation is to use the procedure I just dubbed TPS, 
that is, to reflect upon it as acknowledging four essential relations that 
representations may have to each other: (1) identity and difference, (2) agreement
and opposition, (3) the inner and the outer, and (4) the determinable and the
determined (matter and form), the last of which Kant says to be the “two concepts
that ground all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with every use of
the understanding. The former [matter] signifies the determinable in general, the
latter [form] its determination.”205 Kant writes:
But all judgments, indeed all comparisons, require a reflection, i.e., 
a distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts
belong. The action through which I make the comparison of
representations in general with the cognitive power in which they
are situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to
be compared to one another as belonging to the pure
understanding or to pure intuition, I call transcendental
reflection. The relation, however, in which the concepts in a state
of mind can belong to each other are those of identity and
difference, of agreement and opposition, of the inner and the
outer, and finally of the determinable and the determination. 
The correct determination of this relation depends on the
204 A270/B326.
205 A266/B322.
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cognitive power in which they subjectively belong to each other,
whether in sensibility or in understanding. […] [T]ranscendental
reflection, however, (which goes to the objects themselves)
contains the ground of the possibility of the objective comparison
of the representations to each other […]206 
Kant’s explication of the relations inherent in transcendental reflection offers
illuminating examples, all of which include the confusion of appearances and things
in themselves. For example, in the case of identity and difference, Kant claims that
there are objects we cannot distinguish numerically by concepts alone, e.g. in the
case of two water drops. The objects we are here dealing with are not noumena, that
is, objects of pure understanding, but instead they are phenomena, that is, objects
that are necessarily sensible. This means that the objects may not have any 
conceptual, or “inner”, difference,207 but can still be differentiated numerically on
the basis of their spatial position:
in the case of two drops of water one can completely abstract from
all inner difference (of quality and quantity), and it is enough that 
they be intuited in different places at the same time in order for
them to be held to be numerically different. Leibniz took the
appearances for things in themselves, thus for intelligibilia, i.e.,
objects of the pure understanding […], and there his principle of
non-discernibility (principium identitatis indiscernibilium) could
surely not be disputed, but since they are objects of sensibility, and
the understanding with regard to them is not of pure but of
empirical use, multiplicity and numerical difference are already
given by space itself as the condition of outer appearances.208 
With regard to the other relations making up the grid of Kant’s transcendental
positioning system (TPS), the situation is the same: what might be true of concepts
based solely on logic, does not need to be true of appearances, and what we can
cognize of objects, does not pertain to things in themselves. Kant writes: 
206 A261-263/B317-319.
207 At least such that we would have access to it.
208 A263-264/B319-320.
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even if we could say anything synthetically about things in
themselves (which is nevertheless impossible), this still could not
be related to appearances at all, which do not represent things in
themselves. In this latter case, therefore, I will always have to
compare my concepts in transcendental reflection only under the
conditions of sensibility, and thus space and time will not be
determinations of things in themselves, but of appearances; what
the things may be in themselves I do not know, and also do not
need to know, since a thing can never come before me except in
appearance.
I proceed in the same way with the other concepts of
reflection. Matter is substantia phaenomenon.209 
The objects we are to have experience of, are thus not objects of pure
understanding, but sensible appearances, that is, substantia phaenomenon, which are
from the very beginning determined by the forms of intuition, space and time.
Thus pure conceptual reflection never objectively suffices to grasp empirical reality.
Neither does sensing alone ever provide us with any kind of pertaining relation of
subject and object, thus, any proper objectivity. Sensibility and understanding have
separate functions but both are needed for cognizing objects. An aspect of this is
that both a priori and a posteriori elements are necessary for objective cognition. In
Kant’s view pure conceptual comparison or analysis amounts to very little more
than nothing with regard to actually cognizing empirical objects. On the other
hand, sensibility by itself, let alone sensations in a Humean sense, cannot provide us
experience of objects.210 
209 A276-277/B332-333. In 3.4 I briefly discussed Kant’s account of substantia
phaenomenon. Of this, Kant wrote:"A phenomenon is in itself no substance, with respect to
our senses we call the appearance of substance itself substance. But this phenomenal
substance <substantia phenomenon> must have a noumenon as substrate. This can be
called transcendental idealism." (V-Met/Dohna, 28:682.)
210 As I mentioned in 2.1 and 2.2, Hume already took experience to be, not individual
perceptions, but rather, representations that have been reflected and compared to form a
uniform experience. The uniformity, or unity, of the experience was nevertheless still left
somewhat a mystery and thus his account was lacking something absolutely essential from
the point of view of Kant, who writes: “If every individual representation were entirely
foreign to the other, as it were isolated and separated from it, then there would never arise
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The case, then, seems to be the following: via our faculty of sensibility we
intuit objects and receive representations which are necessarily spatiotemporal, due
to the form of our sensibility/intuition. These representations, however, in
themselves are only subjective representations, if not related to an object (by the act
of apperception via the categories). This means that we could have as many and as
frequent representations as we like, but without a universally and necessarily 
grounded relation to an object, these representations would remain subjective.211 
What are needed are the (necessary and universal) rules by which to relate the
representation to an object (in the unity of apperception) and make it the universal
experience of a subject cognizing an object. These rules are the general functions or
forms of judgment, generally represented in the categories as the concepts of an
object in general. Kant writes:
besides intuition there is no other kind of cognition than through
concepts. Thus the cognition of every, at least human,
understanding is a cognition through concepts, not intuitive but
discursive. All intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections, concepts
therefore on functions. By a function, however, I understand the
unity of the action of ordering different representations under a
common one. Concepts are therefore grounded on the spontaneity
of thinking, as sensible intuitions are grounded on the receptivity
of impressions.212 
anything like cognition, which is a whole of compared and connected representations.” (A97,
italics added.) Thus it is for Kant that the notions of cognition and experience both entail
unified objectivity, in which inherent features are necessity and universality.
211 On page A97/B242 Kant writes: “We have representations in us, of which we can also
become conscious. But let this consciousness reach as far and be as exact and precise as one
wants, still there always remain only representations, i.e., inner determinations of our mind
in this or that temporal relation. Now how do we come to posit an object for these
representations, or ascribe to their subjective reality, as modifications, some sort of
objective reality? Objective significance cannot consist in the relation to another
representation (of that which one would call the object), for that would simply raise anew
the question: How does this representation in turn go beyond itself and acquire objective
significance in addition to the subjective significance that is proper to it as a determination
of the state of mind?” As a note, here we can clearly see the meaning of ‘objective’ as
signifying a relation to something beyond the representations, that is, to the object.
212 A68/B93.
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Here we first of all see Kant calling intuition a kind of cognition. Nevertheless, in
the very next sentence he states that at least all human understanding is cognition
through concepts, and thereby discursive. Kant here groups activity and
spontaneity with the understanding, and passivity and receptivity with sensibility.
It is the task of the activity to order the representations in a unified manner, using
concepts according to universal rules, to form judgments. The passage continues:
Now the understanding can make no other use of these concepts
than that of judging by means of them. Since no representation
pertains to the object immediately except intuition alone, a concept
is thus never immediately related to an object, but is always related
to some other representation of it (whether that be intuition or
itself already a concept). Judgment is therefore the mediate
cognition of an object, hence the representation of a representation
of it. In every judgment there is a concept that holds of many, and
that among this many also comprehends a given representation,
which is then related immediately to the object. […] All judgments
are accordingly functions of unity among our representations, since
instead of an immediate representation a higher one, which
comprehends this and other representations under itself, is used for
the cognition of the object, and many possible cognitions are
thereby drawn together into one.213 
Thus we see that the universal functions of judgment are what according to Kant
bring the necessary unity to our representations. They are needed to represent the
objects as something more than subjective affections, that is, as something
necessarily general and universal:
If we investigate what new characteristic is given to our
representations by the relation to an object, and what is the
dignity that they thereby receive, we find that it does nothing
213 A68-69/B93-94.
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beyond making the combination of representations necessary in a 
certain way, and subjecting them to a rule [...]214 
As stated, these rules are the general functions or forms of judgment, generally 
represented in the categories, the use and unity of which is grounded in the original
apperception. This is what I turn to now.
4.3 Transcendental Apperception and Objectivity
The notion of a transcendental or original apperception is famously central to Kant’s
transcendental idealism, but the exact nature of it as well as its role in especially the
transcendental deduction of the categories, are still debated issues. In their
introduction to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Guyer and Wood write on the
deductions and the notion of apperception:
Kant centers his argument on the premise that our experience can
be ascribed to a single identical subject, via what he calls the
"transcendental unity of apperception," only if the elements of
experience given in intuition are synthetically combined so as to
present us with objects that are thought through the categories.
The categories are held to apply to objects, therefore, not because
these objects make the categories possible, but rather because the 
categories themselves constitute necessary conditions for the
representation of all possible objects of experience. Precisely what is
entailed by the idea of the unity of apperception, however, and
what the exact relation between apperception and the
representation of objects is, are obscure and controversial, and
continue to generate lively philosophical discussion even after two
centuries of interpretation.215 
214 A197/B242-3.
215 Guyer and Wood , Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, 9.
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First of all, whatever else apperception is and how it works, it is in any case a 
capacity that we have, to combine or synthesize different representations together,
so that they belong to a single subject, and are thereby part of the single and unified
relation to objects that we call experience.216 This capacity operates via the
categories as the general concepts for all objects.217 Usually Kant uses the word
‘apperception’ to simply mean what he other times dubs transcendental or original
apperception, and which is, according to my reading, by nature, objective, or
intentional.218 For Kant, this apperception is an active capacity – in contrast to
passive reception – by which we can become conscious of ourselves as well as of the
represented objects and their properties.219 It is an intentional act by which we
become conscious of our representations as universally representing something
objectively, that is, objects. It is thereby that we cognize objects. In the Critique of
Pure Reason Kant introduces the notion of apperception as follows:
216 See B132-142; and A110: “There is only one experience, in which all perceptions are
represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection, just as there is only one space and
time, in which all forms of appearance and all relation of being or non-being take place. If 
one speaks of different experiences, they are only so many perceptions insofar as they
belong to one and the same universal experience. The thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of
perceptions is precisely what constitutes the form of experience, and it is nothing other
than the synthetic unity of the appearances in accordance with concepts.”
217 See A103: “The word “concept” itself could already lead us to this remark. For it is this
one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then
also reproduced, into one representation.” And B137: ”Understanding is, generally
speaking, the faculty of cognitions. These consist in the determinate relation of given
representations to an object. An object, however, is that in the concept of which the
manifold of a given intuition is united. Now, however, all unification of representations
requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently the unity of
consciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object,
thus their objective validity, and consequently is that which makes them into cognitions and
on which even the possibility of the understanding rests.”
218 In the passage, Guyer and Wood do not make the distinction of two types of
apperception. Kant, on the other hand, sometimes speaks of two kinds of apperception (see
e.g. A107), namely empirical and transcendental. The first one coincides with what Kant calls
inner sense. In addition, Kant also writes of empirical and transcendental unity of
apperception.
219 I read this in relation to Kant’s claims in the Refutation of Idealism, where Kant claims
that the persisting existence of things outside me, and the perception of them, are
inseparable from the consciousness of my own existence. See e.g. B276: ”[…] the 
consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the
existence of other things outside me.”
97
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
  
    
 
    
       
 
 
 
  
    
 
     
 
   
     
  
    
    
      
  
 
         
    
 
  
    
  
 
    
   
[N]o cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity among
them, without that unity of consciousness that precedes all data of
the intuitions, and in relation to which all representation of objects
is alone possible. This pure, original, unchanging consciousness I 
will now name transcendental apperception. That it deserves this 
name is already obvious from this, that even the purest objective
unity, namely that of the a priori concepts (space and time) is
possible only through the relation of the intuitions to it. The
numerical unity of this apperception therefore grounds all concepts
a priori, just as the manifoldness of space and time grounds the
intuitions of sensibility.220 
To set the terminological aspects right, when Kant speaks of apperception, he
usually means this transcendental, pure, original and unchanging consciousness,
which is essentially a unity. Based on the above passage, it is also an essential
condition for objective unity. As this consciousness has numerical unity (and
identity), it is the ground for all use of rules or concepts in judgments. Space and
time do not as forms have the same unity as their concepts, but rather they formally
bring about the manifold of intuition.221 
It should be noted that I have up to now mainly treated Kant’s notion of
apperception as a faculty or a capacity. However, it would be a mistake to only treat
apperception as a faculty which we simply have, because more than often Kant uses
the term to mean the act of apperceiving, i.e., the act of apperception. Thus I
suggest that we should often read Kant’s ‘apperception’ as meaning 
‘apperceiving’222, as in the case of the title of §19 of the first Critique. A translation
of the title reads: “The logical form of all judgments consists in the objective unity
of the apperception of the concepts contained therein”. So, in my formulation we
could say that the logical form of all judgments consists in the “objective unity of 
the apperceiving of the concepts contained therein”. I would like to note that I do not
220 A107.
221 As we have seen elsewhere, Kant also speaks of an empirical unity of consciousness,
which he ascribes to inner sense, sometimes called empirical apperception. See A107; see
also B140 and R5927.
222 I do not mean ‘apperceiving’ as an attribute of an ‘apperceiving subject’, but as an act, as
in “my apperceiving of a tree”.
98
 
 
  
   
 
           
   
   
   
 
   
         
  
   
      
  
    
  
   
   
 
        
   
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
  
  
    
  
claim that we should concretely substitute ‘apperception’ with ‘apperceiving’, but
only that the latter is a formulation of what is sometimes meant with the word
‘apperception’, i.e., the act. There are still passages in which it is not clear whether
Kant refers to the act or the capacity, such as the following: “Just this 
transcendental unity of apperception, however, makes out of all possible
appearances that can ever come together in one experience a connection of all of 
these representations in accordance with laws.”223 For now, I refrain from
attempting to explicate the two, possibly differing interpretations of this passage,
based on the act vs. capacity distinction.
At any rate, it seems rather uncontroversial that apperception is closely
related to what Kant calls consciousness in general, that it is essentially a unifying act,
and can thus be said to ‘have unity’.224 As Kant frames it, it is necessarily a unity,
because, to be blunt, without one consciousness, which also operates identically, we
cannot conceive of a relation between subject and object. In that case, it seems, we
would have neither subjects nor objects represented. Thus the unity of the original
or universal apperception is necessary as a condition for (objective) experience in
the first place. The categories represent the very rules by which the original
apperception acts and relates itself to intuition.225 Kant writes:
A category is the representation of the relation of the manifold of
intuition to a universal consciousness (to the universality of
consciousness, which is properly objective). The relation of
representations to the universality of consciousness, consequently
the transformation of the empirical and particular unity of
consciousness, which is merely subjective, into a consciousness that
is universal and objective, belongs to logic. This unity of 
consciousness, insofar as it is universal and can be represented a
priori, is the pure concept of the understanding. This can thus be
nothing other than the universal of the unity of consciousness,
which constitutes the objective validity of a judgment.226 
223 A108.
224 See B143.
225 See A105-110. See also A79/B104-105.
226 R5927, 18:388–389.
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We need not here consider all the stages and conditions needed for what Kant calls
“the manifold of intuition”. But, as I understand the passage, when this manifold of
intuition is there for us, or rather in us, and given to the understanding, there are 
universal rules by which it relates to what Kant calls a universal consciousness. This 
consciousness is the same for all human beings or human subjects. We can see that
Kant writes of an empirical and particular unity of consciousness, transformed into
a consciousness that is universal and objective. So there is (of course, one might 
add) a kind of unity in merely empirical consciousness, but it is not the kind of
unity which can conceptually grasp all representations and relate them to each
other according to universally necessary rules of representing objects. The
transformation needed happens by subsuming the representations under the
categories. Even if not mentioned in the passage just quoted, this subsuming
happens in the act of judging. For this reason, judgments are the proper acts of
objectivity. 227 The reflection continues:
The manifold, insofar as it is represented as necessarily belonging to
one consciousness (or also to the unity of consciousness in general)
is thought through the concept of an object: the object is always a
something in general. The determination of it rests merely on the
unity of the manifold of its intuition, and indeed on the universally
valid unity of the consciousness of it.
Two elements of cognition occur a priori. 1. Intuitions, 2.
Unity of the consciousness of the manifold of intuitions (even of 
empirical ones). This unity of consciousness constitutes the form
of experience as objective empirical cognition.228 
227 Let us remember the passages already mentioned a bit earlier: “If we investigate what
new characteristic is given to our representations by the relation to an object, and what is
the dignity that they thereby receive, we find that it does nothing beyond making the
combination of representations necessary in a certain way, and subjecting them to a rule
[...] ” (A197/B242-3.) and “[...] a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given
cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.” (B141.)
228 R5927, 18:389.
100
 
 
    
  
 
    
  
 
      
   
   
  
 
 
 
 
      
   
 
   
  
 
 
 
      
 
 
    
   
          
  
   
 
       
     
   
  
According to Kant all cognition consists of judgments.229 Thus intuitions or
perceptions in themselves are not cognitions and are not, in themselves, properly
objective, without a universally and necessarily identically operating act of
objectification (the act of judging). Now, Kant states that there are two elements of
cognition, which occur a priori, namely (1) intuitions and (2) unity of the
consciousness of the manifold of intuitions. Now, I cannot here bring myself to
believe that Kant would mean the intuitions to be a priori in the same sense as the
categories are a priori. Rather, I suggest that the intuitions are prior to experience,
as necessary building blocks of it, and it is precisely in experience that the two a
priori elements are united. Kant writes:
Thus experience is possible only through judgments, in which to be
sure perceptions comprise the empirical materials, but the relation
of which to an object and the cognition of which through
perceptions cannot depend on empirical consciousness alone. The
form of every judgment, however, consists in the objective unity of
the consciousness of the given concepts, i.e., in the consciousness
that these must belong to one another, and thereby designate an
object in whose (complete) representation they are always to be
found together.230 
Now, surely Kant does not claim that all objective judgments or even judgments in
general always and every time require the subject to consciously reflect upon
whether some concepts belong together necessarily or contingently. Rather, this is
an explication of what happens and must happen in an objective, unifying act of
consciousness. It is an analysis of the synthesis inherent in objective judgments. So,
when Kant writes of the consciousness that given representations, or concepts,
must belong together, or to one another, it is not that we have reflected upon the
matter and then decided that yes, they do. Rather it is the case that in order to
represent an object, certain representations do and must always belong together
229 “All cognition, hence also that of experience, accordingly consists of judgments; and even
concepts are representations that are prepared for possible judgments, for they represent
something that is given in general as cognizable through a predicate.” (R5923, 18:386.)
230 R5923, 18:386.
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(“in the object”, as Kant says).231 We cannot represent objects without the
categories, or with just one category, for example. In the end of the B-deduction
Kant writes on why the categories, and their necessary unity, cannot be of either
empirical or simply subjective nature and origin:
For, e.g., the concept of cause, which asserts the necessity of a
consequent under a presupposed condition, would be false if it
rested only on a subjective necessity, arbitrarily implemented in us,
of combining certain empirical representations according to such a
rule of relation. I would not be able to say that the effect is
combined with the cause in the object (i.e., necessarily), but only
that I am so constituted that I cannot think of this representation
otherwise than as so connected; which is precisely what the skeptic
wishes most, for then all of our insight through the supposed
objective validity of our judgments is nothing but sheer illusion,
and there would be no shortage of people who would not concede
this subjective necessity (which must be felt) on their own; at least
one would not be able to quarrel with anyone about that which
merely depends on the way in which his subject is organized.232 
I suggest to take this passage as a clue or confirmation that the necessity which Kant
seeks for objectively valid cognition, is the necessary agreement of the a priori
concepts (the categories) to both (1) each other, and (2) their objects. The cause
and effect, for example, do not belong together because of subjective tendencies of
combining representations, but because they belong together essentially as
conditions of representing objects and events. Thereby they validly and really
belong together, not only in the subject, but in the objects.
Now, let us take a step back to still ponder on the capacity or act Kant calls
apperception, which is often stated to mean self-consciousness. What does the rule-
guided representation-unifying act of representing objects have to do with self-
consciousness? What should we think Kant essentially refers to by the word 
‘apperception’? Consciousness? Self-consciousness? Object-consciousness? Unity
231 See B130, B142, B168, A197/B242.
232 B168.
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of consciousness? Objective unity of consciousness? Let us consider textual support
for the claim that apperception (simply) means self-consciousness. First, §18 of the
B-deduction is entitled “What objective unity of self-consciousness is”. The
beginning of the section then reads as follows: “The transcendental unity of 
apperception is that unity through which all of the manifold given in an intuition is
united in a concept of the object.”233 Now, it does not seem far-fetched to read the
“objective unity of self-consciousness” of the title as referring to the same thing as
the first sentence of the section, that is, to the “transcendental unity of
apperception”. By this, I should note, I do not wish to read “transcendental” as
identical to “objective”, which would be absurd. Rather, I am merely pointing out
that it seems right and justified to read “unity of self-consciousness” as meaning the
same as “unity of apperception”, in the context of the sentences in question. Thus
the correct interpretation seems to be that the “transcendental unity” in question is
objective by nature.
The passage claims that through this unity “all of the manifold given in an
intuition is united in a concept of the object”. I take this to mean that the manifold
of intuition is not objective in itself, although created by objects, so to say, but only
when the manifold is united in the concept of an object, can we speak of
representing objects. Only these objects, then, can be said to be really apart from
the subject. It is here that we find the connection between the capacity to represent
objects, and the capacity to be self-conscious, namely as the distinction of the object
and the subject.
As we have already seen, according to Kant there is also another, subjective,
unity of consciousness. But this subjective unity of consciousness is not unity of
‘self-consciousness’, and thus not unity of apperception. The passage reads on: “It
[the transcendental unity of apperception] is called objective on that account, and
must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a
determination of inner sense, through which that manifold of intuition is
empirically given for such a combination.” Thus there is both subjective and
objective unity of consciousness, and what Kant calls ‘transcendental apperception’
or ‘self-consciousness’ is inherent only in the latter. The subjective unity needed to
grasp the manifold is a product of inner sense, and not of transcendental
apperception. The section continues:
233 B139.
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Whether I can become empirically conscious of the manifold as
simultaneous or successive depends on the circumstances, or
empirical conditions. Hence the empirical unity of consciousness,
through association of the representations, itself concerns an
appearance, and is entirely contingent.234 
Now, this latter, subjective unity of consciousness could be taken to be of the kind
which Hume (and perhaps other empiricists) had in mind, so to say. As is apparent,
Kant is trying to show that this kind of associative unity of consciousness is
contingent, as it varies from one subject to another, and cannot thus work as a
ground for a universally necessary relation (of agreement) to objects. And indeed,
the crucial passage still continues:
The pure form of intuition in time, on the contrary, merely as
intuition in general, which contains a given manifold, stands under
the original unity of consciousness, solely by means of the necessary
relation of the manifold of intuition to the one I think, thus
through the pure synthesis of the understanding, which grounds a
priori the empirical synthesis. That unity alone is objectively valid;
the empirical unity of apperception, which we are not assessing
here, and which is also derived from the former, under given
conditions in concreto, has merely subjective validity. One person
combines the representation of a certain word with one thing,
another with something else; and the unity of consciousness in that
which is empirical is not, with regard to that which is given,
necessarily and universally valid.235 
So, we have it that there is an empirical unity of consciousness, which is
nevertheless contingent and thereby not necessarily and universally valid of the
objects represented. The pure forms of intuition, on the other hand, are objectively
valid, due to their necessary relation to the “I think”, as Kant puts it. Finally, I
234 B139-140.
235 B140.
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suggest, it is in this thinking about objects, that we are able to separate the thinking
I from the objects thought about. This assumption is strengthened by the following
passages:
the concept - or rather, if one prefers, the judgment – I think […]
serves to distinguish two kinds of objects through the nature of our
power of representation. I, as thinking, am an object of inner sense,
and am called "soul." That which is an object of outer sense is called
"body."236 
the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means
of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself. Now 
consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the
consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination:
Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the
things outside me, as the condition of time-determination; i.e., the 
consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an
immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside
me.237 
So, Kant’s thought seems to be that there must be, first of all, things, or bodies,
which affect us and which we can perceive. And becoming conscious of these things
as objects, that is, as something outside and separate from ourselves, enables us to
become conscious of ourselves.238 This consciousness of the objects and ourselves
happens via concepts (the categories) used in judgments, which are, as we
remember, ways “to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of
apperception”239. The capacity of apperception is necessarily a unity, because
otherwise separate representations could not be synthesized or united (in concepts
of objects). Thus, I would like to suggest that apperception is an objective act (of 
236 A341-342/B399-400.
237 B275-276.
238Nikkarla (2017) has noted that this thought quite strongly (and not by accident)
resembles Wolff’s conception, according to which we must first be able to cognize objects,
and distinguish them from each other, and then become conscious of our distinctness from
the objects. See Nikkarla 2017, 39.
239 B141.
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self-consciousness), in which, through synthesis of given representations, an object
separate from the thinker comes to be thought. The rules for the synthesizing of the
representations are conceptualized in the categories. In this interpretation
apperception is not primarily understood as consciousness of one's own states of
mind, feelings etc., but as consciousness of an object distinct from the subject.
Something akin to this reading is proposed by A. B. Dickerson, who claims that the
notion of apperception is commonly misunderstood in Kant scholarship:
Kant’s notion of apperception, despite initial appearances, should
not be assimilated to modern notions of ‘self-awareness’, ‘self-
consciousness’, ‘self-knowledge’ or ‘self-reference’. Rather,
apperception is the reflexive act whereby the mind grasps its own
representations as representing, and is thus an essential part of all
thought and cognition.240 
I find Dickerson’s claim, at least as presented in the quote above, much in line with
my interpretation of Kant’s notion of apperception. Nevertheless, it should not be
forgotten that there is clear textual evidence supporting the interpretation of
apperception as self-consciousness, even if we should not read it from the
perspective of contemporary accounts of self-consciousness. In relation to ‘original 
apperception’ Kant at times also writes of ‘self-perception’ as well as the judgment 
or representation ‘I think’, which Kant in a famous passage claims “must be able to
accompany all my representations”:
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for
otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be
thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation
would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for 
me.241 
Dickerson of course does not deny this, but in the previous passage refers to this
identification of apperception to a contemporary notion of self-awareness as the 
240 Dickerson 2007, 81.
241 B131-132.
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“initial appearances”. But if Dickerson does not think that apperception is
essentially, or only, a capacity or an act of introspection, what does he claim instead,
and on what grounds? He writes that
apperception (‘the I think’) is necessarily involved in all conscious
thought, and thus in the cases of both inner and outer cognition.
Apperception is, in other words, not simply the capacity for
introspection or self-awareness. That apperception is something
quite different from inner sense is made even clearer by a remark in
a footnote to § 16 of the B-Deduction, where Kant tells us that
‘indeed, this faculty [sc., of apperception] is the understanding
itself’ (B134n). […] Apperception is the reflexive awareness in
virtue of which I (the subject) grasp my representations as
presenting something to me. It is, in other words, that in virtue of
which I have conscious thought or cognition, and is thus ‘the
faculty of understanding itself ’.242 
First of all we should note here the distinction of inner sense and apperception,
which Kant himself very clearly and repeatedly draws. We have seen elsewhere that
Kant at times refers to inner sense as empirical apperception. But the original or
pure apperception is of a different nature, namely one which Kant in the footnote 
says to be the understanding itself, and which connects to the famous ‘I think’ claim
of Kant’s. Here we should perhaps also pay attention to the fact that Kant does not
state that I must accompany all my representations with ‘the I think’, but rather that
I must be able to do it. In Kant’s text, the phrase ‘must be’, as well as the phrase ‘I
think’, is emphasized by being written in italics. Thus it is not a question of what 
must actually be done, but of what must be possible. Of course, the act of
apperception must also be actualized if the thinking of objects through
representations is to happen. In R4677, which is a note from Kant’s ‘silent decade’,
just prior to the first Critique, Kant writes:
Only because the relation that is posited in accordance with the
conditions of intuition is assumed to be determinable in
242 Dickerson 2007, 90.
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accordance with a rule is the appearance related to an object;
otherwise it is merely an inner affection of the mind. Everything
that is thought as an object of intuition stands under a rule of 
construction. Everything that is thought as an object of perception
stands under a rule of apperception, self-perception.243 
Here we see apperception treated as equal to “self-perception”. This is in line with
my interpretation, according to which the act of apperception is a self-conscious act
of objective representation, that is, of thinking about objects which are distinct
from the subject. Thus it is at the same time the condition of objectivity and of self-
consciousness, as this consciousness of the self means consciousness of the I as
distinct from the objects. Kant’s note continues:
[…] Appearance is made objective by being brought as contained
under a title of self-perception. And thus the original relations of
apprehension are the conditions of the perception of the real
relations in appearance, and indeed just insofar as one says that an
appearance belongs thereunder is it determined from the universal
and represented as objective, i.e., thought. When one does not
represent it as belonging under the functions of self-sensation, but
rather represents it by means of an isolated perception, then it is 
called mere sensation.244 
At the time of these notes, Kant’s critical theory was not yet fully shaped, but I find
no essential contradiction between the notes in question and the first Critique. 
Kant here brings up the role of apprehension, but states it to be a function of the
apperception, which he, as we remember, also identified with the understanding
itself. Another note from the same period supports this view:
If something is apprehended, it is taken up in the function of
apperception. I am, I think, thoughts are in me. These are all 
relations, which to be sure do not provide rules of appearance, but
243 AA 17:658.
244 R4677, AA 17:658.
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which make it such that all appearance is to be represented as
contained under a rule. The I constitutes the substratum for a rule
in general, and apprehension relates every appearance to it.245 
Once more, the passage shows the role of “The I” as that identical one, that unity,
in relation to which rules can be applied to appearances. Then the last, especially
illuminating quote, from the Critique of Pure Reason:
Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the
categories, which for their part represent nothing other than the
synthesis of the manifold of intuition, insofar as that manifold has
unity in apperception. Self-consciousness in general is therefore the
representation of that which is the condition of all unity, and yet is
itself unconditioned. Hence of the thinking I (the soul), which
[thus represents] itself as substance, simple, numerically identical in
all time, and the correlate of all existence from which all other 
existence must be inferred, one can say not so much that it 
cognizes itself through the categories, but that it cognizes the
categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of
apperception, and hence cognizes them through itself.246 
Based on all of the above, my view is that apperception is, for Kant, a faculty or a
capacity, which is a necessary component of cognition as being a capacity for an
identical, unified and universal act which through the categories allows the
understanding to think of objects. Thus apperception is the component which
creates objectivity and intentionality by subsuming the manifold of intuition, via
the categories, under the concept of an object or a something in general (=X) and
by relating these representations to others in the necessary unity of apperception.
The result of this is what Kant calls experience. Thus it is not the only purpose of 
apperception to allow one to become conscious of oneself, but rather to become
conscious of objects, which are, so to say, not-me. Thus the categorically unifying
act of apperception is what creates objectivity and thereby makes possible the
245 R4676, AA 17:656.
246 A401–402.
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conscious relation of subject and object. That is, the objectivity, as in a
representational relation to an object, brought about by the (act of) apperception,
first allows for a consciousness of the distinctness of the object from the subject.
In addition and with regard to the above, we might say that the main element
missing from Hume’s philosophy was the universal and necessary objectivity,
which, for Kant, requires a priori elements, such as the capacity of transcendental
apperception, as well as the universal rules by which the apperception necessarily
operates. Apperception is the capacity to think objects (distinct from ourselves) for
our representations. This action of thinking objects is rule-guided, conceptually
unifying activity of making judgments. Therefore, with regard to objects we may 
also call this activity cognition, and it results in objective experience. The proper,
universal and necessary ground for thinking and making judgments is the
transcendental unity of apperception. In this context it makes sense for Kant to
identify the capacity of apperception with the capacity of understanding, because
apperception is precisely the one original capacity247 which is, so to say, added to
sensibility and imagination (the other two original capacities) in order to be able to
make judgments, think of objects, and have a self-conscious relation to objects at all.
Transcendental apperception is an active capacity to self-consciously and
universally represent objects distinct from the subject, and this capacity necessarily
has a universal and permanent structure. The unity of this transcendental
apperception is that non-changing structural capacity, on which the identity of the
active, categorizing and thinking subject is possible, and based on which it makes
sense to speak of a subject and objects in relation to each other. Based on this unity
subjects are able to synthesize representations and use them to refer to and make
judgments about objects.
247 See A94: “There are, however, three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul),
which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be
derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely sense, imagination, and apperception.”
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4.4 Judgment, Categories and Objectivity
[…] a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given
cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.248 
In the first Critique Kant presents the twelve logical forms of judgment, that is,
functions of thinking. These, according to Kant, “can be brought under four titles,
each of which contains under itself three moments.”249 The four titles and
moments are (1) the quantity (universal, particular, singular), (2) the quality
(affirmative, negative, infinite), (3) the relation (categorical, hypothetical,
disjunctive) and (4) the modality (problematic, assertoric, apodictic) of the 
judgments. This is supposed to be a presentation of all the logical forms that a
judgment can possibly take or include. As it is not my aim here to try to present
Kant’s theory of judgment in all its details, but rather show the place and
importance that judgments have for Kant’s conception of objective reference, I
shall only make a few comments.
First, Kant remarks that there is a difference with regard to whether we are
taking the judgments as only internally, that is, logically, valid, or transcendentally
valid, that is, as cognition in general. As I see it, this question is most relevant to the
study at hand, since only the latter validity is in my view objective validity. We 
should note that even though we are here at issue with the logical forms, and not
the content of the judgments, still, taken transcendentally, it is the three first titles
(quantity, quality and relation) which constitute the content of a judgment. This
means that the modality of judgments does not contribute to the content, as Kant
writes:
[t]he modality of judgments is a quite special function of them,
which is distinctive in that it contributes nothing to the content of
the judgment […], but rather concerns only the value of the copula
in relation to thinking in general.250 
248 B141.
249 A70/B95.
250 A74/B99-100.
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Here, an essential supposition is that objective reference requires intuitions and
concepts working together in judgments. But is all use of concepts in relation to
intuitions judgment, and are all judgments objective? In the Critique of Pure Reason
Kant presents judging as essentially the same as thinking, which again is said to be
conceptual cognition:
We can […] trace all actions of the understanding in general back
into judgments, so that the understanding in general can be 
represented as a faculty for judging. For according to what has
been said above it is a faculty for thinking. Thinking is cognition
through concepts.251 
Now, this still does not mean that judgments are always objective, or refer to
objects in a universally valid way. Part of the problematics in presenting Kant’s view
of judgments and objectivity is that he at times presents judgments as essentially
objective, whereas at other times he writes specifically of subjective and objective
judgments, and their differences. Another distinction of judgments is that of
judgments of perception and judgments of experience, the first of which Kant says to
be subjective, and the latter objective. These distinctions are relevant to my purpose
because some interpreters, such as Cassirer252 and Allison253, claim that Kant's
theory of judgments actually requires judgments to be essentially objective, which
would mean that his own talk of subjective judgments of perception is incoherent
rhetoric. Others, such as Longuenesse254, Beizaei255 and Laiho256, claim that there 
actually is no incoherence or contradiction, but rather the notion of judgment that
Kant uses leaves room for subjective judgments, some of which can become
objective through the proper use of understanding, while others will remain 
subjective. As stated, my aim is not to solve all the problems related to these
distinctions, but they can still be of assistance in forming a picture of Kant’s
251 A69/B94.
252 Cassirer 1981.
253 Allison 1983, 148-153.
254 Longuenesse 1998.
255 Beizaei 2017.
256 Laiho 2012, 201-205.
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conception of judgment. In the B-edition of the transcendental deduction Kant
writes of judgments and the objective unity of apperception:
I have never been able to satisfy myself with the explanation that
the logicians give of a judgment in general: it is, they say, the 
representation of a relation between two concepts. Without 
quarreling here about what is mistaken in this explanation, that in
any case it fits only categorical but not hypothetical and
disjunctive judgments (which latter two do not contain a relation
of concepts but of judgments themselves) (though from this error 
in logic many troublesome consequences have arisen), I remark 
only that it is not here determined wherein this relation consists.257 
Here Kant first criticizes the view that judgments only represent relations between
concepts, as it is his view that they also represent relations between judgments.
However, the second matter criticized is that the nature of the relation is not at all
explicated. By this I mean the question of whether the relations depicted are 
contingent or necessary, and thus subjectively or objectively valid. Kant continues:
If, however, I investigate more closely the relation of given
cognitions in every judgment, and distinguish that relation, as
something belonging to the understanding, from the relation in
accordance with laws of the reproductive imagination (which has
only subjective validity), then I find that a judgment is nothing
other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity 
of apperception. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to
distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the
subjective.258 
This passage has come up multiple times already, and for a reason. I have above
discussed Kant’s notion of apperception as a capacity to unify representations
objectively, that is, to combine and synthesize different representations according
257 B140-141.
258 B141-142.
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to universal and necessary rules, to become unified experience which is about the
world, or, about the objects. Now, Kant says that the procedure of moving from
mere associative, subjective and contingent synthesizing of representations to
objective representation is to bring the representations to the objective unity of
apperception by judging that something is something (e.g. ‘x is p’), in which we do
not claim merely to associate something with something, but that something really
and necessarily is something. By this Kant does not mean that if we e.g. see a glass of
milk, and judge that ‘the milk is white’, then the milk is necessarily white. Rather,
the point is that the whiteness and milk necessarily and objectively belong together
(in the unity of apperception), when we represent the object (milk; substance) as
white (accident). Likewise, if I were to pour more and more milk into the glass, it
would eventually be spilled on the table. Now, to objectively represent this event,
one must use the category of causality. It is then possible to understand the
necessity of the relation of the pouring as cause and the spilling as effect. The
passage continues:
For this word designates the relation of the representations to the
original apperception and its necessary unity, even if the judgment
itself is empirical, hence contingent, e.g., "Bodies are heavy." By 
that, to be sure, I do not mean to say that these representations
necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition, but
rather that they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary
unity of the apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, i.e., in
accordance with principles of the objective determination of all
representations insofar as cognition can come from them, which
principles are all derived from the principle of the transcendental
unity of apperception.259 
I attempt to approach this with an example. There is a story, found in many
cultures and languages, about a rather foolish man who sits on a tree branch, sawing
off the very branch he is sitting on. Another man passes by and advises the fool to
stop the sawing, or he will fall. The fool, nevertheless, neglects this advice, because
he does not see how the other man could possibly foresee what will happen to him.
259 B142.
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So, sawing on, he cuts the branch and falls. The fool starts shouting out that the
other man is a sage who can tell the future. But the other man has thought it quite
natural to understand what will happen if the branch is cut. Now, what has this to
do with Kant and judging?
In Kantian context, we might say that the fool was somehow lacking in his
capacity of the understanding, or his capacity to judge objectively. He was not able
to apply the category of causality in his thinking, which category one needs to
understand something as a cause (the sawing) and something else as an effect (the
falling). A simple failure to see the specific effects of a given cause, however, is
common enough, and happens to everyone at times. This, in Kant’s terms, would
simply be a failure of the capacity to judge. According to Kant, the understanding
itself is a capacity of rules260, that is, a capacity to form and comprehend rules. But
the capacity to apply these rules is a separate capacity which Kant calls the capacity
(or faculty) to judge.261 Now, as we all do sometimes, the fool might have had
problems with his capacity to judge. Maybe he did not see that the situation with
the branch was such that causality applies to it, even if he otherwise thinks of
relations of objects and events using the concept of causality. One might think it is
actually rather impossible for us to even comprehend what the world would seem
like without this concept. But in this case, the fool did not see this even after the
accident. Rather, he seems incapable of at least fully understanding the notion of
causality, and the fact that it does apply to all objects in all times, as Kant requires of
the categories as the concepts of objects in general. Thus he did not properly and
objectively experience the relations of the tree, the branch, the sawing and himself. 
The Kantian notion of experience, however, means basically the same as objective
cognition, and both of them require the understanding and the application of the
categories to empirical objects and events. Thus, the fool of our story could not
cognize the world (fully) objectively, because of a lack of either the capacity to
judge, or perhaps even a lack of the capacity of understanding itself.262 
Having pondered on Kant’s thought on the capacity to judge, let us still
return to the passage of the B-deduction, which continues:
260 A69/B94; A132/B171; A158/B198.
261 A132/B171.
262 Kant (A133n/B172n) notes: “The lack of the power of judgment is that which is properly
called stupidity, and such a failing is not to be helped.”
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Only in this way does there arise from this relation a judgment, 
i.e., a relation that is objectively valid, and that is sufficiently
distinguished from the relation of these same representations in
which there would be only subjective validity, e.g., in accordance
with laws of association. In accordance with the latter I could only
say "If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight," but not "It, the
body, is heavy," which would be to say that these two
representations are combined in the object, i.e., regardless of any
difference in the condition of the subject, and are not merely found
together in perception (however often as that might be
repeated).263 
In this crucial passage Kant depicts a difference between relating representations to
other representations either subjectively (contingently or according to laws of
association) or necessarily and objectively. As I suggested, we should not think of
this difference as a depiction of something we choose to do this or that way, thus
producing either subjective or objective judgments, but rather it is a depiction of 
what happens in objective judgments, that is, in those judgments which actually
claim something about objects, and can thus have what some call truth value.264 
Once more, Kant writes that judgments are ways of bringing “given
cognitions to the objective unity of apperception”. Thus, rather than talking about
relating concepts to each other, Kant now says that judgments relate cognitions to 
each other in the objective unity of apperception. The difference between relating
concepts and relating cognitions could be that cognitions themselves are, as it were,
already objective and contain something sensible as well as conceptual, whereas
concepts just by themselves can have a relation to an object only via sensibility.
263 B140-142. The very last sentences of the passage, concerning the repetitions of certain
perceptions, seem to be direct reference to Hume’s theory of perception, in which the
concept of necessary connection, or causality, is derived from the repeated occurrences of
perceiving a connection between things. This was discussed in Chapter 2.
264 Henry Allison (2012 ,34) writes of this: “the objective validity, which Kant here attributes
to judgment as such, is not to be equated with truth (since that would commit Kant to the
absurdity that every judgment as such is true). It is rather that every judgment makes a
claim to truth or has a truthvalue, which is enough to distinguish judgment from a merely
imaginative association of the same representations.”
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In any case, the activity of relating cognitions concerns their relation to the
original apperception, from whence the unity and necessity of the judgments
originates. This relation that the representations will have to apperception and each 
other is then not only subjective, as, say, association, but objectively valid, in the
case of having happened according to the necessary rules of understanding, which 
are conditions for the objectivity. Furthermore, Kant explicates that this is what we
properly mean by saying that something “is” something; it not only feels like
something or appears like something, but indeed is (objectively) something. For to
make a judgment that states e.g. that “this stick is one meter long”, it is presupposed
that certain necessary laws are followed, which laws are common to every judging
subject, as they are laws of objective judging in general. This Kant says to mean that
they are proper judgments.
Now, it is essential that categories are necessary concepts for cognition and
thus for objective judgments. As a pre-note to what will be discussed below, this
could even by name suggest that objective judgments are always categorical
judgments. Now, as we already saw, Kant indeed writes that the other forms of
relation besides categorical, that is, hypothetical and disjunctive judgments, are
functions of relating two or more judgments. This relating in itself does not
guarantee objectivity, because it remains unsettled whether the related judgments
themselves are objective or true. However, in my view the question of different
types of judgments does not, in the end, cause serious difficulties at least to my 
essential interpretation of Kantian objective reference. The key still lies in the use
of the categories, as they are what make it possible to form the universally necessary
relation of objects in general to apperception. Related to this A.B. Dickerson
writes:
Kant’s analysis aims to show that cognition should be analysed as
involving the two faculties of receptivity and spontaneity. The
argument is that grasping a unified complex representation entails
spontaneity, but if spontaneity is to be made compatible with
objectivity, and thus with receptivity, then it must be governed by a
priori rules derived from the essential structure of the act of
judging – that is, it must be governed by the categories. In this way,
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Kant argues, the categories are shown to be necessary conditions of 
experience, and thus their objective validity is proved.265 
Now, I agree with Dickerson’s claim of the interplay of receptivity and spontaneity.
It is the latter which is supposed to be governed by rules “derived from the essential
structure of the act of judging”. But how does this essential structure of judging
relate to the use of the categories, and the question of the objectivity and
subjectivity of judgments? As the question concerning the subjectivity and
objectivity of judgments may shed more light on Kant’s thought, below I offer a few
thoughts on the types of judgment as related to the question of objectivity.
4.5 Judgments of Perception and Judgments of Experience
The seemingly essential objectivity of all judgments appears to be in contradiction
with the Prolegomena’s and the Critique of the Power of Judgment’s notions of
subjective judgments of perception and subjective judgments of beauty. In the
Critique of Pure Reason we find not a single mention of ‘subjective judgment’, 
which fits very well with the fact that Kant also only once in the Critique of Pure
Reason uses the expression ‘objective judgment’.266 By this I mean that it makes
sense not to talk of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ judgments, if the matter involves no
distinction, or such a distinction is irrelevant to the matter dealt with. This might
be taken to support a supposition that in the Critique of Pure Reason the 
‘judgments’ referred to are the ones that Kant later calls objective or determining
judgments. We might want to note that in the earlier quoted passage from the B-
deduction, Kant indeed expresses what he says to be a subjectively valid relation of 
representations, in the form of a hypothetical judgment: "If I carry a body, I feel a 
pressure of weight". To give this judgment objective validity, Kant then offers the
formally categorical judgment, in which the “representations are combined in the
object”: "It, the body, is heavy". This change of a formally hypothetical judgment to
265 Dickerson 2007, 32.
266 A262.
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a formally categorical judgment often marks or represents for Kant the difference
between a subjective relation of representations and an objective one.267 
Kant’s talk of judgments of perception and judgments of experience causes a 
notorious difficulty in interpretation because of the seeming contradiction to at
least the account found in the first critique in which we can find no mention of
judgments of perception. Rather the account of the Critique of Pure Reason seems
to be that all judgments are categorical and objectively valid. Thus they seem to be
what Kant in the Prolegomena deems judgments of experience. Now, the problem is
not only that the notion of judgments of perception, which are supposed to be valid 
only subjectively and not objectively, is missing in the Critique of Pure Reason. In 
addition, as is claimed by many, the notion seems contradictory to the Critique of
Pure Reason’s doctrine, and especially the B-deduction, as Kant there seems to
present judgments altogether as conditioned by the categories and the original
unity of apperception. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant writes about the Table
of Categories:
Now this is the listing of all original pure concepts of synthesis that
the understanding contains in itself a priori, and on account of 
which it is only a pure understanding; for by these concepts alone
can it understand something in the manifold of intuition, i.e.,
think an object for it. This division is systematically generated from
a common principle, namely the faculty for judging (which is the
same as the faculty for thinking) […]268 
Here we see what is basically an identification of thinking and judging, and an
account of what they are essentially achieving: an object for the manifold of 
intuition. Now, this would suggest that without the understanding (as a faculty for
thinking or judging) we only have subjective representations, as in the manifold of 
intuitions. It is only when the understanding starts to synthesize these
representations that we can achieve the relation to an object, and this synthesizing
happens precisely by the functions identified, or represented, as the categories:
267 In addition to B 140-142, see e.g. the Prolegomena’s examples of subjective and
objective judgment.
268 A 80-81 / B 106.
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The same function that gives unity to the different representations
in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different
representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called
the pure concept of understanding. The same understanding,
therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through
which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by
means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content
into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the
manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are
called pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects a
priori […]269 
This passage is much debated as it identifies the unity bringing function of a
judgment and that of an intuition. This has led some commentators to think that if
and when we have intuitions, they are always already subsumed under the
categories.270 I do not think this is the case, as Kant rather clearly says that we do
not need concepts or the understanding for intuition, and as the case would then
make the purpose of the transcendental deductions rather odd.271 Rather, it seems 
that we obviously can have representations called intuitions without the
understanding, but for them to be objective, that is, to have a relation to an object,
the understanding and the categories are necessary. In the Prolegomena Kant writes:
We will therefore have to analyze experience in general, in order to
see what is contained in this product of the senses and the
understanding, and how the judgment of experience is itself 
possible. At bottom lies the intuition of which I am conscious, i.e.,
perception (perceptio), which belongs solely to the senses. But,
secondly, judging (which pertains solely to the understanding) also
belongs here. Now this judging can be of two types: first, when I
merely compare the perceptions and connect them in a 
consciousness of my state, or, second, when I connect them in a
269 A79/B104-105.
270 See e.g. Guyer , McDowell (1996, 46), and Schulting (2016a, v-xviii).
271 See e.g. A91/B123: ”Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for
intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking.”
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consciousness in general. The first judgment is merely a judgment
of perception and has thus far only subjective validity; it is merely a
connection of perceptions within my mental state, without 
reference to the object. Hence it is not, as is commonly imagined,
sufficient for experience to compare perceptions and to connect
them in one consciousness by means of judging; from that there
arises no universal validity and necessity of the judgment, on
account of which alone it can be objectively valid and so can be
experience.272 
According to this passage we can and do have conscious perception and judging (or
relating) of these perceptions, all without reference to an object. For objective
reference we need something more:
A completely different judgment therefore occurs before
experience can arise from perception. The given intuition must be
subsumed under a concept that determines the form of judging in
general with respect to the intuition, connects the empirical
consciousness of the latter in a consciousness in general, and
thereby furnishes empirical judgments with universal validity; a 
concept of this kind is a pure a priori concept of the understanding,
which does nothing but simply determine for an intuition the
mode in general in which it can serve for judging.273 
Now, an obvious problem seems to be that if the a priori concepts depicted in the
latter passage are what determine an intuition’s mode for judgments, then the prior
passage’s judgments of perception are completely lacking it. The judgments of
perception seem to be mere connections of perceptions without the categories, and
thus without unity in a consciousness in general, and without universal validity or
reference to an object. This description also seems to fit the Critique of Pure 
Reason’s passage, which I remarked in 4.4, where Kant contrasted the subjective
hypothetical judgment "If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight," with the
272 Prol., 4:300.
273 Ibid.
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objective one: "It, the body, is heavy". Now, we can note that Kant in fact does not
call the hypothetical one a judgment at all in the passage but writes only of “saying”
this. But it is then very hard to express the subjective relation of the representations
without forming a judgment of some kind, and thus Kant uses the form of
hypothetical judgment for expressing the relation in question.
In the Prolegomena Kant repeatedly refers to Hume’s problem and his crux 
metaphysicorum.274 I have already discussed aspects of the problem but in the
Prolegomena Kant treats it in close relation to his notions of judgments of
perception and judgments of experience. What I take Kant to be saying is that the
Humean picture simply lacks the relation of the representations to an object, as it is
simply subjective comparing and relating of representations, or ideas, as Hume
would have put it, to each other. Thus, what Kant repeatedly says of the sun
warming a stone should be read as explicating the difference of relating
representations to each other categorically and non-categorically.
Now, I find that one reading of §29 would be that hypothetical judgments as
such are simply not objective, as Kant’s procedure in §29 is first to turn the
judgment “If a body is illuminated by the sun for long enough, then it becomes
warm” into another one: “The sun through its light is the cause of the warmth”. 
Now, this surely fits what we already saw Kant to say about hypothetical
judgments, namely that in them only the relation of two judgments is considered.
This means that the validity of the two judgments themselves is not at issue. Thus
we can consider the relation of two or more judgments logically, while none of the
judgments are objective. Now what exactly is the difference between the two
judgments, the first of which is subjective and the latter objective? At first glance it
appears that the objective judgment “The sun through its light is the cause of the
warmth”, has the form of a categorical judgment, because of the copula “is”. This is
still not the case, but rather what is considered is the relation of the two judgments,
namely one about sunshine and the other of the stone’s warmth. In the objective
judgment we find the quite exact word “cause” being used to describe the relation.
Now this is precisely what hypothetical judgments are supposed to be as objective
determinations. As logical, the form is that of ground and consequence, but as
empirically objective, it is that of cause and effect. Thus a hypothetical judgment
274 E.g. Prol. 4:257-262, 4:312.
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can in itself be objective, if it includes the relation of ground and consequence, that
is, the concept of cause: 
the concept of cause indicates a condition that in no way attaches
to things, but only to experience, namely, that experience can be an
objectively valid cognition of appearances and their sequence in
time only insofar as the antecedent appearance can be connected
with the subsequent one according to the rule of hypothetical
judgments.275 
What I still find to be problematic in this account is the first judgment, “If a body is
illuminated by the sun for long enough, then it becomes warm”. First of all, I do not
see how this is not a hypothetical judgment, and Kant even says it to be such.
Secondly, isn’t it the case that the judgment rather clearly expresses a relation of
cause and effect, even if not using the word “cause”? I would think that the latter
judgment, which indeed includes the word cause, is basically an analysis of the first
one, with the additions of “is” and “cause”. But if it is simply an analysis, then why
isn’t the first judgment already objective?276 
So, does Kant at one point seriously claim that all proper judgments are 
categorical and related to the original apperception? If so, did he change his view, or
rather terminology, so as to call that which in the Prolegomena is named judgments 
of perception by another name in the Critique of Pure Reason? Or, is the case such 
that what is at issue with judgments of perception is simply not really dealt with at
all in the Critique of Pure Reason? Still, to avoid contradiction it seems that either
one must say that not all judgments are categorical, and thus the definitions of 
Critique of Pure Reason would be either lacking or only referring to so called 
judgments of experience, or that judgments of perception aren’t really judgments
altogether, at least in a strict sense.
Beatrice Longuenesse claims that there is no contradiction between the
Prolegomena and the B-deduction, but on the contrary that they complement each
275 Prol., 4:312.
276 A similar case to be considered, but which I cannot give a satisfying solution to, is the
example that Kant gives concerning air. Kant claims that air will serve as antecedent to
expansion which is then the consequent, but the final, objective judgment, again, has the
form of a categorical judgment: “air is elastic”.
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other.277 How does that come to be the case? After stating that many
interpretations, as that of Cassirer’s278, often reduce judgments of perception to a
Humean associationist model (perhaps then identified with Kant’s theory of pre-
judgmental empirical association?) she makes an interpretative move towards
recognizing the role of the mere forms of judgment with regard to schemata.
Longuenesse refers to an ability that we supposedly have to reflect upon a sensible
manifold using the logical forms of judgment as our guide:
To say that all judgments concerned with appearances are at first
mere judgments of perception or "mere logical connections" of 
perceptions, prior to any subsumption of appearances under
categories, is to recognize the full role of mere logical forms of
judgment, as forms of reflection, in guiding the generation of 
perceptual schemata. If judgments of perception result from
reflection on a sensible manifold given in circumstances that are 
quite contingent (depending on the biography of particular
empirical subjects), the activity that produces this kind of
judgment is also the activity that first generates in the sensible
given the forms of synthesis Kant calls "schemata of the pure
concepts of understanding."279 
Now, I have only presented Longuenesse’s view as an example of an interpretation
in which there is no real contradiction in Kant’s talk of judgments of perception
and judgments of experience. I do not wish or see necessary here to consider her
claims with regard to the role and origin of schemata, but it must be noted that her
interpretation still is left with the problem raised by the Critique of Pure Reason B 
140-142, that is, the fact that Kant defines judgments to be objective. The solution
for this problem, then, seems to be that what Kant meant by saying “judgment” in
B 140-142, simply was “objective, determining judgment”.
277 Longuenesse 1998.
278 Cassirer 1981.
279 Longuenesse 1998, 194-195.
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4.6 The Categories as the Concepts of an Object in General
We have now seen that it is necessarily the use of the categories which according to
Kant makes it possible to relate our representations to an object. But what precisely
does Kant mean by saying that the pure concept of a transcendental object, “(which 
in all of our cognitions is really always one and the same = X), is that which in all of
our empirical concepts in general can provide relation to an object, i.e., objective
reality”?280 To be more precise, Kant states that this concept (of a transcendental
object) provides the relation to an object, and thus, the objective reality of empirical
concepts. But this concept is precisely the product of an act of objectivization,
whereby the pure sensible manifold is united in relation to the act of apperception.
Empirically this means that the sensibly given is subsumed under the categories in
the necessary unity of apperception. Kant writes:
Now since this unity281 must be regarded as necessary a priori (since 
the cognition would otherwise be without an object), the relation
to a transcendental object, i.e., the objective reality of our empirical
cognition, rests on the transcendental law that all appearances,
insofar as objects are to be given to us through them, must stand
under a priori rules of their synthetic unity, in accordance with
which their relation in empirical intuition is alone possible, i.e.,
that in experience they must stand under conditions of the
necessary unity of apperception just as in mere intuition they must
stand under the formal conditions of space and time; indeed it is
through those conditions that every cognition is first made
possible.282 
Let us revise. According to Kant he was able to show the necessity and objective
validity of space and time by showing that no objects can appear without these
forms of intuition. The strategy is similar with regard to the categories as
conditions of thought and thus of experience, as the categories are subject to the
unity of apperception and thus in a sense make up the unity of experience. The
280 A109.
281 [The unity of consciousness.]
282 A109-110.
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situation, then, is that all relation of objective representation to objects is
dependent on a connection that the appearances have to the understanding
according to universal and necessary laws. These laws, according to Kant, cannot
originate in our empirical and contingent perceptions, but must be a priori, and so 
originate in the structure of the understanding.283 Kant writes: 
Unity of synthesis in accordance with empirical concepts would be
entirely contingent, and, were it not grounded on a transcendental
ground of unity, it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to
fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from it.
But in that case all relation of cognition to objects would also 
disappear, since the appearances would lack connection in
accordance with universal and necessary laws, and would thus be
intuition without thought, but never cognition, and would 
therefore be as good as nothing for us. The a priori conditions of a
possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of
the possibility of the objects of experience. Now I assert that the
categories that have just been adduced are nothing other than the
conditions of thinking in a possible experience, just as space and
time contain the conditions of the intuition for the very same
thing. They are therefore also fundamental concepts for thinking
objects in general for the appearances, and they therefore have a
priori objective validity, which was just what we really wanted to
know.284 
I should like to note that the well-known statement Kant makes here about the "a 
priori conditions of a possible experience in general" being "at the same time 
conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience" does indeed stand just as
is, and should be taken seriously. This statement is part of the answer to the
question of the Herz-letter. There Kant stated that empirical objects cannot
produce pure or intellectual representations or vice versa. But now the view has
changed: it is here claimed that the conditions of experience are the conditions of
283 A112: “All attempts to derive these pure concepts of the understanding from experience
and to ascribe to them a merely empirical origin are therefore entirely vain and futile.”
284 A111.
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the objects of experience, which can be found nowhere other than in experience, as
objects given through sensibility and thought via categories. Thus we may say that
the formal conditions of experience are formal reasons (or even formal causes) for
the empirical objects (of experience).
In addition to standing in a necessary relation to the original apperception285, 
the objects also stand in a necessary relation to each other: “[a]ll appearances
therefore stand in a thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws, and 
hence in a transcendental affinity, of which the empirical affinity is the mere
consequence.”286 Now, to refer to one of these objects is essentially to make a
categorical judgment about an empirical object. An empirical object is, so to say,
intuitively determined by sensibility according to the forms of intuition, by which
determination it necessarily has primary qualities287, that is, extension and shape
(and their derivatives), and conceptually determined by the understanding via the
categories. Through these determinations we are able to use our representations to
refer to an object intersubjectively, that is, different people can stand in a similar
relation to one and the same object, and make judgments about it. As seems
natural, in this picture we must be able to judge a thing objectively, that is, in
relation to a consciousness in general, to then be able to compare these judgments
(of the same object) to those made by others, to arrive at any kind of certainty or
truth in knowing the nature of the objects.
Even though objectivity for Kant in the simplest sense means object-
relatedness, on the other hand, objectivity seems in Kant’s use to refer to our using
the categories to bring a representation into the unity of apperception. In other
words, it is basically the product of a subject relating or referring a representation to
an outer object as an object of experience, using the categories. Thus there is no
objectivity without the use of categories, which again means that e.g. no sensation
alone can be objective, even if it is caused by an object, unless this sensation is used
in the cognition of the object, in which case it is brought under the categories as
experience of an object. Still, Kant at times calls some sensations objective to
285 A111-112: “the possibility, indeed even the necessity of these categories rests on the
relation that the entire sensibility, and with it also all possible appearances, have to the
original apperception, in which everything is necessarily in agreement with the conditions of
the thorough-going unity of self-consciousness.”
286 A113-114.
287 I return to this more thoroughly in Chapter 5.
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separate them from mere feelings (of pleasure and displeasure), which cannot
contribute to cognition of the object, and are thus completely subjective.
Intersubjectivity or intersubjective validity is in itself not a condition of 
objectivity in the same sense, but rather objectivity is a precondition of
intersubjectivity, even though these two go somewhat hand in hand. As Kant writes 
in the third Critique, the sensation of the green color of the meadow belongs to
objective sensation of the object288, even though I might very well see the color of
the object differently than others, or even see the object in only black and white. 
The point is that it is still the same object, because there is only one space-time and 
only one experience.289 On the other hand, we can also use the categories to think
of things which are not and cannot be given to us sensibly, but this does not entitle 
us to any claims of such things. To think of a transcendental object, or a
noumenon, is to apply the concept of objectivity without an empirical reference,
because a noumenon cannot be an object of sense, and to really apply objectivity, or
the categories, we need an object of sense. For this reason we obviously can have no
objective relation to noumena, or, in other words, we cannot represent noumena in
any other way than conceptually as a transcendental object.
With regard to my purpose here, it seems that the relation of a representation 
to an object is only achieved in the universally necessary relation that the
representation has to the unity of original apperception. This relation is cognitively
achieved by the use of categories in an objective judgment. This is where the essence 
of Kantian objective reference lies, as it is precisely this relation of subject and
object, determined by both the a priori forms of intuition and the a priori
categories, in which we find the conditions of objectivity, namely necessity and
universality, fulfilled. However, even if the a priori forms of intuition and the
understanding make up the formal conditions of objective reference, they alone are
not sufficient for it, because obviously we also need the empirical, material elements
to achieve this. To put it in Aristotelian-Kantian terminology, in addition to
288 KrU 5:206.
289 Kant (A110) writes: “There is only one experience, in which all perceptions are
represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection, just as there is only one space and
time, in which all forms of appearance and all relation of being or non-being take place. If 
one speaks of different experiences, they are only so many perceptions insofar as they
belong to one and the same universal experience. The thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of
perceptions is precisely what constitutes the form of experience, and it is nothing other
than the synthetic unity of the appearances in accordance with concepts.”
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formal elements we also, and obviously, need material elements. These elements
and their role I try to explicate in the two following chapters.290 Thus, as an answer
to Kant’s own question concerning the relation of representations to their objects,
presented in the letter to Herz, Kant claims that in a way we indeed are responsible
for the objects and their properties, but not with regard to their original existence 
or (all of) their properties. Thus Kant does not claim that we produce the things in
themselves, but that cognition of the objects is not purely passive, rather on the
contrary it involves quite a lot of activity and spontaneity on behalf of the cognizer. 
This activity, then, is a condition of the objects as appearances and as phenomena.
In this sense, we, along with our activity, are formal causes for the objects, as 
phenomena, that is, as sensible objects of the understanding.
4.7 Further Remarks on Objectivity, Objective Validity and Truth
There seems to be some controversy in Kant scholarship about how the notions of
objectivity, objective validity and truth relate to each other. I mostly agree and want
to support Dennis Schulting in his view that:
The object qua object, the object’s objectivity, is a sheer product of
the synthetic unity among our representations. It is in the way that
we combine our representations that we are able to recognize some
existing thing as object. (The object of our judgement is not, or
more precisely cannot be, simply a thing that exists in itself, but is
rather something that is necessarily for us. If it merely existed in 
itself, it would by definition not be an object for us, an object that we
could cognise.) The “as” here is important; it points to the
necessary reflexive or subjective element in the cognition of objects,
which in a certain respect is also sufficient for it.291 
290 Taken transcendentally, the material elements of cognizing objects would also have to
include what Kant calls transcendental objects, or, depending on interpretation,
transcendental matter. In an empirical sense, we might include in the material conditions of
cognition the physical senses by which only can our sensibility gain the representations.
291 Schulting 2017, 105.
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Schulting here claims that objectivity is a product of a unity among our
representations. This much I agree on with him, but I find that it should be
clarified that objectivity is, to be precise, not a feature or property of objects, but a
property of representations, with regard to objects. The representations may or may 
not concern objects. This is to say that representations may be objective or
subjective, and if they are objective, they still may be true or untrue. The objects
themselves are not true or untrue, valid or invalid, but the representations are. It is
my view that Kantian objectivity in itself does not amount to truth, and so to say
e.g. that a judgment is objective does not mean to say that it is true, but rather that
it makes a claim about an object. This is simply understandable because we can
most surely make errors of false claims which are about objects, but which are not
true. These are mistaken objective judgments. But Dennis Schulting makes the
claim that even objective validity does not straightforward amount to truth:
What Kant calls the objective validity of a judgement is therefore
not its truth value per se […] Rather, the truth value of a
judgement—that a judgement can be true or false—is, while
certainly essential, merely a surface aspect of judgement (an aspect
considered in general logic, not in transcendental logic); it is not
what makes a judgement an objectively valid statement.292 
I think this matter, and Schulting’s claim, need clarification, most of all with regard
to the meanings of ‘objective’ and ‘objectively valid’. I imagine that I understand
what Schulting here means. If I understand him correctly, the point is that when
the categories are used (in relation to the unity of apperception), we manage to
‘catch’ or refer to the objects. Moreover, we refer to the objects in a way which is
universally valid. I would express this by saying that the judgments are objective. As
Schulting states, and I agree, this does not amount to truth of the judgments
concerning the objects, but only that the judgments are about the objects. My
problem is rather conceptual, but I find that the proper way to characterize the
difference would be to say that these judgments are objective, even though not
necessarily correct. The objective validity of the categories, on the other hand, is
another matter than the objective validity of a claim or a judgment. I have found
292 Schulting 2017, 117-118.
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time and again in Kant scholarship that ‘objectivity’ and ‘objective validity’ are
identified, or their distinction is not made sufficiently.293 Now, this may seem a
small or even irrelevant matter, especially when I myself am defining objectivity as
object-relatedness, or object-aboutness. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that we
should not strictly identify ‘objectivity’ with ‘objective validity’, for the following
reasons. First, a phrase like ‘objective validity’ does not in itself make the meaning
of objectivity, or ‘objective’, any clearer, but rather to understand what ‘objective
validity’ means, we already need to understand what ‘objective’ means. Thus,
‘objective validity’ means ‘validity with regard to an object or objects’. Second, we
may very well have representations or make judgments which are objective, but
which are not objectively valid, that is, correct or true. For these reasons I feel there
is a need to be precise with the concept of objectivity. I partly disagree on this 
matter with Robert Hanna, who states that
[o]bjective validity, in turn, is a necessary but not sufficient
condition of truth, and hence of objectively real propositions, for
false judgments are also objectively valid (A58/B83). In this way
the objective validity of a judgment is equivalent to its propositional
truth-valuedness, but not equivalent to its propositional truth. By
contrast, all judgments that are not objectively valid are “empty”
(leer) or truth-valueless.294 
The reason why I have a small reservation to agreeing with Hanna295, is that he does
not clarify the referent of the statement when he says that objective validity is a
necessary condition of truth, and that false judgments are also objectively valid. By
referent I here mean: the objective validity of what? That is, the validity of the
categories, or the validity of the actual judgment? I would nevertheless agree with
his first claim about objective validity being a condition of truth. However, he does
not specify whether he means the objective validity of the categories used in the
judgment, or the objective validity of the judgment itself. Now, this is only a matter
of clarification, and in this case I take it that both would be required for truth. Still,
I find that there is a sense in which his claim of false judgments being objectively
293 See e.g. Young 1979;Allison 2004, 83.
294 Hanna 2018, 1.3.
295 And Schulting, for the same reason.
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valid does not hold. I agree, that both a true and a false judgment, if it is objective,
will use the categories in an objectively valid way. However, the content of the
judgment cannot be objectively valid, if the judgment is false. Kant himself rarely
speaks of the objective validity of judgments, but usually of the objective validity of
certain concepts. What is more, Kant himself identified objective validity with
correctness, or truth.296 I propose that both the true and the false judgments can be 
objective, if they are about an object, but the false judgment cannot, simply as a
judgment, be objectively valid. Nevertheless, the applying of the categories in the
false judgment can be objectively valid. Thus we also here, in Hanna’s case, seem to
have a slight need for clarification, and especially a more precise analysis of the
concept of objectivity, which is what I am trying to accomplish. To sum what I have
discussed and claimed, I am of the conception that for Kant, the only case in which 
the objectivity and objective validity of a representation is pretty much the same
thing, is the case of the pure concepts, that is, the categories. In the case of
judgments, objectivity in itself does not amount to claims about validity or truth,
but only to object-relatedness, as the ‘objective validity’ of a judgment would
obviously amount to the validity or truth of the judgment, with regard to the object
of it.
296 See A125.
132
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
   
    
  
  
       
   
   
 
 
     
     
     
  
  
 
  
   
     
      
   
        
 
      
     
   
    
       
   
  
      
        
  
  
5 Empirical Objectivity and the Properties of Empirical Objects
5.1 Empirical Conditions of Objectivity?
In this chapter I present a view of how Kant thought of empirical, sensible objects
and their objective properties.297 I build this presentation on my interpretation of
Kant’s distinction of primary and secondary qualities, claiming that what Kant calls
empirical things in themselves298 consist precisely of the primary qualities of
empirical objects. In my view these are, for Kant, the real empirical referents in 
objective judgments. Now, I have already stated that according to Kant, experience
has both sensible and conceptual elements and conditions, both of which are also
conditions of the existence of the objects of experience. Even if these conditions
should be seen to belong together as the conditions of all experience, they can, to
some extent, be treated separately. Thus, by “empirical conditions” of experience I
refer to our senses and sensibility as necessary elements of experience.299 This is only
to emphasize that Kant did not think we can achieve cognition of real objects
without sensibility, that is, by understanding or reason alone. Thus, this is firstly to
emphasize his difference from rationalist metaphysics, or any philosophies, which
thought to achieve knowledge of the real world in a purely intellectual fashion.
Secondly, this is to defend Kant from later attacks against him, which attacks, such
as those of e.g. Quentin Meillassoux’s300 or Levi Bryant’s301, claim that Kant’s
transcendental idealism loses affiliation with the real world, and is only concerned
with the subject. This is not the case, as Kant’s famous a priori cognition offers us
only formal cognition of objects, and is thus not in itself empirical objective
cognition. Thus Kant writes in the B-edition of the first Critique that “we can
297 I do not claim to present a complete view, but only a sufficient one for the purposes of 
this study. I thereby do not attempt to thoroughly include all aspects of the matter, such as
the principles of pure understanding, into my presentation. I suggest that one way to
interpret Kant is that such things as colors and smells, which are often called secondary
qualities, may be taken to be subjective properties of objects, whereas primary properties,
such as figure and size, could respectively be called objective properties of objects.
298 See A29-30/B45 and B69-70.
299 For the most part, I refrain from dealing with the ‘Principles of the Understanding’,
because they are not necessary for making the points I am trying to make in this work.
300 Meillassoux 2008.
301 Bryant 2010.
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cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them”.302 Things,
however, whether as themselves or as phenomena, do not consist only of what we
have put into them.
My aim here is to explicate a kind of difference between the material and
formal conditions of cognizing empirical objects, and to inquire into the relation of
sensation to objectivity, to find out what role our senses and sensations have in
achieving a relation to an object. I have in the previous chapter explicated why and
how Kant thought that neither sensibility nor the understanding alone can achieve 
any kind of objective reference, but rather what is needed is the co-operation of 
these two.303 Based on this, I want to explicate what, on Kant’s account, we can
then expect to know of the properties or qualities of objects a priori. I suggest that
the matter can be illuminated by relating Kant’s account to the historical discussion
regarding primary and secondary qualities of objects. This discussion was, if not
initiated by, at least made famous by John Locke, who presented the view that we
can make a distinction of the qualities we perceive in objects into primary and
secondary qualities, of which only the first ones are actual properties of the objects
themselves, and the latter, the secondary qualities, only contingent effects in the
perceivers.304 To this claim Berkeley in his idealist way replied that all of the
qualities are actually only in the perceiver, and thus ideal and secondary.305 I aim 
here to show that Kant worked out a sort of synthesis between these views, and
thus in a way was able to keep both of these views, with certain restrictions, which I
address below.
As an example, I address the contrast of such subjective qualities as colors to
such objective, spatial properties as size and figure, and explicate the way in which
some of our sensations, as well as some of our senses, are more objective than others.
I show that for Kant the most basic spatiotemporal properties are the primary
qualities, and they are precisely what constitute the empirical object in itself, in
contrast to secondary qualities, which are only modifications of the senses. This
distinction, however, only applies to appearances, and not to things in themselves,
302 B xviii.
303 See e.g. A253, where Kant writes: “If I take all thinking (through categories) away from
an empirical cognition, then no cognition of any object at all remains; for through mere
intuition nothing at all is thought, and that this affection of sensibility is in me does not
constitute any relation of such representation to any object at all.”
304 See Locke, Essay, II.VIII, §9-15.
305 See Berkeley 2009, 1:9-10.
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as all qualities or properties of objects are subject to the formal conditions
explicated by Kant. Thus certain criticisms toward Kant, such as that of
Meillassoux’s306, fail, if they claim that Kant does not recognize the difference
between certain measurable or mathematizable properties of objects, and those
which are only e.g. feeling. Thereby Meillassoux fails to acknowledge that also Kant
made a similar distinction between primary and secondary qualities, but Kant
insisted, with good grounds, that in such a case it is not a distinction of things-in-
themselves and appearances, but rather a distinction of primary and secondary
qualities of appearances or phenomena. Now, before moving on to address the
distinctions, I want to lay out the more basic pieces of the puzzle, that is, the role of
sensibility, senses and sensations with regard to objectivity and the objective
properties of objects.
5.2 Sensations and Objectivity
Kant’s treatment of sensation has given rise to many questions and problems. One
problem relevant to my question concerning the conditions of objectivity is
whether sensations are objective or not. That is, do sensations refer or relate to
objects, or are they simply and only subjective modifications of the subject’s
states?307 Kant’s writings on the matter seem to be somewhat contradictory. In the
beginning of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant writes the following: “The effect of
an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is
sensation.”308 Later in the book he defines sensation in relation to cognition:
A perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state
is a sensation (sensation); an objective perception is a cognition
(cognition). The latter is either an intuition or a concept (intuitus
vel conceptus). The former is immediately related to the object and
306 Meillassoux 2008.
307 This question is related to but not identical with the problem in the debate of 
conceptualism and nonconceptualism. The debate, however, pulls into many other
directions, and therefore I have chosen to treat my question separately from the mentioned
debate.
308 A20/B34.
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is singular; the latter is mediate, by means of a mark, which can be
common to several things.309 
Based on these definitions it seems rather clear that, for Kant, a sensation is
something that objects cause or affect in a subject. Nevertheless, Kant says,
sensations do not refer to any object but only to the subject, namely as
modifications of the subject’s states. It is here that we once again find the relevant
meaning for the terms objective and subjective; objective is something (a
representation) that refers or relates to an object, in other words, is “about” an
object, whereas subjective means something that only refers to the subject, and thus
lacks this “aboutness” with regard to objects.
It is noteworthy that when speaking of the effect of the objects upon the
subjects, Kant does not mean primarily some (perhaps measurable) physical effects
of the object upon the subject’s senses or body in general, but rather the effect that
the objects have on our consciousness, even though the former of course are
involved in producing the latter. Thus Kant is obviously not saying that we do not
need actual senses such as sight and hearing, for objective representations, rather on
the contrary. But in this context, objects can be said to affect our capacity for
representation.310 Now, this capacity for representation is a complex matter, but it
may be claimed that a sort of a material ground for our capacity for representing
anything objective is our sensibility. This is because Kant has abandoned
assumptions of an intellectual intuition, and thus our only way of intuiting objects
is by sensibility. Kant writes of sensibility and intuition in the very beginning of the
Critique of Pure Reason:
In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may
relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, 
and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is 
intuition. This, however, takes place only insofar as the object is
given to us; but this in turn, is possible only if it affects the mind in
a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations
through the way in which we are affected by objects is called
309 A320.
310 A19/B33.
136
 
 
   
   
 
     
   
   
  
    
    
  
 
 
  
    
    
  
   
    
  
   
  
      
  
 
   
 
     
        
    
 
 
  
  
sensibility. Objects are therefore given to us by means of sensibility,
and it alone affords us intuitions but they are thought through the
understanding, and from it arise concepts. But all thought, whether
straightaway (directe) or through a detour (indirecte), must
ultimately be related to intuitions, thus, in our case, to sensibility,
since there is no other way in which objects can be given to us.
The effect of an object on the capacity for representation,
insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition which is
related to the object through sensation is called empirical. The
undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called
appearance.311 
So, first of all, some things or objects must be there, and they must be able to affect
us. This requires something from both the things and from us. Our capacity to be
affected by objects is what Kant calls sensibility, and sensibility thereby is
receptivity; a capacity to acquire representations. Intuitions, on the other hand, are 
not sensations, but rather intuition relates to the object through sensation, that is,
in empirical cases. Now, this still does not mean that intuitions as such would be
objective in a proper sense. This is shown in the end of the passage where Kant
informs us that the object of intuition, which also bears the name of appearance, is
an undetermined object. I take this peculiar expression to mean that it has not been
determined by the understanding through the categories, and thus is only a
subjective representation as such, and not a cognition. This is also shown in the
following passage:
If I take all thinking (through categories) away from an empirical
cognition, then no cognition of any object at all remains; for
through mere intuition nothing at all is thought, and that this
affection of sensibility is in me does not constitute any relation of 
such representation to any object at all.312 
311 A19/B33.
312 A253/B309.
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It is only the effect caused by the object in the subject’s capacity for representation
that Kant calls ‘sensation’. It is something that is brought about in the subject (as a
modification) by the object, but still does not refer to the object.
Considering all of the above, it can strike one as a surprising fact that in both
the Critique of the Power of Judgment313 and on his lectures on metaphysics314, Kant
indeed speaks of objective sensation. What does he then mean by “objective
sensation”, and how could a sensation be objective, if it is, by definition, such a
modification of the subject’s states which does not refer to any object? Kant writes:
The green color of the meadows belongs to objective sensation, as
perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness belongs to
subjective sensation, through which no object is represented, i.e., to
feeling, through which the object is considered as an object of
satisfaction (which is not a cognition of it).315 
It is clear that in this passage Kant speaks of two types of sensation, one of which is
objective and the other subjective. But we can also see here once again Kant’s use of
the notion of object, namely that an object is the object of some capacity or act. In
this case, the green color is included in the perception of an object of sense, whereas
what Kant calls agreeableness has to do with the object as considered as an object of
satisfaction. Of course the context here is that of the Critique of Judgment’s, where
Kant is contrasting the subjective feeling of agreeableness to the perception of the
object. Nevertheless he now uses the term “objective sensation”, which seems
contradictory to the first Critique. What is going on here, and how does this relate
to what Kant says of sensation in the first Critique? Has Kant either changed his
view or his terminology, or are we dealing with different account or aspects of 
objectivity?
313 Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790.
314 The lectures V-Met/L1 (AA 28) and V-Met/Mron (AA 29).
315 KrU, 5:206; Italics added.
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5.3 Is there a Problem of Objective Sensation?
For the reasons explicated above, it seems to be conceptually contradictory for Kant
to talk of objective sensation. Nevertheless, he obviously does so, which raises
questions to be answered. If he was not just being sloppy with concepts, could
sensations perhaps be in some way subjective, and yet be objective on another? Or is
the case such that there indeed are sensations which can be called objective in some
sense of the word, but there also are sensations which are in no way objective? In 
what way, then, could even some sensations be objective, if, on the other hand, 
Kant says specifically that only ‘cognitions’, which include the categorial
understanding, are objective, and sensations are subjective?
Without going into very much detail, I claim that the short answer to the
relevant problem of objective sensation is the following. Kant actually doesn’t claim 
that sensations themselves can be really objective in the strict sense of the concept.
That is, he doesn’t say that they are representations that refer to objects. What I
take to be his real stand on the matter is that some sensations can and do contribute
to our cognition of empirical objects, and in this way they can be objective. Thus
the above quoted passage actually makes a distinction between those sensations that
are included in the sensible cognition of the objects, and which thus are objective,
and those which are of no use to cognition, and thus subjective. In themselves, as
separate representations, sensations still cannot be claimed to be objective as in 
being a representation which would be related to an object. So, it seems to me that
the problematicity of the objectivity of sensation is in a way only ostensible, because
Kant does not claim anywhere that any sensation as such would be sufficient for a
real objective relation to an object. In other words, no sensation alone can be
objective.316 Kant may still claim that a sensation is objective in the sense that it is a
316 For example Westphal (1997) considers Kant’s 'sensationism', that is, the view that
sensations in themselves cannot refer to objects, to be central to Kant’s critical philosophy.
According to this interpretation we cannot have an objective relation to an object without
the understanding and the ability to form judgements. This seems to be affirmed rather
clearly by Kant himself, e.g. in B137: ”Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of
cognitions. These consist in the determinate relation of given representations to an object.
An object, however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is
united. Now, however, all unification of representations requires unity of consciousness in
the synthesis of them. Consequently the unity of consciousness is that which alone
constitutes the relation of representations to an object, thus their objective validity, and
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necessary requirement for an objective cognition, or included in it. But are all 
sensations, then, equally objective as parts or requisites of cognitions?
First of all, it should be noted that in addition to the aforesaid, part of the
problematicity of the objectivity of sensation is due to Kant’s usage of the terms
objective and subjective in different contexts. This is not to say that there isn’t a
common factor in all of his uses, but to remind of the need to consider context.
Now, to answer the questions I presented above I once more summarize my claim
this far: all sensations as such are pure modifications of the subject. Thus it is the case
that sensations can only be objective as part of cognition, that is, as contributing to
our relation to and knowledge of objects. Furthermore, not all sensations can be
objective in this sense, because all sensations cannot be part of cognition. Some
sensations really do contribute to our knowledge concerning real empirical objects,
and as part of cognition refer to real properties of objects. These sensations can thus
be called objective sensations. Others, respectively, only refer to the subjects’ states,
or feelings, and are thus called subjective sensations. Cognition properly
understood needs sensations but only some sensations are of use to cognition. 
These are the sensations that Kant calls objective sensations, as opposed to the
subjective ones, which basically contribute and relate only to how we feel.
5.4 Another Problem of Objective Sensation?
It might seem that the problem of the objectivity of sensations has now been solved,
but actually another problem remains. Let us consider the following question: if
sensations are either subjective (contributing to feeling) or objective (contributing
to cognition), then are all sensations clearly either subjective or objective, and can
we distinctly know which they are? My take is that even if there are sensations
which are only subjective, generally taken this is a not a clear question of either/or,
but rather sensations seem to differ in the amount of objectivity and subjectivity. In 
the metaphysics lectures Kant even says that all sensations are both objective and
subjective, but differ in degrees of objectivity and subjectivity.317 What is the cause
of the differences in the amount of objectivity, and how do we get to know it? Can
consequently is that which makes them into cognitions and on which even the possibility of
the understanding rests.”
317 V-Met/L1 28:231-232
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we still make sense of objectivity as proper object-relatedness after taking into
account the notion of objectivity coming in degrees?
According to my interpretation, which I explicate and justify below, it makes
sense to talk of the degrees of objectivity as object-referentiality, when considering
that different senses and sensations give us access to different aspects or qualities of
the objects. My basic claim is that those senses and sensations which provide access
to the spatially determined primary qualities of the objects are the objective ones,
because the empirical object in itself, so to say, consists of these qualities rather than
the secondary ones. Still, I find it fruitful to consider the notion of objectivity with
regard to sensation, as not only object-referentiality, but also as instructivity or
revealedness with regard to the object.318 Thus it would not be simply a relation of
reference to the object, but a special kind of relation to the object, or to certain
aspects of the object. Kant speaks about the objectivity and subjectivity of different
senses on his lectures on metaphysics:
Some of these senses are objective, others subjective. The objective
senses are at the same time connected with the subjective; thus the
objective senses are not only objective, but also subjective. Either the
objective is greater in the senses than the subjective, or the 
subjective is greater than the objective. E.g. with seeing, the 
objective is greater than the subjective, and with a strong sound
that pierces the ears, the subjective is greater. But if we look not to 
the strength, but rather to the quality of the senses, then we notice
that seeing, hearing, and feeling are senses more objective than
subjective, but smelling and tasting are more subjective than
objective.319 
In spite of numerous examples, the above does not make it clear what Kant here 
means with objective and subjective. What is the essential difference? It is 
important to note that Kant, however, now starts to speak of the quality of the
senses. As I take it, this should be read with regard to the relation of the senses to
the qualities of the objects. The following part sheds more light on the matter:
318 I clarify these concepts below.
319 V-Met/L1 28:231, italics added.
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The subjective senses are senses of enjoyment, the objective senses, 
on the other hand, are instructive senses. The instructive senses are
either fine, if they act on us by means of fine material from a
distance, or coarse, if they act on us and affect us by means of a 
coarse material. Thus the sense of sight is the finest because the
material of light, by means of which objects affect us, is the finest.
Hearing is somewhat coarser, but touch the coarsest. Sight and
touch are completely objective representations. But touch is the
fundamental one of the objective representations, for through
touch I can perceive shapes when I can touch them from all sides, it
is thus the interpretive art of shapes. Through sight I cognize only
the surface of the object.320 
To summarize the above, first, in the metaphysics lectures Kant says that our senses
themselves differ, by quality, from each other. The differences in quality explain the
differences in the amount of objectivity that the sensations can include. For
example, seeing and touching are more objective ways of sensing than smelling and
tasting. But why and in what way are some senses (and sensations) more objective
than others? What is the standard of objectivity here?
My claim is that according to Kant some senses are more objective than
others in that they reveal to, or tell us, something more of the real, primary
properties of the empirical objects themselves. The primary qualities are the basic,
mathematizable and universal properties of the objects, by which they can be 
identified and referred to as the holders of other, subjective qualities. In other
words, some senses are better than other senses, as it were, in grasping the empirical
objects or empirical things themselves (and their real properties).321 If this is right, it
would mean that we would not have to give up the account of objectivity as
referentiality to objects, but rather that we would have to think about what the
objects cognized actually consist of, i.e. their essential, primary properties.
320 V-Met/L1 28:231-232, italics added.
321 See A29-30/B45.
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5.5 Primary Qualities and Empirical Things in Themselves
Above, I have suggested how the objectivity of sensations (as part of cognition)
could be taken to refer to their object-relatedness, or object-referentiality. The
thought of this objectivity having degrees still needs more attention. What I suggest
is that the degree of objectivity that a sensation carries is determined by how it is
able to represent the empirical thing in itself, that is, the primary qualities that make
up the empirical object in itself, rather than its secondary qualities. Kant writes:
[…] things like colors, taste, etc., are correctly considered not as
qualities of things but as mere alterations of our subject, which can
even be different in different people. For in this case that which is
originally itself only appearance, e.g., a rose, counts in an empirical
sense as a thing in itself, which yet can appear different to every eye
in regard to color.322 
So, according to Kant, a rose is an empirical thing/object in itself, whereas its color
is only a modification of the subject. What then, generally taken, are the empirical
objects themselves, along with their properties, and how do we know them?
According to my reading the empirical objects consist of what can be called
the primary qualities of objects. These qualities are the real properties of the
objects, and they are essentially spatiotemporal by nature. But why are these 
properties the ones that determine the empirical object? In what way are they
special? I suggest that the answer lies in the conditions of the possibility of the
objects being experienced, which conditions are universal and necessary. I am now
not explicitly referring to space and time as forms of sensibility and our intuition,
by which we immediately relate to empirical objects, but also to the forms of the
understanding. In Kant’s theory, however, all empirical objects we may encounter
are necessarily spatiotemporal, because space and time are the forms of our
sensibility. We cannot experience outer objects otherwise than in the form of space
and time. Already this a priori nature of the forms of sensibility makes it the case
that empirical objects must have certain properties which come along with existing
322 A29-30/B45, italics added.
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in space and time.323 These properties are such as extension, location and shape,
which thereby are necessary properties of all empirical objects. Let us consider this
lengthy but very relevant passage from the first Critique:
Besides space, however, there is no other subjective representation
related to something external that could be called a priori objective.
Hence this subjective condition of all outer appearances cannot be
compared with any other. The pleasant taste of a wine does not
belong to the objective determinations of the wine, thus of an
object even considered as an appearance, but rather to the
particular constitution of sense in the subject that enjoys it. Colors
are not objective qualities of the bodies to the intuition of which
they are attached, but are also only modifications of the sense of 
sight, which is affected by light in a certain way. Space, on the
contrary, as a condition of outer objects necessarily belongs to their
appearance or intuition. Taste and colors are by no means necessary
conditions under which alone the objects can be objects of the
senses for us. They are only combined with the appearance as 
contingently added effects of the particular organization. Hence 
they are not a priori representations, but are grounded on
sensation, and pleasant taste is even grounded on feeling (of 
pleasure and displeasure) as an effect of the sensation. And no one
can have a priori the representation either of a color or of any taste:
but space concerns only the pure form of intuition, thus it includes
no sensation (nothing empirical) in itself, and all kinds and
determinations of space can and even must be able to be
represented a priori if concepts of shapes as well as relations are to 
arise. Through space alone is it possible for things to be outer
objects for us.324 
So first of all, Kant claims that space is both a subjective and an objective
representation. But as an objective representation, space in itself does not contain
323 In addition (or contrast?) to the a priori nature of the primary qualities, which I stress,
Gary Hatfield (2011) has stressed their physical explanatory power.
324 A28-29/B44.
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anything empirical, that is, no sensation. On the other hand, taste and colors, for
example, exist only in relation to our senses. We might even conclude that were our
senses different, these qualities might also be different. But there is something that
could not be different, and that something is space, the form of intuition itself.
Now, we only need to add that there are certain properties which necessarily result
from existing spatially, and these are then the essential and primary qualities of
empirical objects. The passage continues:
The aim of this remark is only to prevent one from thinking of 
illustrating the asserted ideality of space with completely
inadequate examples, since things like colors, taste, etc., are 
correctly considered not as qualities of things but as mere
alterations of our subject, which can even be different in different
people. For in this case that which is originally itself only 
appearance, e.g., a rose, counts in an empirical sense as a thing in
itself, which yet can appear different to every eye in regard to color. 
The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the
contrary, is a critical reminder that absolutely nothing that is
intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form that 
is proper to anything in itself, but rather that objects in themselves
are not known to us at all, and that what we call outer objects are
nothing other than mere representations of our sensibility, whose
form is space, but whose true correlate, i.e., the thing in itself, is not
and cannot be cognized through them, but is also never asked after
in experience.325 
So, the claim seems to be that we can assert that taken empirically, things or objects
in themselves can be separated from their affections in subjects. This is not to say
that we could know or attribute anything to things in themselves in the
transcendental sense. But within the sphere of appearances, we can separate
essential, spatial properties from mere contingent modifications of the subject. A
worry, however, comes to mind here. Is Kant claiming that we do not need senses
and sensations to cognize the essential properties, or the empirical things in
325 A29-30/B45.
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themselves? I do not think so. This is because I read the passage to say that some of
the things which we call qualities of objects, e.g. taste and smell, seem to exist
wholly dependently on subjective sensing. Their existence is grounded upon the
organization of sensing, as Kant wrote: “[taste and colors] are only combined with
the appearance as contingently added effects of the particular organization. Hence 
they are not a priori representations, but are grounded on sensation, and pleasant
taste is even grounded on feeling (of pleasure and displeasure) as an effect of the
sensation.” But spatial representations, such as shapes, are not grounded on 
sensation. This is still not to say that we would not need sensation to have access to
these properties of the objects, but it is a question of whether there is a universal
and necessary ground for these representations. In the case of the purely spatial
properties, the universal and necessary ground is space itself, as the form of
intuition.
I hope to have reached a point of some clarity with regard to how some of the
qualities of objects are more essential than others in identifying the empirical thing
in itself. It is a further claim of mine that these primary properties/qualities can be
characterized as being transcendentally ideal but empirically real, whereas some
other so called qualities of objects (secondary qualities) are both transcendentally
and empirically ideal. Thus the same would apply to phenomena generally, as 
applies to the primary qualities: they are transcendentally ideal but empirically
real.326 The primary qualities which make up the empirical object in itself are such
that they could be represented a priori. By this I do not mean that we can represent
the objects without ever sensing them, but that the qualities are of the kind that
every subject can necessarily represent them in a similar way, because for us there is
only one a priori space, and this space is a condition for representing objects.327 
What does all this mean with respect to our original question concerning the
objectivity of (some) sensations? As we remember, it is intuitions that give us access
to empirical objects, and intuitions consist of sensations. Now, objects must be of 
the kind that they can affect our sensibility, in order for us to have a relation to
them. This, in turn, means that objects must have certain “essential” or “minimal”
properties, to be experienced by us, and to exist in the first place as objects. As for
the side of sensibility, some senses as well as their related sensations are more
326 See e.g. A28/B44.
327 See e.g. A26-30 and A110.
146
 
 
   
        
    
 
 
    
 
     
  
 
   
 
 
  
 
  
 
    
     
       
   
 
 
   
 
     
     
     
     
 
    
      
  
 
    
objective than others because via them we can cognize the essential properties of
empirical objects, which are empirically real and yet transcendentally ideal. The
senses that give us access to the primary qualities are (more) objective senses, and
the sensations by which this is achieved, are (more) objective sensations. As the case
still is that the distinction of primary and secondary qualities is not often dealt with
in Kant’s context, I find it beneficial to further explicate his understanding and use
of the distinction. This is even more necessary because in fact Kant seems to make 
two such distinctions: one most clearly put in the Prolegomena, but which basically
only amounts to the distinction of appearances and things in themselves, and
another, which is the relevant one here, and which can be called Kant’s real
distinction of primary and secondary qualities.
5.6 Primary and Secondary Qualities
5.6.1 Locke and Berkeley
Even though a distinction akin to what we nowadays call primary and secondary
qualities can be found at least as early as in Democritus, in the modern sense it was
formulated by figures such as Galilei, Descartes and Boyle, and finally made famous
by John Locke.328 In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke presented
a representationalist view according to which we can distinguish between three
kinds of qualities (primary, secondary and tertiary) of objects based on what the
relation of our ideas is to the actual properties of the objects. According to Locke,
the objects themselves consist of certain (primary) properties, such as size and
figure, and have the power to affect other objects and minds. What Locke then calls 
qualities (of objects) are actually for him powers to bring about something in other
objects. Primary and secondary qualities are for Locke basically powers to bring
about ideas in perceiving minds, whereas tertiary qualities are just powers to affect
other objects. The difference between primary and secondary qualities is the fact
that only the ideas brought about by the primary qualities resemble the actual
properties of the objects, whereas the ideas produced by the secondary qualities are
just contingent, non-resembling effects produced in the mind of the perceiver by
328 See e.g. Lee 2011, and Jackson 1929.
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the powers of the object consisting of the primary properties. The actual properties
of the object, as well as the object itself, is never perceived directly, as according to
Locke we only perceive ideas, but the primary qualities represent to us the actual
properties of the objects, which properties then have explanatory power with regard
to the other powers or qualities.329 
Berkeley’s account of Locke’s distinction, on the other hand, seems to have
reduced the whole distinction to that of real properties and ideas, which in the end
does not really do justice to Locke. From his own idealist theses Berkeley claimed
that Locke’s distinction is wrong from the start. This is because all we have access to
are ideas, and the only thing common to everyone and responsible for causing the
ideas then is God.330 For Berkeley it is not the case that some of the properties of
objects are ideal or contingent and others real, absolute or necessary. Rather, all of
the properties, as well as the objects themselves, are ideal and relational. Now, I 
admit that my representation of Berkeley above hardly does him justice but it may
suffice to help me lay out a the following claim. Even though Kant’s transcendental
idealism obviously contradicts both Locke and Berkeley, there is still a way in which
he manages to partly hold on to, not only one, but both of the mentioned accounts.
That is, Kant’s transcendental idealism actually commits to two distinctions of
primary and secondary qualities, which respectively can be related to Locke and
Berkeley. I will now examine these two ways in a more structured manner.
5.6.2 Kant’s Transcendental Distinction
In the Prolegomena, Kant famously refers to Locke and the distinction between
primary and secondary qualities. As commentators such as Langton331 have pointed
out, it is a matter of dispute whether Kant does justice to Locke’s distinction or not.
In the latter case, it seems that Kant is interpreting Locke in the way that Berkeley
interpreted him, namely so that secondary qualities are something that exist only in 
the mind of the perceiver, whereas primary qualities are real properties of the
objects themselves. This is only partially true, since according to Locke, the
secondary qualities, such as color and taste, are, in a way, also contained in the
329 See Locke, Essay, II.VIII, §9-15.
330 See Berkeley 2009, 1:33.
331 Langton 1998, 140-161.
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objects, but only as powers to affect perceivers, or, to be exact, powers to create 
ideas in the perceiver.332 According to Locke we never directly perceive the objects,
but rather the ideas caused by the objects. What should be noted is that according
to Locke all qualities are powers to produce ideas, but only the ideas produced by
primary qualities resemble the real properties of the objects333. So, the secondary
and tertiary qualities do also reside in the objects, but not as they are perceived, or
as resembling the ideas produced by the qualities.
Kant’s view is obviously not the same as Locke’s, but taken only empirically it
does seem to resemble it. However, from a transcendental perspective, the views are
worlds apart, as in Locke’s view the primary qualities are the properties of things in
themselves, whereas in Kant’s view they are qualities of appearances, and the
qualities of the things in themselves remain out of reach. Here is Kant's lengthy
take on the matter, from the Prolegomena:
That one could, without detracting from the actual existence of
outer things, say of a great many of their predicates: they belong
not to these things in themselves, but only to their appearances and
have no existence of their own outside our representation, is
something that was generally accepted and acknowledged long
before Locke’s time, though more commonly thereafter. To these
predicates belong warmth, color, taste, etc. That I, however, even
beyond these, include (for weighty reasons) also among mere
appearances the remaining qualities of bodies, which are called
primarias: extension, place, and more generally space along with
everything that depends on it (impenetrability or materiality,
shape, etc.), is something against which not the least ground of
uncertainty can be raised; and as little as someone can be called an
idealist because he wants to admit colors as properties that attach
not to the object in itself, but only to the sense of vision as
modifications, just as little can my system be called idealist simply
because I find that even more of, nay, all of the properties that make
up the intuition of a body belong merely to its appearance: for the
332 See Locke, Essay, II.VIII, §9-15.
333 Locke, Ibid.
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existence of the thing that appears is not thereby nullified, as with
real idealism, but it is only shown that through the senses we
cannot cognize it at all as it is in itself.334 
This seems somewhat straightforward. When secondary qualities are taken to mean
something that exists only in, or as, our representation, then Kant is willing to
count all qualities or predicates of objects among the secondary qualities, because
they indeed are qualities of appearances. Thus they are entirely relational, and Kant
indeed affirms, e.g. in the amphiboly section, that appearances consist entirely of
relations.335 In this distinction the primary qualities would be attributed to things
in themselves, but of course we cannot know about these qualities, and thus it
would perhaps be wiser not to talk about primary qualities at all. Now, I do realize
that in the Prolegomena passage Kant does not actually call the perceivable qualities
secondary but rather points out that they are transcendentally ideal, as they are not
properties of the things in themselves. Thus the Prolegomena distinction is basically
a distinction of appearances and things in themselves, and all of the qualities we are
in contact with belong to the former. In this sense Kant’s distinction resembles
Berkeley’s view. This, however, does not mean that there is no other distinction of
primary and secondary qualities for Kant. There indeed is another one, which is 
made within the empirical domain of appearances. To confirm and explicate the
point just made, let us look at one more passage, where Kant indeed makes the
comparison of two different distinctions, one of which is empirical and one
transcendental (italics added):
We ordinarily distinguish quite well between that which is
essentially attached to the intuition of appearances, and is valid for
every human sense in general, and that which pertains to them only
contingently because it is not valid for the relation to sensibility in
general but for a particular situation or organization of this or that
sense. And thus one calls the first cognition one that represents the
object in itself, but second one only its appearance. This distinction, 
334 Prol., 4:289.
335 A285/B341: “It is certainly startling to hear that a thing should consist entirely of 
relations, but such a thing is also mere appearance, and cannot be thought at all through 
pure categories; it itself consists in the mere relation of something in general to the senses.”
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however, is only empirical. If one stands by it (as commonly
happens) and does not regard that empirical intuition as in turn
mere appearance (as ought to happen), so that there is nothing to
be encountered in it that pertains to anything in itself, then our
transcendental distinction is lost, and we believe ourselves to cognize
things in themselves, although we have nothing to do with
anything except appearances anywhere (in the world of sense), even
in the deepest research into its objects.336 
Thus, the transcendental distinction which Kant refers to amounts to the
distinction of things in themselves, whose properties as such are unknown to us,
and appearances, whose empirical properties we are able to know. The reason why
the properties of the transcendental things in themselves are unknown to us, is that
all of the properties of these representations, that is, appearances, are 
spatiotemporal, and if we were now to strip the forms (space and time) away, we
would be left with no properties at all. The empirical distinction, on the other
hand, refers to precisely what I call the proper or real distinction of primary and
secondary qualities, or to put it in other terms, the distinction between the
empirical thing in itself and its contingently sensible qualities, which are only
modifications of the subject.
5.6.3 Kant's Empirical Distinction and Its Transcendental Grounding
Gary Hatfield presents Kant’s "real distinction" of the qualities, which distinction is
situated within the domain of appearances (and not things in themselves), as being
mostly about physics, in the sense that the primary qualities are those which can
explain the secondary physical qualities, but not vice versa.337 In Hatfield’s
interpretation Kant’s primary qualities are thus, to be precise, spatialized forces as
they appear in space and time, and thus form the object with its qualities, first the
primary, and, in a way, on top, the secondary. Now, it does seem fair to say that
physical explanatory power has certainly played a role in the distinction, and is
336 A44-45/B61-63.
337 Hatfield 2011.
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linked to the “new mechanistic science” of the 17th century and after.338 Kant does
not seem an exception to this, and he probably wanted to incorporate physics, and
to be precise, Newtonian physics, into his system, or at least make them
compatible.339 
Nevertheless, there is also another reason or grounding for Kant's ‘real
distinction’, which distinction substantially resembles Locke's distinction, only
now applied to appearances, and not things in themselves. This reason, as we have
already seen, has more to do with Kant's idea of the a priori forms of intuition as
conditions for all objective representation, than with Newtonian physics. I wish to
note that I do not claim that e.g. Hatfield reduces the notion of primary qualities
simply to physics, but rather I want to stress that Kant indeed constructs a theory
where spatiotemporality has the essential role as being the one absolutely necessary
form of all possible objects of experience. Thus Kant’s project results in supporting
the natural sciences in the view that the mathematizable properties are primary to
other properties. In 5.4 we saw Kant actually identify the difference between
subjective and objective senses as that of senses of enjoyment and instructive senses.
We should here note, that taken at face value, this description really does not hold,
that is, without further specifications. We can think of many cases where our so
called subjective senses, such as smelling or hearing, can be enormously instructive
and perhaps even save our lives, if by them we know to e.g. avoid rotten food or
move out of the way of a truck. Thus they are not only senses of enjoyment, but on
the contrary, very instructive senses. What they do not instruct us of, however, are
the basic, mathematizable properties of the objects, such as spatial figure and size.
Thereby it is revealed that these basic spatial properties are the standard of
objectivity and thus of objective reference.
In order to cognize objects, we need to have an intuition of the object.
Intuitions, as we know, have the form of time and space. Thus we know a priori
that all objects of intuition necessarily have qualities that come along with being in
time and space, such as size and figure. Even if it were so that e.g. colors are
completely contingent qualities of objects, I take it that for Kant it would not have
to mean that we could actually see objects completely without colors. The point is,
as Kant wrote with regard to a rose, that the color may vary from perceiver to
338 See Nolan 2011, or Langton 1998.
339 See e.g. Cassirer 1981, 25-27; 69-92.
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perceiver, but the thing to which the color is attached is the same for every
perceiver. This empirical thing consists of, not the secondary qualities, but precisely
the basic spatiotemporal qualities of the object. The empirical object in itself has
size and shape, whereas colors are only modifications of the sense of sight, and
nothing in the objects. Thus the empirical thing in itself is the proper referent of
our objective judgments.
To summarize the question of the primary and secondary qualities within the
domain of appearances: in addition to being (scientifically) explanatory within the
field of empirical objects, the primary qualities (of objects) differ from the
secondary in that they are based on something a priori, namely the form of 
intuition. For this reason we may call these primary qualities formal or
transcendental qualities of objects. These qualities are, in Kant's sense,
transcendentally ideal and empirically real, while the secondary qualities are both
transcendentally and empirically ideal.
5.7 Summary
It is Kant’s thought that only via sensibility, in other words a posteriori, can we
experience objects and acquire knowledge concerning and referring to them.
Objects must then be such that they can affect us in order for us to experience
them. They must be such that they are able to affect our sensibility, because this is
the only way of intuition for us. The case being such sets a priori conditions to what
can even possibly be experienced and known. These a priori conditions of 
experiencing objects are at the same time conditions of the existence of the objects
(as appearances). This is because the only objects which can sensibly be given to us
are appearances, the objects of experience, which (experience) has an a priori form.
Thus we can know beforehand that all objects we may encounter must and will
have certain properties, even if we obviously cannot know their exact organization
prior to the encounter. My claim is that those properties which the objects will and
must have, based on the a priori forms of experience, are the primary qualities of the
objects. These properties, such as extension and shape, are thereby objective, and
they make up the empirical thing in itself. The secondary qualities, on the other
hand, are produced in the experiencing subjects upon the encounter, but are not
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necessary for the existence of the objects (as appearances), and are not necessarily or 
universally the same for different subjects experiencing the same object.
Upon encountering objects, they cause sensations in us. My claim is that
those sensations (or parts of sensations) that refer to the primary qualities of the
objects, are objective. Accordingly, those sensations (or parts of sensations) that do
not refer to the primary spatiotemporal qualities of the objects are subjective. Thus
these secondary qualities are not actual properties of the objects, but only
modifications of the subject. One should keep in mind that from a transcendental
perspective all qualities or properties are only modifications of the subject, as we
have no access to the formless thing in itself. Therefore all qualities of objects as
appearances are secondary, if by this is meant that their existence has some 
conditions other than the objects themselves. Empirically, however, we can
differentiate between the actual primary qualities of the objects, and the secondary
qualities which are only modifications of the subject’s state.
We should also note that in this picture our particular senses play no
determining role. The point is not that the way our senses are determines the
objects and their properties. Rather, the determination has to do with the forms of 
sensibility/intuition, space and time. However, it is clear that we need to have some
actual, material senses to have access to the objects, and in providing this access to 
the empirical thing in itself (a substance consisting of the primary qualities), some 
senses are more useful than others. The point is exactly that some of our senses
provide us better access to the essential and necessary spatiotemporal properties of
objects, and thus they are more objective senses. The properties that are essential
and necessary, in a word, a priori, are such because they are conditions for objects to
exist and to be experienced in space and time. The senses providing the access, on
the other hand, are not a priori, but are still necessary requirements for objectivity
and objective reference.
My essential claims here have been that the formal a priori conditions of 
objectivity, that is, the forms of intuition and understanding, are not alone
sufficient for actual objective reference, but certain material, in a way a posteriori,
elements are also required. We cannot claim to know the organization or particular
specifics of any object without it affecting us sensibly, but we can claim to know
which kinds of qualities in general it must and will have. Here we find reflected
Kant’s negative view of metaphysics and his critique of Leibniz-Wolffian
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rationalism, which claimed to have knowledge of the world and objects in a purely
intellectual fashion, thus neglecting the special and necessary role of sensibility as
the other original source of objective cognition. These a posteriori elements, then,
are not the forms of sensibility but our actual senses, as well as the sensations as
representations produced by them. Given this, we can make sense of Kant’s claim
that some senses, as well as some sensations, are more objective than others. What
determines the (amount of) objectivity of a sense, or a sensation, is the way it
provides us access (or a relation) to the empirical objects themselves, consisting of
spatial primary qualities. The senses that provide us access to physical properties,
such as size and shape, are more objective than those which provide us access to the
smell or taste of an object, the latter properties being subjective in the sense that
they are only modifications brought about in the subject, and nothing in the objects
themselves, even when considered empirically. Size and shape, on the other hand,
are properties which are necessary for us to even have a relation to the object, and
they are necessarily such that all subjects experience them in a similar way.
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6 Kant on Objective Judgment, Language and Communication
6.1 Language, Thought, Judgment and Form
The aim of this chapter is to explicate the role of language and communication in
Kant’s account of objective judgment and objective reference. This is an attempt to
treat Kant’s theory of judgment, already partly explicated in previous chapters, in 
relation to Kant’s views on language. As we have seen, the basic units of proper
objective reference for Kant are objective judgments, which basically are acts of
relating given cognitions to other cognitions in the unity of apperception.340 The
question is, does language play any role in this activity, or is this activity reflected in
language somehow?
My suggestion is that, unlike critics such as Herder and Hamann (and many 
after them) have suggested, Kant does not overall neglect language and
communication in his philosophy, but rather can be taken to give an account of
how it is possible to use language objectively and communicate objective judgments
in the first place.341 Furthermore, from Kant’s perspective we can account for a
certain necessity in the structure of language(s), which is something we need for
objective use of language, but could perhaps not be accounted for by e.g. Hume.
Thus Kant indeed recognizes the interconnection of thought and language, and at 
times comments on it, even though it must be admitted that the nature of the 
relation is only vaguely commented upon by him. A crucial question here is the
nature of judgments (and concepts): are they linguistic by nature, or do they
perhaps depend on language only on behalf of their expression? Do we thus need to
consider language – and even communication – necessary components in laying
out a satisfying Kantian theory of objective reference or not?
In the following I explicate the way in which Kant’s views on the relation of
language and thought seem to alter throughout his philosophy, perhaps in the end
remaining somewhat ambivalent. Nevertheless, there seems to be enough
consistency in his scattered remarks concerning language to form a conception his
view. I aim here to show that for Kant, some structures of language and
340 B141.
341 For more on Herder’s and Hamann’s “Metacritiques” of Kant, see e.g. Robert E. Butts
1988 and Michael Forster 2010.
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communication are formally determined by the logic of the understanding, and
thus necessarily reflect the a priori form of thought. This means in essence that
natural languages are necessarily inherently categorical by nature. Still, language and
communication are indeed empirically necessary for making – and obviously for
communicating – objective judgments. As such, I claim that they should be read as
empirical conditions of actual objective reference, much in the same fashion as I
claimed in the previous chapter that we should read the senses and sensations as
empirical conditions of objective reference. In addition, I hope to show that there is
no obstacle for thinking that Kant could have accepted the view that languages also
determine our thought to some extent. Still, the most basic and universal functions
and structures of languages are dependent on laws of understanding, which are
themselves independent of language and communication. This is reflected in Kant’s
frequent mentions of universal grammar, which I address below. For the tasks
described above, I need to examine Kant’s writings and lectures for comments on
the relation of language to judging/thinking, as well as his account of the role of
communication for objective judgments. Before digging into Kant’s position, I
briefly sketch out the context and discussion Kant himself was partaking, after
which I offer my take on Kant’s views and their relevance for his theory of objective
reference.
6.2 A Context for the Relation of Language and Thought
I first briefly present two overlapping distinctions of philosophical language
theories, to which I then relate Kant. The first of these is (1) Charles Taylor’s
distinction of language theories into two groups which he names the designative
theory, or HLC-theory (Hobbes, Locke, Condillac), and the constitutive theory, or
HHH-theory (Herder, Hamann, Humboldt).342 I will shortly explicate the core of
the distinction below. The other is (2) Michael N. Forster’s presentation of Kant’s
view on language, in which he identifies the two main claims of Herder and
Hamann, sets thems against what he calls a dualistic enlightenment view, and
follows the stages of Kant’s career to see whether he accepted the views or not. 343 
342 Taylor 2016.
343 Forster 2012.
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The basic difference between Taylor's HLC- and HHH-theories is the
following. The HLC-theories, described by Taylor as atomistic and designative, take
language essentially to describe or designate some content, like ideas or thoughts,
which already exist without and prior to language. In this respect language can be
said to exist on top of the thinking, which can be examined without reference to
language. The purpose of language, then, is to encode these thoughts and ideas into
words, and the purpose of communication is to transmit these codes to others. The
HHH-theories, described as holistic and constitutive, on the other hand, see a
tighter connection of language and thought, because of which connection thinking
cannot occur without or prior to language. Furthermore, language is taken to be
primarily speech, that is, social activity, which then obviously brings in a strong
social and linguistic element to thinking and cognizing.344 
This distinction rather well coincides with the distinction Michael N. Forster 
makes between a basic dualistic enlightenment view of language, on the one hand,
and Herder's and Hamann's view, on the other. According to Forster Kant’s view 
of the importance of language for our thinking and cognition altogether somewhat
consistently moved, probably with the influence of Herder and Hamann, from an
enlightenment view to something closer to Herder’s and Hamann’s view345, so as to 
finally give language an essential role in our cognizing objects and making true,
objective judgments. However, the change did not occur at any given point of
Kant’s life or career, but rather these two differing accounts both lived within
Kant’s philosophy throughout his career. Still, at some point, after the Critiques, 
Kant’s emphasis clearly seems to have changed. Forster writes of what he calls the
dualistic enlightenment view:
The philosophers of the Enlightenment had usually conceived of
the relation between thoughts and concepts (or “ideas”), on the 
one hand, and language, on the other, in a sharply dualistic way:
thoughts and concepts were in principle quite separable from
whatever expression in language they might happen to receive (so
that they could in principle occur without it), developed
autonomously of it, and merely employed it as a useful means for
344 Taylor 2016, 3-25; 104-106.
345 In Taylor’s terms: from an HLC-view to an HHH-view.
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memorization and especially for communication with other
people.346 
It is this dualistic view which obviously seems to be present in many of Kant’s
writings, e.g., the Critique of Pure Reason, which is supposed to be an account of our
cognition and its transcendental conditions altogether, presented with very few
mentions of language or communication at all. An alternative view, however, was
already to some extent prevailing before Kant’s writing, in the form of Leibniz’s and
Wolff’s conception of thought being somehow essentially related to language, and
especially at Kant’s time of writing, in the form of Herder’s and Hamann’s
philosophies, which tied language and thinking together inseparably.347 It is these
latter views that we sometimes seem to meet in Kant’s writings, especially in the
period after the Critiques. Forster presents the view which Herder and Hamann
introduced as supporting the two following doctrines:
(1) Thought is essentially dependent on and bounded by (Hamann
even goes as far as to say: identical with) language – i.e. a person can
only think if he has a language and can only think what he can
express linguistically. (2) Concepts or meanings are – not the sorts
of items independent of language that much of the philosophical
tradition has understood them to be, for example, referents,
Platonic forms, or the subjective mental “ideas” favored by the
Cartesian tradition and the British Empiricists, but instead –
usages of words.348 
Forster claims that in the later stages of Kant’s career he came to accept these two
Herder-Hamannian doctrines. I find this to some extent questionable, even though
it must be admitted that there are passages which point to this direction. The
biggest problem, however, is doctrine number two (2), which I claim Kant could 
346 Forster 2012, 485.
347 See e.g. Forster 2012, 509.
348 Forster 2012, 485-486. Note the resemblance to such modern views on language as the
pragmatists held, or, Wittgenstein's private language argument. In his Philosophical
Investigations Wittgenstein wrote: “the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” (PU
2009: 43.)
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never have fully accepted. For this I argue below, but we should also note that even 
if Kant by some interpretation would have accepted even doctrine (2) at final stages
of his career, this by no means implies Kant’s acceptance of all of Herder’s and 
Hamann’s views, most of all their view on the essentially historical nature of
language. According to Herder, language is not such an innate capacity which
everyone, so to say, brings into the world, but rather language essentially exists
socially and historically.349 
Moving back to Charles Taylor, Kant is not especially important for his
distinction, and thus he does not make too many claims about Kant as a language
philosopher, but he does consider Kant to be meaningful as a figure who fell
somewhere between the dualistic enlightenment view and the modern linguistic
view, that is, what he calls the HLC-theory and the HHH-theory. In addition,
Kant may have contributed something essential to the modern understanding of
the relation of language and cognition, via his transcendental philosophy in 
general.350 Taylor writes:
The arguments of the transcendental deduction can be seen in a
number of different lights. But one way to take them is as a final
laying to rest of a certain atomism of the input which had been
espoused by empiricism. As this came to Kant through Hume, it
seemed to be suggesting that the original level of knowledge of
reality (whatever that turned out to be) came in particulate bits,
individual “impressions”. This level of information could be
isolated from a later stage in which these bits were connected
together, for example in beliefs about cause- effect relations. We 
find ourselves forming such beliefs, but we can, by taking a stance
of reflexive scrutiny which is fundamental to the modern
epistemology, separate the basic level from these too hasty
conclusions we leap to. This analysis allegedly reveals, for instance,
that nothing in the phenomenal field corresponds to the necessary
connection we too easily interpolate between “cause” and
“effect”.351 
349 See e.g. Herder 2002, 154-156.
350 Taylor 2016, 14-16.
351 Taylor 2016, 14-15.
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What Taylor is saying here is very much connected to what I dealt with in Chapter
2, namely the ‘Humean Problem’. As Kant noticed, Hume’s account of experience
and cognition was still atomistic, even if Hume did write of the (perhaps temporal)
uniformity of experience. There is still no proper ground or explanation as to how
and under what circumstances impressions or representations are united, and in
what way they are connected to objects. But that is exactly what would be needed to
make the relation of representations and objects objective, that is, to make the
relation universal and necessary. These are the characteristics of objective
representation, in contrast to simply being subjectively affected by objects, and this 
reciprocity or holism in contrast to atomism, is also reflected in the language
theories discussed in this chapter. Taylor continues:
Kant undercuts this whole way of thinking by showing that it
supposes, for each particulate impression, that it is being taken as a
bit of potential information. It purports to be about something.
This is the background understanding which underpins all our
perceptual discriminations. The primitive distinction recognized
by empiricists between impressions of sensation and those of
reflection amounts to an acknowledgment of this. The buzzing in
my head is discriminated from the noise I hear from the
neighboring woods, in that the first is a component in how I feel,
and the second seems to tell me something about what’s happening
out there (my neighbor is using his chain saw again). So even a
particulate “sensation”, really to be sensation (in the empiricist
sense, that is, as opposed to reflection), has to have this dimension
of “aboutness”. This will later be called “intentionality”, but Kant
speaks of the necessary relation to an object of knowledge. “Now
we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its 
object carries with it an element of necessity” […] 
With this point secured, Kant argues that this relationship to
an object would be impossible if we really were to take the
161
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
  
   
  
  
   
    
   
   
 
 
  
 
 
  
    
   
    
 
  
  
   
  
   
 
  
 
 
   
impression as an utterly isolated content, without any link to
others.352 
This passage is obviously not mainly concerned with the relation of language and
thought but rather links tightly to the core theme of my entire study. As such
Taylor’s presentation nicely serves to illustrate the importance of Kant's
transcendental philosophy, and the element in it which I call objective reference, as
an abandoning of the atomism prevalent in empiricism. The important point here
is that just being affected by an object is not enough to represent that object
objectively, that is, in a way that is universally valid (and communicable). A task of
transcendental philosophy is to explicate the conditions of this universally and
necessarily valid representing of objects. To these conditions belong our shared,
necessary forms of intuition, our empirical senses (at least some of them), our
universally shared concepts, and finally, it seems, the socially and linguistically
existing expressions of the concepts and judgments.
6.3 Language and Objective Judgments
It is apparent that Kant was not a philosopher of language, and I do not intend to
portray him as one. Nevertheless, his published books and lectures are sufficient for
creating an overview of his standing. Thus, I do not claim that Kant ever
accomplished or even tried to give a full and proper account of the relation of 
language and thought. My purpose is, then, not to try to reconstruct such an 
account in all detail, but only to show how Kant’s theory of objective cognition can
be seen to ground the objective use of language, as expressing objective judgments,
which can be communicated and thus compared to the judgments of others.
For my purpose, the essential question concerns the relation of language and
communication to the possibility of thought and judging. Now, this relation, or
these relations, are big and debated issues to start with, and far too wide in scope to
be thoroughly dealt with here. Thus I limit my task according to the theme of the
study, and ask the following questions: did Kant think that we need language and
communication for objective reference? If so, in what way? If thinking is making
352 Taylor 2016, 15.
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judgments, do we need language for both or neither? In trying to answer these
questions I develop a view I ascribe to Kant, according to which natural languages
share a universal grammar, which is determined by universal logic. Thus, natural
languages inherently include or are structured according to categories, as well as
including expressions for space and time, and thus it is the grounding possibility of
objective reference achieved by the use of categories which brings the possibility of
objective reference into language. However, within Kant’s texts and lectures we can
find passages which at least may seem contradictory. Let us look at the following
passages:
Among the rules of thought there are universal ones, which apply
to particular objects without distinction. Thus there are universal
rules of language, too. Such a grammar does not contain words, not
a copia vocabularum, but rather only the form of language. We will
be able to represent to ourselves a universal doctrine <of thought>.
This universal doctrine of thought is called logic, doctrine of the
understanding. It is a preparation for thinking about objects.353 
When the logici say, however, that a proposition is a judgment
clothed in words, that means nothing, and this definition is worth
nothing at all. For how will they be able to think judgments
without words?354 
One does not understand a thing until one can communicate it to
others.355 
The above passages present what may seem to be differing aspects of the relation of
language and communication to our cognition and objective judging. The first
speaks of language as including a universal grammar which is identified with logic,
also called the “doctrine of the understanding”. The latter two seem to point to a
more practical, or empirical, account of linguistic communication, which is
considered a prerequisite for understanding. In my view, these are only differences
353 Kant, V-Lo/DW, 24:693.
354 Kant, V-Lo/Wiener, 24:934.
355 Kant, V-Lo/DW, 24:781.
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in aspect, and need not present a crucial difference with regard to the relation of
language and communication to our thought and understanding. It would
admittedly be surprising if there were a big conflict, as the first and third of the
passages are from the same lectures. However, when considering Kant’s view of the
matter at hand throughout his writings and lectures, it indeed seems we can find
two differing accounts, which cannot really be said to sit well together. Here I focus
on explicating these two differing views, and investigating which of them Kant in
fact held on to, and what implications this may have to his conception of
objectivity and objective reference.
To consider Kant’s theory of objective reference from sufficient aspects, it is 
my view that one must come to understand Kant’s conception of objective
judgment. In the previous chapters I have shown that the conditions of objective
reference include for Kant the conditions of sensibility by which we may be given
the object, and the conditions of understanding, that is, the categories as the
concepts of an object in general, by which we can achieve a proper, objective
relation to an object, in the form of an objective judgment. What I now want to
consider is whether language and communication, for Kant, play any significant
role in these operations. That is, are they conditions of objective judgments?
The basic question or problem of this chapter is how Kant saw the role of
language and communication with regard to the objectivity and truth of judgments.
The first of the passages I presented in the beginning points out Kant’s belief in a
universal grammar, which he thought to be tightly connected, if not identical to,
universal logic. An account like this does not need to give language any proper role
in grounding or forming our ability to refer to objects, but rather this ability is
grounded on the general conditions of experience, that is, the forms of intuition
and the categories of the understanding. Even if Kant throughout the Critiques (1-
3) gives judgments, and the conditions of making judgments, an essential role, he
rarely refers to language use in this context. Still, on his lectures and other texts,
Kant at times does refer to language and communication as the best means to test
the truth of our judgments, and come to certainty with regard to them, and even as
a prerequisite of making judgments altogether.
Now, it is clear that Kant did not at any point of his career present a proper
theory of language. Still, the remarks he did make of language are not so few as to 
give the impression that Kant didn’t care about language. Rather, it seems that he
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thought of the intimate relation of language to judging and thinking so obvious
that one needed not say that much about it. He probably also felt that it belonged
not in the field of transcendental philosophy or metaphysics, but rather more in
some empirical field of study, which explains why he thought it not that essential
for his purposes. Another thing to note is that, as Michael N. Forster has observed,
Kant was well informed of the then-contemporary developments in language
philosophy, mainly those of Herder and Hamann.356 According to Forster, these
views were actually influenced by, and to some extent developed from the views of
Leibniz and Wolff, who obviously were essential influences on Kant. It is
noteworthy that Kant expressed that he felt to be out of his field of expertise when
considering language, and for this reason did not want to make claims with regard
to it. However, he did occasionally make such claims, and it seems that they follow 
a certain pattern rather consistently.
6.4 A Kantian Account of Language?
According to some interpreters, like Michael Wolff and Reinhard Brandt, Kant did
in fact consider thought and judging to be essentially linguistic.357 They would then
support Forster’s claim that Kant would have finally accepted doctrines (1) and (2).
In his anthropology lectures he indeed stated that “thinking is speaking with 
oneself”.358 This does not mean that he really offered a proper language theory of
his own, but basically borrowed these insights from others, mainly Leibniz and
Wolff in his early writings, and later Herder and Hamann.359 In this respect, Kant
did not have or create his own language theory. According to Pietro Perconti
there are only the premises of a theory of language in Kant’s work,
which however is never developed. Kant stopped on the threshold
of language, investigating only the pre-linguistic conditions making
linguistic meaning possible. Even if Kant’s reflections are not
explicitly on a linguistic level, they are taken by some language
356 Forster 2012.
357 Forster 2012, 488-490; Wolff 1995; Brandt 1991.
358 Kant, Anth, 7:192.
359 See Forster 2012, 488-490.
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theorists of the post-Kantian generation as a basis for a linguistic
theory inspired by critical philosophy. In this perspective we can
therefore talk of a `Kantian linguistics’: not in the sense of a
linguistic theory hidden in the folds of transcendental philosophy
of mind, but with reference to all linguistic theories elaborated
immediately after Kant and used in the linguistic conversion of his
philosophy.360 
Given this, it is unsurprising that what Kant wrote of language in his three
Critiques is not very much. In the Critique of Pure Reason there seems to be only
one section relevant to the matter at hand. Starting at A 312 Kant describes in
particular the reasons why he thinks it is good to philosophize using a dead
language or the terms of a dead language. This is a view he often expressed on
lectures, and which is connected to the stability of a given language. The passage
also illuminates the difference, yet intimate connection, between concepts and
expressions/words:
In the great wealth of our languages, the thinking mind
nevertheless often finds itself at a loss for an expression that exactly
suits its concept, and lacking this it is able to make itself rightly
intelligible neither to others nor even to itself. Coining new words
is a presumption to legislate in language that rarely succeeds, and
before we have recourse to this dubious means it is advisable to
look around in a dead and learned language to see if an expression
occurs in it that is suitable to this concept; and even if the ancient
use of this expression has become somewhat unsteady owing to the
inattentiveness of its authors, it is better to fix on the meaning that
is proper to it (even if it is doubtful whether it always had exactly 
this sense) than to ruin our enterprise by making ourselves 
unintelligible.361 
360 Perconti 1999, 19.
361 Kant, A312/B369.
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This preference to use old or existing words instead of coining new ones is repeated
in the second Critique (5:10-12) but Kant does also seem to approve new uses or
even new words if none other are available. What is very noteworthy in the passage
above, is that without an expression the mind cannot even be intelligible to itself.
This does seem to show the intimate connection of (1) concepts and words, and (2)
thought and speech/language. Now, it should be noted that for Kant thinking is
essentially making judgments, and as I noted earlier, on his lectures he described
thinking as “speaking with oneself”.362 Thus, a question essential to this study is,
whether judging itself is dependent on language, or not? That is, is language an
essential element or a condition of judgments? In the beginning of this chapter, we
saw Kant reply:
When the logici say, however, that a proposition is a judgment
clothed in words, that means nothing, and this definition is worth
nothing at all. For how will they be able to think judgments
without words?363 
As stated, this answer points to a direction of an HHH-view, where judging in itself
is already conditioned by language. However, this reply represents Kant’s later
views and may not represent his thought overall. We already saw that Kant
thought, probably based on a Leibniz-Wolffian account of language, that there
exists a universal grammar, on which any reasonal language would be based. A 
particular language may differ to some extent from another language, and the
vocabulary will obviously be different, but Kant must have thought of the universal, 
logical essence, as it were, of language as the same in all languages: “[w]ords are the
matter of language, but grammar the form. Thus a science that is occupied with the
form of the understanding is called logic.”364 Kant also describes the relation of
grammar to speech as analogous to the relation of logic to thinking: “Logic is
related to the whole use of the understanding just as grammatica is to a 
language.”365 This implies that as the use of understanding happens according to
logic, so does the use of language happen according to grammar. To state this would
362 See Kant, A69/B94, A70/B95; An, 7:192.
363 Kant, V-Lo/Wiener, 24:934.
364 V-Lo/Wiener, 24:791.
365 V-Lo/Blom, 24:24.
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seem for Kant to give the upper hand, so to say, to the grammar of a language
instead of the empirical and contingent use of a language.
It should also be noted that when Kant wrote of grammar, he did not
primarily mean a grammar constructed from an existing tradition of language use,
but rather the universal grammar, grounded on logic. However, in the following
passage he refers to a constructed grammar: “Languages were there before their 
grammars, speakers before rhetoric, poets before poesy.”366 Thus this comment may
not imply any “Herder-Humboldtian” view of language, according to which no one
can use a language unless the language already exists, but a language cannot exist
unless it is being used, but rather only that the acts were there before any theory of
them was constructed. In any case, Kant's thought was that even if the speakers of a
given language do not know it, the speaking and related communication can only
occur if there already is a (universal) structure of the language, which enables
communication: 
[u]niversal grammar is the form of a language in general, for
example. One speaks even without being acquainted with
grammar, however; and he who speaks without being acquainted
with it does actually have a grammar and speaks according to rules,
but ones of which he is not himself conscious.367 
This much is certain, however, that all languages, in accordance
with their first principles, can be reduced to a grammar. Moreover,
grammar is a doctrine of the understanding, of course. For as our
soul combines concepts, so must words also be combined.368 
For Kant it seems that ultimately the possibility of speech and communication 
means the possibility to have a universal system within which objective judgments,
or cognitions, can be communicated. This system does not for Kant seem to be
primarily linguistic but conceptual. Nevertheless the conceptual system is somehow
dependent on a linguistic system and the use of it. I find very interesting the
comparison which Kant in the above passage makes between combi He writes:
366 V-Lo/Blom, 24:23.
367 V-Lo/Jäsche, 24:11.
368 V-Lo/Wiener, 24:790.
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“Our cognition has need of a certain means, and this is language. This means,
however, is subject to many alterations. Hence one must write in a dead
language.”369 Kant very clearly thinks of the relation of cognition and language as an
intimate one, and the preference of a dead language supposedly is connected to the
fact that in such a language the rules cannot change. But how should we think of 
the dependency relation between concepts and words/language, and how does this
fit together with Kant’s account of communication and communicability?
6.5 Judgments, Communication and Objectivity
“One does not understand a thing until one can 
communicate it to others.”370 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes judgments as ways of bringing
cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.371 In context, Kant wants to
make it clear that judgments are not simply actions of relating concepts to other
concepts, but rather relating cognitions to each other.372 The difference is that
cognitions here are objective and sensible, for which reason they are also
conditioned by senses and sensations. Now, we may compare this relation to that of
language and concepts; as sensibility is in need of senses to be able to operate, so do
the concepts of the understanding need language and words to operate. As I have
shown, Kant thought that languages are determined by logic/universal grammar,
and so naturally include the universal a priori elements necessary for objective
reference. It is because of this universal basis of language that we can understand the 
judgments of others, and are able to test their truth. Thus, we need the forms of
judgment and the categories for objective communication, but we also need
language and communication to really understand our own cognitions and to
compare them to those of others. To put it shortly, according to Kant, linguistic
369 V-Lo/Wiener, 24:812.
370 V-Lo/DW, 24:781.
371 B141-142.
372 It should be noted that Kant is probably here talking about what he later called objective,
determining judgments. See Chapter 4, and Laiho 2012, 198-210.
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communication is (1) natural or essential human activity, (2) somehow necessary in
order to understand cognitions and to test their truth:
It is unfair to condemn people to keep all their judgments to
themselves. For they have to communicate if they are not to lose
the strong criterion of truth, to compare their judgments with the
judgments of others.373 
Men have a natural inclination to communicate to others the
judgments that their understanding has made, and merely from
this arises the writing of books, whose cause has otherwise been set
down to vanity, to ambition, by other critics of the human race, 
who would happily interpret everything most unfavorably. Men
who separate themselves from all human society necessarily find, in 
the end, when they begin to investigate their condition and the
causes of their misanthropy, that they do not themselves have
enough means to distinguish the true from the false. The freedom
to communicate one's thoughts, judgments, [and] cognitions is
certainly the only[,] most certain means to test one's cognitions
properly, however, and to verify them. And he who takes away this
freedom is to be regarded as the worst enemy of the extension of
human cognition, indeed, of men themselves. For just by this
means he takes away from men the one true means they still possess
for ever uncovering, becoming aware of, and correcting the
frequent deception of their own understanding and its false
steps.374 
These passages alone do not make the strong claim that language is necessary for
any kind of judging, but they do claim that communication is necessary for
verification of judgments. The judgments must thus be universally expressable in a
way that can be communicated to others. This fits well with my suggestion that
objectivity as a feature of those representations which are related to an object, is no
373 Kant, V-Lo/DW, 24:740.
374 Kant, V-Lo/Blom, 24:150-151.
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guarantee of the truth or validity of the objective representations, but rather it is a
precondition for the objective validity or truth of the representations or judgments.
It would not make sense to try to arrive at the truth of a thing, by comparing our
judgments to those of others, if the judgments were not about the same objects.
But, again, the comparison seems to require that the judgments be about the same
object, and somehow of the same, universally expressable/communicable form. In 
the following passage we see an aspect of the intimate connection of cognition and
expression:
A rule for testing oneself and one's science concerning any
cognition is this: if I understand and have insight into a thing
perfectly, then I must be able to communicate and represent it so
clearly to another man that he will have insight into it just as
perfectly as I, if only he has a healthy understanding. If I cannot do
this, however, it is a certain sign that I do not yet understand it
rightly myself.375 
All of this could be taken to support that Kant did in fact think that expressing a
concept or a cognition in language is necessary for understanding it in the first
place, and communicating it to others must necessarily be possible if we want to
decide upon its truth. But what does all of this mean specifically with regard to
objectivity? My idea here is that for Kant, if a judgment is objective, it relates
representations to each other and to the object in a way which is necessary and
universal. This means that others too must be able to relate to the object in a similar
way. Now, if we want to test out the universality of our cognition, we must be able
to communicate it to others. Is it then so that, that which is objective, is necessarily
communicable? In the following lengthy passage from a letter to Beck
communicability rather clearly means universal validity:
one cannot actually say that a representation befits another thing
but only that, if it is to be a cognition, a relation to something else
(something other than the subject in which the representation
inheres) befits the representation, whereby it becomes
375 V-Lo/Blom, 24:96.
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communicable to other people; for otherwise it would belong
merely to feeling (of pleasure or displeasure), which in itself cannot
be communicated. But we can only understand and communicate
to others what we ourselves can produce, granted that the manner
in which we intuit something, in order to bring this or that into a
representation, can be assumed to be the same for everybody. Only
the former is thus the representation of a composite. For –
2. The composition itself is not given; on the contrary, we must
produce it ourselves: we must compose if we are to represent
anything as composed (even space and time). We are able to
communicate with one another because of this composition. The
grasping (apprehensio) of the given manifold and its reception in
the unity of consciousness (apperceptio) is the same sort of thing as
the representation of a composite (that is, it is only possible
through composition), if the synthesis of my representation in the
grasping of it, and its analysis insofar as it is a concept, yield one
and the same representation (reciprocally bring forth one another).
This agreement is related to something that is valid for everyone,
something distinct from the subject, that is, related to an object
since it lies exclusively neither in the representation nor in
consciousness but nevertheless is valid (communicable) for
everyone.376 
Based on this passage, it seems that for something to be communicable it must first
of all relate to an object, i.e., be objective in some sense, and thus mere feelings (in
themselves) cannot be, according to Kant, communicated.377 The universal validity
of a representation/cognition is tied to our universally shared way of synthesizing,
which makes it possible to communicate a cognition that is about an actual, shared
object. Thus, it seems that due to their grounding in logical forms of
understanding, as well as their role in materializing these forms, language and
communication are necessary elements in our cognizing and verifying judgments.
376 Kant, Letter to Beck, July 1794.
377 There is, however, an exception, namely judgments of beauty, which Kant says to be
universal (and communicable) but nevertheless subjective, and not objective. For this
reason I read Kant as thinking that objectivity implies communicability but not vice versa.
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I have suggested that the objectivity that Kant ascribes to at least some
judgments, e.g. in B-deduction §19, which is related to bringing sensibly given
material into the objective unity of apperception as experience, does not necessarily
imply the truth of judgments. Rather, it implies the object-relatedness of the
judgments, which relate to the object through the intuitions subsumed under the
categories, thus creating the very possibility of the judgments having what can be
called truth value. To test the correctness, or truth, of our judgments, we however 
need to be – or at least greatly benefit from being – able to communicate and
compare our judgments to those of others, for which reason language and
communicability of judgments are requirements for their certainty and truth.
Furthermore, especially at later stages of his career, Kant expressed the view that we
need language to think of objects and make objective judgments in the first place.
Thus my essential concluding suggestions are the following: Kant probably
would never have accepted all of the implications of an HHH-type of theory of
language. Mostly this is due to Herder’s and Hamann’s emphasis on the empirical 
and historical nature of language, in which our thought seems to be essentially
dependent on historical, thus contingent events, occurrences and changes in
language. Furthermore, Kant might have accepted Herder's and Hamann's
simplified doctrine on the interdependence of language and thought, as presented
by Forster in doctrine (1), but never doctrine (2).378 This need not cause a serious
conflict in his transcendental theory of objective reference, if he still held onto his
account of a universal grammar. In this case it is definitely something to explicate
that we need words within a language to actually make judgments altogether, but
any given languages must and will have a certain, similar, a priori structure by which
the objective reference is possible according to universal rules. Thus, we do need 
language for objective reference, but the form and basic functions of language are
not in this respect subject to contingent changes, but rather determined by the
universal functions of sensibility and the understanding.
378 Forster, 2012, 485-486: “ (1) Thought is essentially dependent on and bounded by
(Hamann even goes as far as to say: identical with) language – i.e. a person can only think if
he has a language and can only think what he can express linguistically. (2) Concepts or
meanings are – not the sorts of items independent of language that much of the
philosophical tradition has understood them to be, for example, referents, Platonic forms,
or the subjective mental “ideas” favored by the Cartesian tradition and the British
Empiricists, but instead – usages of words.”
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Given the above, I still do not find it a plausible view that according to Kant
there is no thinking at all without or prior to language. This is shown many times,
especially in the first Critique, when Kant speaks of finding the right [linguistic]
expression for given thoughts. Nevertheless, in this same passage Kant does hold
the view that we do not properly understand even ourselves, if we do not find the
proper expression for our thoughts. This basically shows that Kant was very aware
of the importance of language for thinking, and thus cannot have held a view where
language and thought are completely separated. This being the case, Kant would
still not have approved the idea that language determines our thought overall, were
this taken absolutely, as this would then entail complete relativism of thought.
Rather, Kant’s account would have been that the basic structures of language are 
and have to be determined by the a priori rules of the understanding, namely the
categories, which, as we have seen in prior chapters, are the elements which bring
unity, necessity and universality to experience, and make objectivity and objective
reference possible in the first place.
Kant’s account does not rule out the importance of language for our thinking,
judging and communicating. On the contrary, it gives a ground, or an explanation,
if one likes, to the possibility and structure of thinking, speaking, judging, referring,
communicating, and in the end, to the possibility of being right or wrong. Thus my
claim is that Kant’s account of categorical experience as universal and necessary
cognition of objects provides the ground for languages and their objective use, that 
is, for the possibility of objective reference in language.
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7 Kantian Remarks about Speculative Realism: What is Wrong with the Critique of the
Critique?
7.1 From Kant’s Critiques to Contemporary Critiques of Kant
The Kantian theory of objectivity and objective reference, aspects of which I have
discussed in previous chapters, has proven very difficult to grasp, or at times
difficult to accept, possibly due to misunderstandings concerning Kant’s actual
claims and their implications. This has resulted in huge numbers of both 
interpretations and critiques of Kant’s critical philosophy and his transcendental,
or formal, idealism. Over two centuries have now passed since Kant gave his last
lectures, and almost two and a half centuries since he wrote his magnum opus, the
Critique of Pure Reason. There is no room here to make even a brief survey of the
astounding impacts which his work had, or the debates and currents of philosophy
it started. What can be said is that the nature of Kant’s idealism has been a matter
of debate from the very beginning, sometimes causing interpreters to forsake it
altogether. One of the somewhat strange aspects of these debates is that
philosophers advocating various sorts of realism at times tend to forget that Kant
himself advocated empirical realism, while of course simultaneously advocating
transcendental idealism. In recent years such philosophical movements as
speculative realism and object-oriented ontology have tried to construct various forms
of realist ontology, often unitedly criticizing Kant and the philosophical currents
his philosophy started.379 Thus e.g. Quentin Meillassoux, one of the forerunners of
speculative realism, writes in his celebrated and debated book, After Finitude, that
the central notion of modern philosophy since Kant seems to be
that of correlation. By ‘correlation’ we mean the idea according to
which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking
and being, and never to either term considered apart from the
other. We will henceforth call correlationism any current of
thought which maintains the unsurpassable character of the
correlation so defined. Consequently, it becomes possible to say
379 See e.g. Bryant, Harman et al. 2011; Meillassoux 2008; Harman 2011. For a critical
evaluation, see e.g. Cole 2013.
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that every philosophy which disavows naïve realism has become a
variant of correlationism.380 
From this we can see that the program of speculative realism is rather clearly set
against Kant, or as it sometimes seems, against a constructed version of his
philosophy.381 To point this out, in his preface to Meillassoux’s After Finitude, 
Alain Badiou indeed calls the book a “critique of Critique”.382 Because of the united
stand against Kant, and the fact that the name of speculative realism itself can be 
read as a critique (or denial) of Kant, there is a need to address the accusations and
relate to what Kant really stated. In addition, this is to clarify my interpretation of
Kant, and to show that the criticisms of the speculative realists are not as novel as
one might think, but rather resemble the exact debates that went on before, during
and after Kant’s active writing. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant wrote of 
speculative reason and cognition:
A theoretical cognition is speculative if it pertains to an object or
concepts of an object to which one cannot attain in any experience.
It is opposed to the cognition of nature, which pertains to no
objects, or their predicates, except those that can be given in a
possible experience.
The principle of inferring from what happens (the empirically
contingent) as effect to a cause, is a principle of the cognition of 
nature, but not of speculative cognition. For if one abstracts from it 
as a principle that contains the condition of possible experience in
general, and, leaving out everything empirical, wants to assert it of
the contingent in general, then not the least justification is left over
for any synthetic proposition from which it can be discerned how I
can go from what exists to something entirely different (called its
cause); indeed, in such a speculative use the concept of a cause, like 
that of the contingent, loses all the significance that is made
comprehensible by its objective reality in concreto.383 
380 Meillassoux 2008, 5.
381 One might even say ‘strawman’.
382 Badiou 2008, VII.
383 A634-5/B662-3.
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For Kant “speculative cognition” implies that it is not empirically objective, thus
not universal or necessary cognition of objects, but rather, as the name says,
subjective speculation based on reason alone. If the agenda of the speculative realists
is to try and venture in metaphysics, or philosophy on a larger scale, beyond the
boundaries set by Kant, that is, beyond the boundaries of the conditions of
experience, then from Kant’s point of view they are only trying to return to the
time before Kant’s Copernican revolution. Again, from a Kantian point of view, it
seems they are unhappy with the claim that there are things inaccessible or 
inexpressible to us, or that there are conditions to our cognition and experience.
This seems to be the essence of the speculative critique of Kant: the speculative
realists want to show that not all properties of objects, and thus not all of the
objects themselves, are dependent on any human conditions:
The thesis we are defending is therefore twofold: on the one hand,
we acknowledge that the sensible only exists as a subject’s relation
to the world; but on the other hand, we maintain that the
mathematizable properties of the object are exempt from the
constraint of such a relation, and that they are effectively in the
object in the way in which I conceive them, whether I am in
relation with this object or not.384 
Thus it is entirely fitting that Meillassoux opens his After Finitude by insisting that
the distinction of primary and secondary qualities be brought back into philosophy.
This is because, taken prior to Kant, it implies that there are objects, and most of all
certain properties or qualities of these objects, which are completely and utterly
independent of us or any conditions set by us for them. As I have shown in chapter 
5, Kant in fact did maintain even two distinctions of primary and secondary
qualities. In one sense, he maintained that neither are properties of things in
themselves, but in another sense, the mathematizable properties can, according to
my reading, be attributed to what I call empirical things in themselves. Thus I find
that the speculative realists most often do not actually have any proper critique of
Kant’s critical philosophy and his account of objectivity, but they simply do not 
384 Meillassoux 2008, 3.
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recognize the claims and implications of it. This seems to be the case with regard to,
first of all, Kant’s claim of the Transcendental Aesthetic, that space and time are a
priori and necessary for objects of experience, but not properties of things in
themselves. Space and time are not representations abstracted or drawn from
experience but conditions of the possibility of appearances.385 Secondly, as I have
shown in chapter 4, Kant maintains that precisely by using the a priori universal
concepts known as the categories to relate objects to our capacity of apperception,
we are able to bring universality and necessity to experience, and thus make
objective reference possible. These claims, at least, seem to be what the speculative
realists wish to disregard.
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly address this debate, and show, based
on my previous chapters, that very often the accusations toward Kant, and the
implications constructed, are without a proper a ground, or simply false. This is not
to say that all of the speculative realists’ claims are simply due to a
misunderstanding of Kant; sometimes they are a matter of a real and deep
difference in thinking about the world, and the possibilities of cognizing it. Yet, at
times the misunderstandings concerning Kant’s philosophical standing are so
obvious that a question concerning motivation in answering might rise. In
addition, the criticisms in my view do not rival earlier criticisms of Kant’s
philosophy, such as those of Schopenhauer (1818/19) or Strawson (1966), because
of a simple lack of expertise on Kant. Nevertheless, as speculative realism has gained
notable attention, it seems a proper context to address the interpretation of Kant’s
philosophy, both for sake of clarification and for sake of criticism, as well as,
hopefully, a more fruitful dialogue.
7.2 Meillassoux
In his After Finitude Quentin Meillassoux presented his view concerning
philosophical ontology in modern times. A term central to the book, and which has
since become rather famous, is correlationism, which Meillassoux takes to be
descriptive of a certain modern tendency to do philosophy (correlation of thinking
385 See A22-26/B37-42.
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and being).386 As we already saw, this tendency, according to Meillassoux, first and 
foremost begins with Kant. Now, Meillassoux may in some respects be right to
make this sort of a claim about modern philosophy in general, and to place the
beginning of “correlationism” with Kant. I do feel, however, that there are
problems, and even mistakes, in Meillassoux’s interpretation of Kant, as well as the
interpretation of what both Kant and Meillassoux call “Hume’s problem”. In 
addition, some of the problems that Meillassoux ascribes to what he calls 
correlationism seem superficial, or even nonexistent to me, and it is possible to
question the correctness of the entire term in the first place.387 Even if some of the
things that Meillassoux ascribes to what he calls correlationism were true, it is not
clear to me how his concept brings much novelty to the historical conversation,
other than a novel name for idealism. This is so because Meillassoux’s formulation
and critique of correlationism seem to be in the end just forms of a critique of
idealism, and a defence of (scientific) realism. Below I present observations on After
Finitude, and a critique of Meillassoux’s view of Kant and his notion of
correlationism. Meillassoux writes:
Correlationism consists in disqualifying the claim that it is possible
to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently
of one another. Not only does it become necessary to insist that we 
never grasp an object ‘in itself’, in isolation from its relation to the
386 The term probably derives from many sources, but an important one is most likely
Husserls’s use of “correlation” in describing the nature of intentionality.
387 Luckily, I am not alone with this thought; e.g. David Golumbia (2016) has defended Kant
and Kantian philosophy against the accusations by Meillassoux, and stated that Meillassoux
mispresents both Kant’s view and the philosophical situation and standings concerning the
issues Kant dealt with and which have been dealt with since him. Golumbia (2016, 3) writes
e.g. the following: “Among [Meillassoux’s After Finitude’s] most troubling characteristics in
this regard are its almost total lack of reference to secondary and interpretive writings on
Kant, and to contemporary philosophy in general, because Meillassoux repeatedly tries to
show that Kant’s influence has made contemporary philosophy correlationist. Instead of 
demonstrating that flaw in contemporary philosophy, though, Meillassoux generally (with
very few specifics) argues that Kant himself is correlationist and that this foundational taint
itself contaminates what comes after. Meillassoux thus purports to discover something
unseen in Kant, and then to claim that this unseen thing has been the dominant influence
over all philosophy since Kant, while making no effort to show how correlationism can at
one and the same time have been so strongly determinative and also largely unnoticed.”
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subject, but it also becomes necessary to maintain that we can never
grasp a subject that would not always-already be related to an
object. If one calls ‘the correlationist circle’ the argument according
to which one cannot think the in-itself without entering into a
vicious circle388, thereby immediately contradicting oneself, one
could call ‘the correlationist two-step’ this other type of reasoning
to which philosophers have become so well accustomed – the kind
of reasoning which one encounters so frequently in contemporary
works and which insists that
'it would be naïve to think of the subject and the object as
two separately subsisting entities whose relation is only
subsequently added to them. On the contrary, the relation
is in some sense primary: the world is only world insofar as
it appears to me as world, and the self is only self insofar as
it is face to face with the world, that for whom the world 
discloses itself [. . .]'
Generally speaking, the modern philosopher’s ‘two-step’ consists in
this belief in the primacy of the relation over the related terms; a
belief in the constitutive power of reciprocal relation.389 
I do not think that this description of correlationism fairly represents Kant’s view,
and I am not sure whose view it does actually represent. The main problem
associated with so called correlationism seems to be, for Meillassoux, the inability to
grasp the object in itself. That is, the problem seems to be the relativity of the object
and its properties. And it is exactly here that I find the first problem of
Meillassoux’s thinking: he misunderstands the relativity and the nature of the
conditions of the objects and their properties. Meillassoux seems to think of the
388 I wish to remark already here, that Kant did not talk of any “vicious circle” in this respect,
and he did in fact hold the view that we can think of things in themselves as transcendental
objects, using the categories, but we cannot experience them as such. We can experience
objects only under the formal conditions of experience, which are transcendental.
389 Meillassoux 2008, . The passage Meillassoux sites in the middle as an example is:
Huneman, P. and Kulich, E. (1997), Introduction à la phénoménologie (Paris: Armand Colin),
p. 22.
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relativity as a dependency on actual, empirical subjects, when Kant speaks of
transcendental, universal conditions of experience. In Kant’s view, singular
empirical subjects do not set conditions for the existence of objects, and in this way
Kant was indeed an empirical realist.390 Rather, the conditions are transcendental
and universal conditions for cognizing and experiencing objects at all. Of course,
Kant did hold the view that the existence of appearances is relational, and thus he
writes in the amphiboly section of the first Critique:
It is certainly startling to hear that a thing should consist entirely of 
relations, but such a thing is also mere appearance, and cannot be
thought at all through pure categories; it itself consists in the mere
relation of something in general to the senses.391 
Given this, Meillassoux’s claim of Kantianism as a form, or even the root, of
correlationism, could at first glance seem fit. As I said, it is nevertheless the nature
of the relativity which Meillassoux seems to misunderstand, or in some instances
simply disagree with. At times, one gets the impression that it is not quite clear
what Meillassoux claims is wrong in the Kantian picture, and what it is that
Meillassoux then wants to claim instead. On page seven of After Finitude
Meillassoux gives a hint of what he thinks is wrong or missing in the view he coins
correlationism: it is a wrong feeling. Here is how he says it's wrong:
on the one hand, correlationism readily insists upon the fact that 
consciousness, like language, enjoys an originary connection to a
radical exteriority (exemplified by phenomenological consciousness
transcending or as Sartre puts it ‘exploding’ towards the world); yet
on the other hand this insistence seems to dissimulate a strange
feeling of imprisonment or enclosure within this very exteriority
(the ‘transparent cage’). For we are well and truly imprisoned
within this outside proper to language and consciousness given that
we are always-already in it (the ‘always already’ accompanying the
‘co-’ of correlationism as its other essential locution), and given
390 For a thorough investigation on the nature of Kant's empirical realism, see Abela 2002.
391 A285/B341.
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that we have no access to any vantage point from whence we could
observe these ‘object-worlds’, which are the unsurpassable
providers of all exteriority, from the outside.
[…]
For it could be that contemporary philosophers have lost the great 
outdoors, the absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers: that outside
which was not relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to
its own givenness to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of
whether we are thinking of it or not; that outside which thought
could explore with the legitimate feeling of being on foreign
territory – of being entirely elsewhere.392 
Here Meillassoux’s aim seems rather obvious: he wants to return to pre-critical 
thinking, openly stating to favor cartesianism over Kantianism, thus raising the
same questions and debates that Kant himself, and his immediate followers, were
battling with.393 Indeed, Meillassoux states later that the aim is “to get out of
ourselves, to grasp the in-itself, to know what is whether we are or not.”394 I, again, 
think that Meillassoux is not correct in his interpretation of Kant as a correlationist
in his sense. To be sure, it gives me no pleasure to read that Meillassoux feels
trapped or caged within a domain of language and thought. I, however, do not feel
like this, and I believe I am not alone in this either. Rather, I believe that the
Kantian (transcendentally idealist, empirically realist) world view most definitely
leaves room for uncharted territory, some of it perhaps to remain uncharted
forever. But it also provides us the means of doing some of the charting in a very
well-grounded manner. In my view, Kant is not denying that we are in contact with 
reality itself, but he is modest enough to say that even the contact has conditions,
especially when we are talking of an objective contact with reality. Thus it is not
unfitting that e.g. Rae Langton has written of Kant’s critical philosophy and its
view concerning our knowledge of things in themselves as epistemic humility.395 
Another problem Meillassoux associates to correlationism, and as should now
be obvious, thus to Kant, has to do with Meillassoux’s notions of ancestral
392 Meillassoux 2008, 7.
393 Many speculative realists, however, also seem to criticize Descartes along with Kant.
394 Meillassoux 2008, 27.
395 Langton 2001.
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statements and arche-fossils. By the former he means statements or judgments
concerning objects and time prior to any human thought (or even any form of life),
that is, “anterior to every form of human relation to the world”.396 By arche-fossils 
he means “materials indicating the existence of an ancestral reality or event”.
Correlationism and Kant, he says, are in trouble in explaining ancestral statements
or arche-fossils. This is because Meillassoux seems to think of Kant as a sort of 
berkeleian without God, by which I mean that existence is to be perceived, and
there is no all-perceiving God, but only the empirical human perceiver-subjects.
Here Meillassoux is simply wrong with regard to Kant. Some forms of his so-called
correlationism may be in trouble, but if they are, they should be. The Kantian basic
view, however, is not. This is so because the rules or conditions for our thinking of
objects are in no way limited to objects that exist now, or during the thinking, or
even during the physical, or material, possibility of the thinking. It is simply not a
Kantian statement that dinosaurs couldn't have existed if there weren't minds of
men existing at the time of the dinosaurs. It is a Kantian statement to say that
dinosaurs existed, and we, now, are capable of knowing this. It is just that as we do,
there are certain conditions to our doing and being able to do so. As if anticipating
such accusations, Kant himself wrote: 
Accordingly, the objects of experience are never given in
themselves, but only in experience, and they do not exist at all
outside it. That there could be inhabitants of the moon, even 
though no human being has ever perceived them, must of course be 
admitted; but this means only that in the possible progress of 
experience we could encounter them; for everything is actual that
stands in one context with a perception in accordance with the 
laws of the empirical progression. Thus they are real when they
stand in an empirical connection with my real consciousness,
although they are not therefore real in themselves, i.e., outside this
progress of experience.397 
and
396 Meillassoux 2008, 10.
397 A492-3/B521.
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The real things of past time are given in the transcendental object
of experience, but for me they are objects and real in past time only
insofar as I represent to myself that, in accordance with empirical 
laws, or in other words, the course of the world, a regressive series
of possible perceptions (whether under the guidance of history or
in the footsteps of causes and effects) leads to a time-series that has 
elapsed as the condition of the present time, which is then
represented as real only in connection with a possible experience
and not in itself so that all those events which have elapsed from an
inconceivable past time prior to my own existence signify nothing
but the possibility of prolonging the chain of experience, starting
with the present perception, upward to the conditions that
determine it in time.398 
Thus, such things as past times or far distances present no problem at all to Kant’s
view of objectivity. Meillassoux however holds that correlationism basically always
means actual, spatiotemporal mind-dependency of existence (or dependency of
being on thought), which would mean that whenever (temporally) minds do not
exist, then nothing exists. This conclusion can luckily be avoided by Meillassoux by
positing that some things just basically exist regardless of who, whether and how
the things are thought of or experienced. These things are called primary qualities,
and mathematical sciences are able to form statements pertaining to them, that is to
say, can be true of them. Now, Meillassoux does, however, claim that a Kantian, or
correlationist, way to answer his supposed problem of ancestrality is possible, but
will always be one which includes a condition, that is, it will be of the form: “event
Y occurred x number of years before the emergence of humans – for humans”399. 
Now, this is for Meillassoux supposed to portray the problem, which is that
nothing is true in itself, or just bluntly true, but only in relation to something else.
At this point we start to see that the conflict of thought between Meillassoux and
Kant is probably too deep to overcome. It seems to me that Kant wanted to show
how objectivity requires rules or concepts of necessity and universality, which we
398 A495/B523.
399 Meillassoux 2008, 13.
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cannot abstract from the objects or from experience, but which we nevertheless
need for objective experience, whereas Meillassoux seems to want objectivity to
require nothing at all. Indeed, Meillassoux seems to claim that even the laws of
nature are contingent.400 In any case, Meillassoux’s perhaps most relevant claim to
this study is that Kant’s view in a way loses the object and defines objectivity only in
terms of intersubjectivity. He writes:
We said above that, since Kant, objectivity is no longer defined
with reference to the object in itself (in terms of the statement’s
adequation or resemblance to what it designates), but rather with
reference to the possible universality of an objective statement. It is 
the intersubjectivity of the ancestral statement – the fact that it 
should by right be verifiable by any member of the scientific
community – that guarantees its objectivity, and hence its
‘truth’.401 
I have shown in previous chapters that the meaning of objectivity, for Kant, does
include object-relatedness, and thus is actually defined with reference to the object.
The universality of an objective judgment does not mean only that a judgment is
such that it can be posited by anyone, but that it is about an object, thus an objective
judgment. Meillassoux’s insistence of referring to the object in itself of course
complicates the matter. However, I must contend that in the end Meillassoux
seems to seek a view according to which the existence of objects is in no way
dependent on any conditions. But this, taken with reference to things in
themselves, is the Kantian view. As I have shown, Kant assured in the Prolegomena
that his formal idealism in no way questions the existence of the objects, but only
posits their properties as relational. If the case, however, is such that what
Meillassoux seeks is properties of objects which exist regardless of any conditions or
relations, then the problem is unsolvable, and there simply is an absolutely essential
difference between his aim and that of Kant’s. Whether or not we take Kant to be
right in his claims or not, it is clear that they are not sufficiently, or at all,
recognized in most of the speculative realist discussions. Kant's aim was to show 
400 See Meillassoux 2008, 53.
401 Meillassoux 2008, 15.
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that objectivity requires universal and necessary a priori elements, namely the forms
of intuition and the categories, by which only can we achieve objective reference.
This claim is not dealt with properly at all in the speculative realist discourse
concerning only a proposed independence of the objects from the aforementioned
conditions. In my view, the discussion will lead nowhere unless Kant's claims are
taken seriously and, if chance will have it, even understood.
7.3 Bryant, Harman and the Mind-World Relation
I have already stated that I find the speculative realist critique of Kant to be based
on very little knowledge and understanding of Kant’s true claims and position.
Thus the so called critique is not even a proper critique but more of a
misunderstanding. Showing and explicating this is one of the aims of this chapter,
and an aim perhaps not too difficult to accomplish. With this in mind I observe a
few more claims about Kant by other speculative realists, if only in order to lay out
Kant’s view proper, rather than a straw man version of it, attacked by speculative
realists. In Graham Harman and Levi Bryant, we see Meillassoux’s claim of Kant’s
correlationism repeated, now in the form of the claim that Kant reduces
philosophy into a mere study of the relation of mind and world, thus neglecting
everything else, including the objects themselves.
One of the leading speculative realists, Graham Harman, writes that “what is
truly characteristic of Kant's position is that the human-world relation takes
priority over all others.”402 This sounds as if Kant was oblivious to what his own
project was. In Chapters 2 and 3 I have indeed shown that Kant very knowingly
stated that the doctrine called ontology should be replaced by the analytic of the
understanding.403 This does not mean that he eliminated the possibility for
objectivity, but on the contrary, that he wanted to eliminate the speculative claims
he thought to have no ground. Here, I should not and cannot repeat what I wrote
in the aforementioned chapters, but only note that in my view Kant had good
grounds for his claim.
402 Harman 2011, 45.
403 A247/B303.
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As opposed to the Kantian view, Harman writes the following about realism,
supposedly identifying his own philosophy along with other speculative realism
with it: “For the realist, the existence of objects outside the mind is as real as human 
experience itself.” Now, if this is supposed to be a critique of Kant, or an explication
of what is wrong in Kant’s or Kantian philosophy, we need only one passage from
Kant to surpass the critique: 
[…] what I called idealism did not concern the existence of things
(the doubting of which, however, properly constitutes idealism
according to the received meaning), for it never came into my mind 
to doubt that, but only the sensory representation of things, to 
which space and time above all belong […]404 
Here Kant explicitly states that his idealism is not such an idealism which makes
objects, and all of the world in fact, existentially dependent on subjects or minds.
His idealism in no way doubts the very existence of things. Rather, his idealism is 
formal idealism, in which it is the way of sensing, experiencing and cognizing
objects which is shown to be a condition of the properties of objects as objects of
experience. It is shown here that Harman’s critique does not even apply to Kant,
who clearly was not an idealist in the sought sense.
Levi Bryant has repeatedly expressed similar thoughts and what seems to be
the basic speculative critique and misconception of Kant. He writes: 
In beginning with the hypothesis that objects conform to mind
rather than mind to objects, Kant who genuinely sought a secure
grounding for knowledge and freedom from the endless debates of 
metaphysics, paradoxically rids us of the need to consult the world or
objects. For as Kant himself observes, this shift or inversion allows
us discern how it is possible for something to be given in advance. 
Yet if the world is given in advance, then there is no longer any
need to consult the world or objects. Rather, philosophy, at this
404 Kant, Prol. 4:293.
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point, becomes self-reflexive, interrogating not being or the world,
but interrogating rather the mind that regards the world.405 
This would of course be a troubling matter, were it really the case, but it is not.
With something “given in advance” Bryant refers to Kant’s notion of a priori, 
which, for sure, is a notion that was central for Kant, and does indeed have to do 
with “how it is possible for something to be given in advance”. These a priori
elements are first and foremost the forms of our intuition and the categories of
experience. This, however, in no way produces a state where “there is no longer any
need to consult the world or objects”. On the contrary, these formal a priori
elements are of absolutely no relevance without empirical use, that is, without the
experienced world and its objects. Thus Bryant totally misrepresents Kant’s view,
and what is more, seems also to contradict Meillassoux’s notion of correlation. This
is so because in Bryant’s view Kantian philosophy is only self-reflexive, and not even
concerned with the co-relation (or correlation) of the cognizer and the objects, as 
Meillassoux takes it to be.
I have tried to explicate in Chapter 2 what Kant saw to be wrong in the
empiricist account which did not properly acknowledge the role of a priori, and in
chapter 4 why Kant thought that we must have a priori concepts to be able to have 
experience and objective reference in the first place. Also, in chapter 5 I have tried
to show in what way our empirical senses and sensations are conditions of objective
reference. So, yes, Kant claims that there is and must be something that can be
known or given in advance, because the aforementioned forms and concepts are
universal and necessary conditions of all experience and its objects, the appearances.
Otherwise we would only have some sort of subjective representations, which, even
if caused or initiated by the objects, could have no proper objective reference. Thus
it is not the world that is given in advance, but the forms of sensibility and the most
general concepts and principles of the understanding, by which we can empirically
experience the world. This is why Kant held that the appearances, even though
transcendentally or formally ideal, are empirically real. 
405 Bryant 2010.
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7.4 Final Remarks
As I have said, I find the speculative realists’ critique of Kant essentially a
misunderstanding of Kant’s philosophy, the nature of which misunderstanding I
have briefly tried to sketch out here. Rather than considering Kant’s claims and
arguments, the speculative realists take Kant as an easy opponent, and write
hundreds of pages against this straw man, aiming only to show that Kant must have
been wrong, because the objects and their properties are really out there even
without us. It thus seems to be as Andrew Cole writes in his Call of Things: A
Critique of Object-Oriented Ontologies406 that in fact the new speculative realism
turns out to be a form of dogmatic realism, one of the very views Kant was heavily
criticizing. My suggestive view is that a more fruitful conversation could perhaps
follow if Kant’s philosophy was also in this context taken seriously, and serious
attempts were made on trying to understand it, as well as its aims and implications.
The speculative realists fail to answer Kant’s questions of how metaphysics is
possible and what makes objectivity and objective reference possible. In this
context, we may remember what Kant wrote in the Prolegomena: 
[…] whosoever undertakes to judge or indeed to construct a
metaphysics, must thoroughly satisfy the challenge made here, 
whether it happens that they accept my solution, or fundamentally 
reject it and replace it with another – for they cannot dismiss it
[…]407 
406 Cole 2013, 115.
407 Kant, Prol. 4:264.
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8 Conclusion
Over the course of this work, I have attempted to explicate the most general and 
relevant aspects and mechanisms of the notions of objectivity and objective
reference in the context of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and attempted to show
that Kant’s notion of objectivity is perfectly relevant today. I have also tried to show 
that Kant should not be taken to be primarily "a philosopher of the subject". That
said, his accounts of objectivity and subjectivity should be carefully studied in their
own context before relating them to that of ours. In the process, I believe to have
made some valuable observations and formulations about Kant’s notion of
objectivity, and about how it relates to the contemporary notion of objectivity. The
attempted generality may have cost me to overlook some details, which, however,
could be taken into account in following studies. I hope to not have missed any of 
the most relevant aspects, but I admit and urge that much more could be done still.
I have suggested that there is a need to clarify between differing uses of 
objective, but nevertheless the essence of the meaning, for Kant, always refers to
object-relatedness. In this sense, Kant seems to be among the originators, or
perhaps even the originator, of the modern concept of objectivity, obscure as it
might nowadays be. I suggest that also the essence of the contemporary meanings of
the notion of objectivity is related to being-about-objects. Impartiality and
unbiasedness can be taken to be possible derivatives of objectivity in the sense that
it is only possible to be impartial in, say, a judgment about milk in a glass, if that
judgment is universally and necessarily about the object, and not about the sensing
subjects or their feelings. For that reason, impartiality requires non-subjective
representation, that is, it requires objective representation. Kant might have
expressed this by saying that in this case the representation of milk and the
representation of the glass belong together in the object, and not only in the
subject.
I have proposed that in Kant’s context objectivity is basically a feature of a
specific kind of relation of representations to objects. So, those representations
which concern or refer to objects are objective. They are still not thereby necessarily
valid or true. A representation may be objectively valid only if it is objective in the
first place, that is, such that it relates to an object (in a universal and necessary 
manner). If not related to an object, representations as such are subjective. Thus, a 
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subjective judgment, a sensation or a feeling, is subjective because it does not claim
anything about the object, or properly refer to an object, but only to a feeling in the
subject, even if caused by something external, that is, an object. An objective 
judgment, on the other hand, claims something universal about our real, empirical
world and its objects. A sensation in itself cannot be objective as a representation,
but as a condition and part of our objective cognition, it is essential in establishing
objective reference.
As I have tried to show, if objectivity indeed is said to mean object-
relatedness, other questions immediately arise: what are these objects in relation to
which some representations are, and what does this relation consist in? Here we
find that in Kant’s account, these objects must in a sense be the same objects to 
everyone, as universality and necessity are properties of such a relation which may
be called objective. For Kant, the concept of objectivity does not entail truth, but 
rather it entails the very possibility of truth about objects, i.e., objective truth. This
is the result of a necessary agreement of the categories with the objects.408 Thereby
objectivity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for truth (about objects), that
is, for objective truth. The same applies to what Kant called objective validity.
Objectivity and objective validity are not strictly taken interchangeable notions, 
because the meaning of objectivity per se is not about truth or validity of judgments
as such, but about being related to and representing objects. A judgment can well be 
objective and still not valid objectively. In the case of the categories, however, the
‘objectivity’ and ‘objective validity’ of the concepts come close to expressing the
same relation or property.
The possibility of objectivity in general is intertwined with the possibility and
mechanism of objective reference, as initially posed in the letter to Herz as a
problem concerning the relation of representations to their objects, and what Kant
called “the ground” of that relation. My claim was and is that this ground Kant
found in the possibility of pure, objective representations, also called a priori
synthetic cognitions, and their unity in the original apperception. However, this
alone yields no objective cognition, but we also need sensibility through which the
objects can be given. I thus suggest that we may call the a priori cognitions 
transcendentally objective, as they are related to an object (x) via operating by the
universal and necessary rules of objectivity, but in the case of pure representations,
408 See B166-167.
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the object is ‘empty’, as it were. Furthermore, sensibility has a form of its own, for
which reason the origin of space and time is not the understanding. A proper
acknowledgement of the role of sensibility as the foundation of the a priori nature 
of spatiotemporality was in Kant's view severely lacking in rationalist ontology, and
metaphysics altogether, for which Kant heavily criticized it. To paraphrase how
Kant put it in A402, the subject cognizes the categories, and by their unity can
think and cognize the objects for the representations Kant calls appearances.409 
These appearances are sensible and thus subject to the form of sensibility/intuition,
spatiotemporality. Only through them can we have objective reference.
In the beginning chapters I outlined the most important philosophers and
traditions which Kant was both using and criticizing. After this I showed how
Kant’s transcendental idealism along with its notion of a priori forms of intuition
and a priori concepts of the understanding proved to be requirements for objective
reference. The key of objective reference lies in the necessary agreement of the 
categories to the objects of experience. However, these formal conditions are not 
the only conditions of proper, actual objective reference, as we also need to 
materialize the forms and concepts by both senses and language, which offer us
sensations and words for judgments. Thus I have argued that a more full list of the
conditions of objective reference in Kant’s case would consist of the purely formal
conditions of experience, that is, the forms of intuition and the categories as the
concepts of an object in general, and most of all the capacity to unite
representations in the act of apperception, and what I have called the material or
empirical conditions of objective reference, that is, our actual senses, as well as a
language by which we can materialize judgments.
To summarize: to cognize something is to categorially think about something
that is given sensibly to the understanding. To think about an object is to relate the
original unity of apperception categorially to an object, thus determining the
object. Thus cognizing is not the same as thinking, nor is it the same as sensing, but
it is the co-operation of the two. If we try to think of something completely
without sensibility, this action may have the form of thinking, that is, we may apply 
the categories and thus formally think of an object, but in this case the object would
be empty, as it were. This is the case with trying to cognize e.g. God or souls. This
does not mean that the concept of God or soul is completely meaningless, but
409 See Chapter 4.3.
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rather that we cannot sensibly be given anything to which we can apply the
concepts, and thus they remain empirically empty for us. In addition, as things in
themselves are just things in themselves, without any formal additions, such as
space, we cannot cognize them as such, and can only think of them by trying to
apply the concept of a transcendental object. Therefore the conditions of proper
objective reference include both formal and material elements as described in this
thesis.
For Kant, the notion of experience implies objectivity. By this I mean that not
all of our representations are objective, or have a necessary relation to an object, but
those that do are called cognitions, and they make up what we call experience. Thus
Kant can rightly claim that experience is where all cognition and knowledge begins
and continues. And thus the possible scope of experience equals the possible scope 
of our objective cognition. But Kant has shown that having experience is not a
simple matter of being passively affected by objects, but rather requires a sort of
activity from the subject of experience. Experience has a form (or, rather, forms)
which we can come to understand. This form, or better these forms, then, are
formal conditions of the experience. But they are then also formal conditions – or, 
formal causes – of the cognized objects, as these objects can only be found in
experience.
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This study analyzes and lays out di˜erent aspects of Kant s account of 
the concept of objectivity and objective reference in the broad view, 
as well as their conditions, to show the relevance of Kant s view to 
contemporary philosophy, and to answer some of the criticisms 
expressed toward Kant, which criticisms often seem to be based on 
misguided readings of his doctrines. The study shows that Kant s 
philosophy is not – contrary to what is often claimed – overly subjec 
tivistic with the expense of losing objectivity. Rather, his theory of 
objectivity and objective reference is both coherent and relevant as a 
philosophical theory today. Furthermore, Kant's account of objectivi 
ty, as well as subjectivity, is essential in understanding the origin and 
meaning of the modern concept of objectivity, which concept is 
crucial to science in general. 
This work hopefully contributes ÿrst of all to the study of Kant's 
theoretical philosophy. In addition, the work is related to such ÿelds as 
philosophy of science and conceptual history, because of the histori 
cal role of the concept of objectivity. Furthermore, the study may 
prove relevant to discussions in philosophy of language, and ÿnally 
the discussion concerning the interpretation of Kant's philosophy 
among the contemporary speculative realists. 
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